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 This paper argues, first, that, while philosophical treatments of friendship in the 
western tradition have typically taken Aristotle's account of virtue friendship as their 
starting point, we can already find, in Plato's Phaedrus, an account of friendship which 
comes close enough to Aristotle's in its most philosophically interesting features to be 
meaningfully called a virtue friendship, but with some intriguing differences, and that a 
close examination of this earlier account of Plato's has insights to offer us about both the 
moral significance of friendships of this kind, and, potentially, Plato's own philosophy.  It 
then argues that another, perhaps even more overlooked, account of virtue friendship can 
be found in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, offering us a picture of the moral significance 
that this kind of friendship can have across very different ethical systems, and also, 
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Searching for Virtue Friendship 
 Most of us will be familiar, if we have an interest in the philosophy of friendship, 
with Aristotle's account of virtue friendship, or character friendship, in the Nicomachean 
and Eudemian Ethics, as the best kind of friendship between good people.  This is an 
account which presents the best kind of friendship not only as intrinsically valuable, itself 
constituting a good and perhaps even a virtue, but also as immensely instrumentally 
valuable, to both of the friends, providing them not only with pleasure, but with a 
uniquely powerful asset to their practice and development of virtue.  Though this account 
has been almost as widely criticized as it has been celebrated, much of the work on 
friendship in the western philosophical tradition has been either explicitly or implicitly 
guided by this understanding of friendship since Aristotle's own time.  And there is good 
reason for this.  There is something about the broad features of this account of friendship 
which strikes us immediately as appealing or plausible.  It seems, to many of us, despite 
the problems scholars have long raised for the account, that Aristotle has managed to get 
something here importantly right, at least about one kind of friendship to which we might 
have reason to aspire.  And, while many of the failings of the account might prove to be 
specifically Aristotle's own, many of its virtues seem, quite plausibly, to be ones which 
can have meaningful application far beyond a specifically Aristotelian context, in a 
broader understanding of the value of friendship, across a wide range of different ethical 
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systems.  Since much of what is philosophically intriguing about the account, however, 
concerns its claims about the relationship between friendship and virtue, to examine the 
merits of this kind of account outside the context of a theory of virtue seems to lose 
something important.  It seems potentially instructive, then, to look for how such an 
account of friendship, as virtue friendship, might find a home within the context of other 
prominent theories of virtue, as a start to the search for how it might find a home in our 
own understanding of a virtuous life. 
 In this paper I have set out, then, instead of looking again at Aristotle's own, much 
examined, account, to draw out what I take to be two alternative accounts of something 
still recognizable in all its most important features as virtue friendship, from the works of 
two other major theorists of virtue in the western philosophical tradition, Plato and Kant.  
Plato's account is of particular interest insofar as, if I am right that it comes to an account 
of virtue friendship, it predates Aristotle's own, much more recognized, development of 
these influential ideas.  Kant's, while much later, and clearly much influenced by the 
philosophical tradition built upon Aristotle's account, is intriguing as a development of 
these same ideas within the context of what would, at least initially, appear to us to be a 
drastically different conception of virtue from either Plato's or Aristotle's own.  And both 
of these accounts of virtue friendship, if I am correct that this is what they are, are ones 
which have been widely neglected.  By neglecting them in this way, I believe, we have 
passed over the insights they might offer us not only into virtue friendship, but into the 
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two theories of virtue, more broadly, within which they are embedded, and this is an 
omission that deserves redressing.   
 The contrasts and commonalities between these two accounts of virtue friendship 
in particular, moreover, and between these two accounts and the much better known 
Aristotelian account to which we can compare them, serve to emphasize and help us to 
explore and illuminate how we might best understand two of the most intriguing ways in 
which it seems that virtue friendship can be instrumentally valuable, or beneficial, to the 
friends, across a wide range of conceptions of virtue and ethical theories.  The first of 
these is the way in which this particular sort of relationship, with its combination of 
mutual love and respect with a deep mutual understanding and psychological intimacy, 
secure and justified trust, affinity of character, and shared moral convictions or values, 
might help us to acquire and refine our knowledge of ourselves, and, through this sort of 
knowledge of ourselves, to better pursue and practice virtue.  This theme of self-
knowledge within both accounts raises interesting questions about how our knowledge of 
ourselves is related both to our knowledge of others and their knowledge of us, and of 
how such knowledge relates not only to virtue directly, but to knowledge of virtue.  This 
in turn points us towards the ways in which the same sorts of qualities within a friendship 
which might help us to come to better know our friends and ourselves might also help us 
to come to better know and understand virtue more abstractly, and what virtue might 
involve or require for someone like us.  And this points us towards the second theme 
which these two accounts share with respect to the instrumental value of such 
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friendships: the ways in which such friendships might broaden the scope of our practice 
of virtue more directly, independently of their contributions to self-knowledge, both by 
providing us with new ways and opportunities to act virtuously, and by enhancing our 
ability to practice virtue successfully through collaborative action and the shared pursuit 
of joint activities and projects.   
 These two accounts seem to share, moreover, the intimation of a possible 
response to the worry that has often been raised in an Aristotelian context, that by valuing 
such instrumental contributions to our well-being, whether moral or otherwise, that such 
friendships might make, and valuing such friendships for these benefits they offers us, we 
somehow fail to adequately value the friend, or his well-being or happiness, for his 'own 
sake' in the way that we should, and thus fail to truly love, or adequately respect and 
value him as a person.  Both Kant and Plato, it seems, have readily available to them the 
response that there is no immediate conflict between valuing someone for themselves, or 
their intrinsic qualities, or valuing their happiness or well-being 'for its own sake,' or for 
theirs, and valuing them also instrumentally, for the benefits they offer us.  Plato would 
say, perhaps, that that which is valuable both for what it is and for what it produces is 
more valuable to us, not less, than that which is valuable only for itself or as an end, 
while Kant would say that there are both permissible and impermissible ways of treating 
that which must be valued as an end in itself also as a means, and only when the latter is 
allowed to interfere with the former has one generated a conflict.  So long as we do not 
allow the value that we place upon the friendship's benefits to us to take precedence over 
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the value which we place upon the friend and his own well-being and happiness, it seems, 
then, both of these accounts direct us towards a way in which this worry about virtue 
friendships might be dissolved.   
 Through examining more closely these two widely neglected accounts of virtue 
friendship then, I hoped to find some insight into the nature of virtue friendship as a 
broader phenomenon, beyond the specific context of an Aristotelian ethics, and also, 
perhaps, along the way, into some of the less recognized features of the specific theories 
of virtue presented by Plato in his Phaedrus and Kant in The Metaphysics of Morals.  I 
hoped to explore, moreover, through the comparison and counterposition of these two 
accounts, the themes of self-knowledge, and knowledge of virtue, and the relationship not 
only between these two, but between each of them and our knowledge of others, and their 
knowledge of us.  Furthermore, I hoped to explore the links between all of these many 
types of knowledge and the active pursuit, and practice, of virtue.  I can only hope that 
some part of this has been accomplished in the paper as it has actually come to exist, and 
that, if it has not, you may still, as a reader, find something worthwhile to yourself in 
exploring these two accounts of virtue friendship with me.  I have certainly learned a very 
great deal in exploring them myself. 
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A Prayer For Me As Well:  
Friendship and Philosophy in Plato’s Phaedrus  1
 A version of this chapter was previously published as my Master's Report for the University of Texas at 1
Austin, in 2014, under the title "A Prayer for Me As Well: Friendship and Philosophy in Plato's Phaedrus": 
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/26365
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Introduction: The Philosophy of Friendship in Plato 
Discussions of the philosophy of friendship almost always begin with Aristotle.   
Whether they intend to agree with him or not, most philosophers writing on friendship 
feel the need to take Aristotle’s theory into account, as the first fully articulated theory of 
friendship in the western tradition, and to orient their own positions relative to his.  Very 
few philosophers of friendship, however, feel obliged to address Plato’s views.  Those 
who do seem quite comfortable dismissing his theory of friendship as a half-formed 
subsidiary to his theory of erotic love, articulated poorly and with little commitment in 
the aporetic Lysis, and largely irrelevant to his vision of philosophy and of the good life 
on the whole.   I would like to argue that this perception of Plato is wrong.  While Plato’s 2
views on friendship, or philia, are almost invariably found embedded in discussions of 
erotic love, I would nevertheless like to argue that these views constitute a clear and 
compelling picture of the value of friendship, of the best sort, in both our ordinary and 
philosophical lives.  Moreover, I would like to suggest that these views of friendship 
present us with a somewhat surprising insight into Plato’s overall conception of the 
practice of philosophy, as a personal process of striving for knowledge at the center of the 
best human life.  
 See, e.g. Julia Annas. “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism.” Mind, New Series, 86. 344 (Oct. 2
1977): 532-554.  Hereafter, ‘Annas.’   
 Annas does argue, however, and many seem to accept, that the aporetic ‘problems’ posed by Plato 
in the Lysis provide an important context for Aristotle’s later account; See e.g. Jennifer Whiting. “The 
Nicomachean Account of Philia.” The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Ed. Richard 
Kraut. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.) 276-304.  Hereafter, ‘Whiting.’
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 In trying to tease out these views on philia, I would like to begin with a close 
reading of Plato’s Phaedrus.  As many have noted, this dialogue appears at first glance to 
be strangely disunified: its first half is concerned primarily with giving an account of 
erotic love, while its second half is devoted almost entirely to a discussion of the nature 
and value of rhetoric.  I would like to begin by examining the theory of erotic love 
presented by Socrates in the ‘palinode’ at the center of the Phaedrus, and arguing that we 
can begin to see a theory of philia emerging from this account.  I would then like to argue 
that a central element of this theory of philia, as presented in the palinode to love, 
provides us with a link to the later discussion of rhetoric, and a unifying theme for the 
Phaedrus as a whole, namely, the knowledge of souls.  With this unifying theme in hand, 
we can then turn back to the account of philia and eros in the first half of the Phaedrus 
and, in light of this topic, draw further conclusions about Plato’s views of the importance 
of philia, and eros, to philosophy. 
I. Love and the Nature of the Soul 
 Socrates’ palinode to love in the Phaedrus begins rather strangely with a defense 
of madness.  Eros has been accused, in the preceding speeches criticizing love, of being a 
kind of madness, a madness which makes its victims lose their self-control and grip on 
reason, forgetting their own best interests and behaving erratically, even violently, 
towards both their beloved and others.  Rather than rejecting this criticism outright, 
Socrates concedes that love is a kind of madness, but maintains that the important 
question is not this, but rather what kind of madness it is.  While some kinds of madness 
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are admittedly harmful, he argues, others can be extremely beneficial, and even “god-
sent.”   Such beneficial kinds of madness, like prophetic trances and poetic inspiration, 3
enable those whom they have “driven out of their minds”  to achieve things far beyond 4
what they are capable of when sane or “in control of themselves.”   That love is a kind of 5
madness, then, will stand as a meaningful criticism only if it isn’t a madness of such a 
beneficial kind.  Socrates thus proposes to argue that love is a beneficial madness of just 
this sort.  Love, he maintains, though it is a kind of madness, is a ‘divine’ kind of 
madness “sent by the gods as a benefit to a lover and his boy,”  and to all of us “to ensure 6
our greatest good fortune.”   7
 Already here, then, we are beginning to see what looks like a departure from the 
most familiar reading of the ‘ascent of love’ as outlined by Diotima in Plato’s 
Symposium.  To defend love we must not only show that it is of great benefit to the lover, 
but, apparently, that it is of equally great benefit to the beloved.  Diotima’s account in the 
Symposium provides us with only the faintest of hints of how such a defense might be 
accomplished.  In the palinode, however, to give such a defense is Socrates’ stated aim.  
And the picture of eros which he paints for us here begins not with a depiction of what 
the lover hopes to gain from his relationship with the beloved, as Diotima’s account 
 Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. 3






arguably does,  but with an abstract account of the nature of the human soul.  Having 8
outlined several ways in which a madness can be “god-sent”  and beneficial, and declared 9
his intention to defend love in this way, Socrates turns abruptly to a theory of the nature 
of the soul.  If we are to defend love as a kind of divine and beneficial madness, he 
maintains, “we must first understand the truth about the nature of the soul, divine or 
human.... Here begins the proof.”   But why should an account of the nature of the soul 10
play such a central role in our our defense of love?  It seems that a significant part of 
Socrates’ answer will ultimately be that such an understanding of the nature of our souls 
is among the greatest benefits which love has to offer us, both in the role of lover and in 
the role of beloved.  The benefits love offers to each party to an erotic relationship, then, 
are not differentiated in the way one might expect in traditional Greek homosexual 
practice, with the lover receiving certain benefits in exchange for very different benefits 
he offers the beloved.  Rather, the beloved and the lover both benefit from the 
relationship in what is essentially the same way, although the historical development of 
the relationship is somewhat different for the beloved than the lover.  Nevertheless, if the 
benefit to be expected by the beloved is the same as that accruing to the lover, then the 
claim that such a relationship provides the greatest benefit to both parties becomes much 
more straightforward to defend.  
 Plato. Symposium. Trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. 8




 But to say all of this gets ahead of our argument.  To establish these points, we 
need first to examine the account Socrates offers of the nature of the soul.  The soul, first 
of all, is immortal.   As such, it pre-exists our birth into this world, in an un-embodied 11
form.  To accurately describe the nature of this un-embodied soul, however, would be 
nearly impossible, “a task for a god in every way,”  and so, Socrates suggests, we should 12
attempt instead only to “say what it is like,”  and illuminate its nature by analogy, since 13
to do this “is humanly possible, and takes less time.”   The account that he offers us, 14
then, is an elaborate analogical myth, depicting the nature not only of the human soul, but 
of “all soul,”  godly, human, and otherwise.  Every soul, he argues, is like a chariot-15
team, composed of a charioteer and two horses, which are naturally and inseparably 
bound together into a single being, and held aloft in heaven by wings which spring from 
“every part” of it.   The souls of the gods and of all other beings share this basic 16
structure, and the central difference between the souls of the gods and those of other 
beings is in the natural character of the horses which the charioteer drives.  In the souls of 
the gods both horses are naturally good and well-behaved, obedient to their charioteer 
and well-matched to one another.  In the souls of other beings, however, only one of the 






 Phaedrus 246a5-6 & 251b7-8.16
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to disobey the charioteer and undermine the efforts of its teammate.  It follows that while 
the souls of the gods move themselves through heaven with a natural ease and precision, 
“chariot-driving in our case is inevitably a painful and difficult business,”  even in this 17
un-embodied form.  Our un-embodied souls are nevertheless able to travel with the gods 
through the universe in an orderly procession, helping them to oversee the workings of 
the inanimate world.   As each god has his own place in this heavenly procession, so 18
does each soul, following in the ranks arrayed under the command of one of the gods as 
he tends to those parts of the universe which are his special concern.  These un-embodied 
souls, both gods and otherwise, take their nourishment from the contemplation of what 
lies beyond the heavens which they oversee: the eternal and unchanging reality of “being 
that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge.”   Their sustenance, then, is the 19
knowledge they gain from this vision of true reality, which can only be taken in by 
“intelligence, the soul’s steersman,”  that is, by the chariot driver.  The divine procession 20
of souls travels regularly up to the edge of the heavens to engage in this “banquet”  of 21
knowledge, and “when the soul has seen all the things that are as they are and feasted on 
them, it sinks back inside heaven and goes home.”  22
 Phaedrus 246b4-5.17






 However, this journey to the edge of heaven to feast on knowledge is a very 
different undertaking for the gods than for the souls of other sorts of beings, who are 
hindered in all of their motions by the unruliness of their bad horse.  The way up to the 
edge of heaven is a steep and difficult incline, and while the gods navigate this challenge 
easily, with their skillful charioteers and disciplined horses, the rest of the souls struggle 
badly to reach the top and be able to see the real beings.  The most successful souls, who 
have managed to make themselves most like the gods, are able to follow them close to 
the rim of heaven, and peer over the edge to see all of the real things beyond.  In doing 
this, however, they are constantly distracted by the effort required to keep their horses 
under control, and so the view that they have is less perfect than that achieved by the 
gods.  Other souls rise up and sink down erratically as their horses pull in different 
directions, affording brief views of only some of the real things passing by.   Still others 23
are unable to reach the edge at all, struggling violently with themselves and others in a 
chaotic scramble to climb higher, but ultimately having to return to heaven unnourished 
by reality, and sustained only by “their own opinions.”   Since the wings of the soul are 24
nourished by the “plain where truth stands,”  those who fail to reach the top fail to 25
nourish their wings, and “many souls are crippled by the incompetence of the drivers, and 
many wings break much of their plumage”  in the unsuccessful struggle to climb up.  In 26
 The real things do not themselves move, rather, the rim of heaven spins, carrying the gods and successful 23





this weakened state, the souls which return to heaven without having fed on reality are 
left vulnerable, and if any one of them “by some accident takes on a burden of 
forgetfulness and wrongdoing, then it is weighed down, sheds its wings, and falls to 
earth.”   Each soul in its first life is born into the body of a human being, with the souls 27
who have seen more of reality born into those with better natural dispositions, while 
those who have seen less are born into those with less desirable natural characters.  A soul 
who has seen the most will be born into someone disposed to become “a lover of wisdom 
or of beauty, or who will be cultivated in the arts and prone to erotic love,”  while a soul 28
who has seen the least will be born into someone with the disposition of a tyrant.   But 29
all such human souls will at some point have seen something of the truth outside heaven, 
“since a human being must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding to 
bring many perceptions together into a reasoned unity,”  and we gain this ability only 30
through “the recollection of the things our soul saw when it was traveling with god.”  31
 All of our souls, then, have a natural desire to return to their original place in 
heaven, traveling with the gods.  But to do so is extremely difficult.  At the end of its 
mortal life, each soul is judged for its behavior while embodied, and receives rewards or 
punishments in the afterlife accordingly.  But it is not able to return to its place with the 







long time, at least ten lifetimes, or ten-thousand years.  After a thousand years in the 
afterlife, each soul chooses another life to be born into on earth, and here each has a 
chance to change who it will be.  The souls which had originally been born into one type 
of human being may choose to be born into a better or worse type, or even to be born into 
a non-human animal, if they prefer that sort of life to a human one.  With each passing 
lifetime, then, each soul has a chance to better or worsen its condition, both in terms of 
the quality of the character with which it is born, and the choices it goes on to make 
during its lifetime. 
 And one of the most crucial of these choices, Plato argues, is the way in which we 
choose to respond to love, that is, to eros.  Eros, he explains is that “kind of madness... 
which someone shows when he sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded of 
true beauty...”  32
 ...then he takes wing and flutters in his eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so, and he gazes  
 aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below – and that is what brings on him the  
 charge that he has gone mad.  This is the best and noblest of all the forms that possession by god  
 can take for anyone who has it or is connected to it, and when someone who loves beautiful boys  
 is touched by this madness he is called a lover.  33
Notice, then, that this description of eros does not seem to be restricted to those ‘who 
love beautiful boys,’ rather, the love of beautiful boys is plausibly interpreted as only one 
kind of such eros, that is, the kind with which we are most concerned here.  This 
description of eros, then, seems entirely compatible with the many instances in which 




philosophy, and many other things.   However, the focus in the palinode is not on eros in 34
this general sense, but rather that specific sort of eros which is directed toward persons.  
Furthermore, beauty itself is not the object of this kind of eros, but rather the spark, so to 
speak, which touches it off.   
II. The Lover Falls in Love 
 The process of falling in love, Plato argues, begins with the violent awe inspired 
in us by an encounter with physical beauty, but this is only the beginning of such eros, 
and a love which never moved beyond this stage would be a relatively shallow and 
unfruitful one.  The objects which all human souls most naturally admire, he argues, are 
those perfectly real beings which all of us encountered at some time before our births.  
We must all remember these perfect beings to some extent or another, insofar as we are 
capable of understanding language.   Our recollection of these beings, however, is 35
obscure and imperfect, and many of us have no conscious awareness of this recollection 
at all.  Some of us, moreover, are less able to recollect these perfect beings than others, 
depending upon the experiences which our souls have had in the time before our births 
and since.  Those who have seen more of reality, and who have done more to preserve 
their memories of what they did see, are better able to recall the nature of these perfect 
beings, recollecting them with both greater ease and greater clarity.   Some people, then, 36
 See, e.g., Plato. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C Reeve. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. 34
Cooper. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) VI.490a7-b9, VI.499b4-c2, & VI.501d1.  Hereafter ‘Republic’;  
Plato. Gorgias. Trans. Donald J. Zeyl. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1997) 481d2-6;  Symposium 210d1-211d1.
 See above, p. 14.35
 Phaedrus 249e4-250a6.36
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are easily reminded of these perfect beings by an encounter with “their images down 
here,”  while others are extremely difficult to move towards such a recollection.  Beauty, 37
however, enjoys a special status as a potential object of such recollection.  The 
“likenesses”  which we encounter here on earth of the majority of perfect beings, such as 38
wisdom  or justice, are not directly observable through our physical senses, but must to 39
some extent be inferred from that which we immediately perceive.   The ‘likenesses’ of 40
beauty, on the other hand, can be directly perceived through our senses, and, moreover, 
through “the clearest of our senses,”  our sight.  Unlike those things which might remind 41
us of the other perfect beings, then, which require some careful attention and work to 
make out, a perception of beauty in the things ‘down here’ can come upon us 
unexpectedly, when we have not at all set out to look for it.   
 When some among the human souls ‘down here,’ then, in the course of their 
embodied human lives, are suddenly confronted with beauty in this way, taken off guard 
by an encounter with something which more closely resembles its perfect counterpart 
than any other thing which they are able to directly perceive, they are “startled,”  and 42








cannot fully grasp what they are seeing.”   Then, as they attempt to make sense of what 43
they are feeling, the course of the eros this encounter has sparked in them may turn 
several different ways, depending upon how they come to understand and respond to it.  
Someone who has forgotten much of the real things he saw, or who has obscured his 
memories of them even further through a life of vice, “is not to be moved abruptly from 
here to a vision of Beauty itself when he sees what we call beauty here,”  and so he is 44
likely to interpret this powerful experience only as a physical lust or desire.  Such a 
person consequently “surrenders to pleasure and sets out in the manner of a four-footed 
beast,”  pursuing sex without further reflection upon what has happened to him.  45
Someone who is closer to his memories of true beauty, on the other hand, is struck by a 
mysterious “reverence”  for the possessor of this earthly beauty, as the experience 46
reminds him of the things that he “felt at an earlier time,”  in the presence of Beauty 47
itself.  In the presence of this earthly reflection of beauty, the long-dormant roots of the 
wings of his soul begin to be nurtured again, as they were by the vision of true beauty in 
heaven, and “the soul seethes and throbs in this condition.... like a child whose teeth are 
just starting to grow in,”  as it begins to regain its wings.  The only relief for this pain is 48








nourishes the newly sprouting wings of the soul and eases the discomfort of their growth, 
replacing the maddening frustration of their struggle to grow with pleasure and joy at the 
soul’s revitalization.  And so this second sort of lover is desperate to remain near the 
object of his eros, but is still unsure of what it is that moves him to this desperation, and 
“this is the experience we humans call love.”  49
 But an eros which stopped here would still be one which brought little benefit, to 
either the lover or beloved.  Though this unreflective experience of beauty is enough to 
begin the re-growth of the soul’s wings, if the progress of the lover’s eros went no further 
than this, then his soul would remain in this desperate and frustrated state, confused as to 
how its sudden need could be satisfied.  As such a lover’s eros draws him closer to the 
possessor of this beauty, however, while the soul’s bad horse advocates that he interpret 
his need only as a desire for sex, he is “struck by the boy’s face, as if by a bolt of 
lightning,”  and “when the charioteer sees that face, his memory is carried back to the 50
real nature of Beauty, and he sees it again where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to 
Self-control.”   Awe-struck by this recollection of the perfect beings, the soul pulls up 51
short in its pursuit of the beloved, restraining its bad horse in the realization that physical 
gratification is not the only thing it really wants.  The lover now understands, instead, that 
his desire to be close to his beloved is caused by the way his beloved reminds him of the 





again the way that he once felt in the presence of those perfect beings, when he was still 
“pure”  and “free of all troubles...and...gazed in rapture at sacred revealed objects that 52
were perfect, and simple, and unshakable and blissful.”   Understanding his eros in this 53
context, as a need which draws him closer to the ‘sacred’ world and self which he has 
lost, he is able to resist the pull of the bad horse to convert this desire into a simple 
physical lust, and to bring the bad horse gradually under control, fighting against its 
influence and teaching it the discipline to follow the commands of the charioteer.  
Eventually, when the bad horse in the soul “stops being so insolent”  in the face of the 54
lover’s resistance to its impulses, and “is humble enough to follow the charioteer’s 
warnings,”  the lover is able to guide his soul’s response to eros in the way that he now 55
understands to be most appropriate to the cause of these powerful feelings in himself, and 
“now at last the lover’s soul follows its boy in reverence and awe,”  without 56
discomforted confusion, or dissension from the bad horse in the soul. 
 At this point, then, one might still plausibly interpret the object of this eros not as 
the beloved himself, but the beauty and perfection which the lover is reminded of by him.  
This changes, however, as the violent attraction which the lover has felt towards the 
beloved evolves from a unidirectional desire into a continuing relationship between the 







one imagines, strike a lover in the presence of any physically beautiful person, physical 
beauty alone will not be enough to sustain his desire to be near his beloved over time, 
once he has achieved this insight into what has caused his response to that beauty.  
Though one might experience an intense desire of this sort for anyone beautiful, one does 
not necessarily come to love, in any more robust and lasting sense, any or every such 
person, and something beyond physical beauty alone must explain why this is.  And this 
is because, Plato argues, “everyone chooses his love after his own fashion from among 
those who are beautiful,”  and this choice is not made on the basis of the beloved’s 57
physical beauty, but on that of his character.   
 Although we have been focusing so far primarily upon the differences in character 
which result from the different experiences which each soul has had, and the different 
choices it has made, both before and after its birth, we should remember that Plato’s 
analogical myth picks out two distinct ways in which human souls might be differentiated 
into broad character types, and these two divisions run largely orthogonal to one another.  
One such division is in terms of the soul’s success in achieving a vision of the real beings 
outside of heaven, and in preserving its memories of what it has seen once it has been 
born into a life on earth.  Where a given soul falls within this division may, Plato argues 
explicitly, change over time, as each soul chooses how to live its life, and what sort of life 
to be reborn to, gradually eroding or shoring up the memories it has of the truth.  The 
other division, however, has to do with an aspect of each soul which does not change 
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after its birth into life here on earth: the particular god which that soul had attended in its 
travels through heaven before it was born.  Recall that those souls who were most 
successful in achieving a vision of the real beings outside heaven were those who were 
able to make themselves most like the gods, emulating most perfectly the god whom they 
followed.  A soul who will be born into the world with the best sort of character, then, 
that of ‘a lover of wisdom or of beauty’ or of an individual ‘cultivated in the arts’ or 
‘prone to erotic love,’ will be “one that follows a god most closely, making itself most 
like that god”  during the time before its birth.  But which god such a soul emulates in 58
order to make itself most perfect will depend upon which god it follows in the heavenly 
procession.  The path to its greatest perfection, then, may vary from soul to soul, 
depending upon which god each soul naturally follows, insofar as the division according 
to quality of character is made within the set of souls attendant upon each god, according 
to their success in emulating that god, rather than according to which god each soul 
attends.  And this second sort of division among souls, Plato argues, will persist into our 
lives here on earth, at least insofar as our own forgetfulness and misguided choices fail to 
obscure it, so that “everyone spends his life honoring the god in whose chorus he danced, 
and emulates that god in every way he can, so long as he remains undefiled.”  59
 When a lover turns from the immediate disorientation of an encounter with 




those who possess such beauty, it is this second aspect of character which he turns his 
attention to in those around him.  He searches, specifically, for a beloved whose character 
is like his own in terms of the god he once followed, that is, whose basic and unchanging 
character type is like his own, aside from its achievements in recalling the truth.  He 
seeks out for his beloved, then, not the most accomplished soul, but a soul which displays 
the potential to develop itself in the way that he personally most admires, and to achieve 
that particular sort of greatest perfection after which he strives for himself.  A ‘Zeus type’ 
soul, for example, as it strives to make itself more like Zeus, will also “choose someone 
to love who is a Zeus himself in the nobility of his soul,”  someone who “has a talent for 60
philosophy and the guidance of others,”  and likewise for the souls who followed any of 61
the other gods: “they take their god’s path and seek for their own a boy whose nature is 
like the god’s.”   This nature, however, need only be a ‘talent’ or a disposition in the 62
beloved, not yet a fully realized ability or virtue.  The lover searches for a beloved who 
has the capacity to become the sort of man whom he himself most hopes to be, whether 
either of them have achieved much with respect to this goal yet or not.  And since it is the 
natural hope of each soul to emulate its own god as perfectly as possible, and a beloved 
with such a disposition will himself be a soul who followed the same god as the lover, the 





beloved who shares the same aspirations, whether the beloved is yet aware of these 
aspirations in himself or not. 
 And once he has found such a beloved, the lover’s driving aim is “to help him 
take on as much of their own god’s qualities as possible,”  at least “so far as a human 63
being can share a god’s life.”   And so, “once they have found him and are in love with 64
him they do everything to develop that talent”  which first drew them to him in their 65
search for a beloved.  In order to do this, however, to help the beloved progress towards 
the realization of his potential to emulate their shared god, the lover himself must develop 
a better understanding of that god’s true nature, and of his own, and his beloved’s, natures 
and standings with respect to that god.  He cannot effectively assist his beloved in 
achieving their shared goal, that is, without a working knowledge of what that goal is, 
and of how human beings like themselves might go about achieving it.  And so, “if any 
lovers have not yet embarked on this practice,” presumably, of deliberately seeking to 
emulate their god, “then they start to learn, using any source they can and also making 
progress on their own.”   And the lover’s ability to do this, to seek out a greater 66
understanding of his god and himself with respect to that god, has been greatly 
augmented by his experience of love.  Such lovers “are well equipped to track down their 






god, and as they are in touch with the god by memory they are inspired by him and adopt 
his customs and practices.... For all of this they know they have the boy to thank, and so 
they love him all the more.”  67
III. How Love Transforms the Lover 
 What, then, should we take to have happened to the lover in the course of this 
process of falling in love, as Plato has described it to us here?  And how is it that the eros 
which he feels for his beloved has put him in a position to more effectively pursue his 
individual project of living a life as much as possible like that of his god, of reshaping his 
own soul in the image of the god whom he follows?  The changes which Plato describes 
as taking place in the lover under the influence of love look at least partially 
epistemological, and partially motivational.  Before this experience, it seems, the lover 
may well be entirely unaware of his recollections of the perfect beings and the 
experiences of his soul before his birth.  The sudden confrontation with physical beauty, 
however, breaks his complacency in accepting the world around him as the one which is 
most certainly real, and about which he can most reliably know.  In the course of his 
ordinary life, he has found himself confronted with a reaction in his soul which his 
knowledge of the everyday world cannot adequately explain.  He is ultimately forced, 
then, if he has the self-awareness and perspective to recognize this reaction as something 
more than what can be accounted for completely by his animal needs, to look for an 
explanation of this power which beauty has over him in something beyond his 
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experiences thus far in this world.  He is forced to turn to a recollection of the true nature 
of Beauty in order to understand the disproportionate effect which the beauty in this 
world has had on him, if he is to escape the tortured confusion into which this experience 
has thrown his soul.  And once he has been forced to confront his recollection of one of 
the perfect beings, he is no longer able to ignore such recollection, or to take it for 
granted, as he once did.  When his mind is cast back, almost involuntarily, to his vision of 
true Beauty by the shock of proximity to the beauty which he has encountered here, he is 
also put in mind of the context in which he experienced this Beauty, of the other perfect 
beings which stood alongside it outside of heaven,  and of the state of his own soul as it 68
was when he first experienced this vision.  He experiences this vision of Beauty, and the 
intimation, at least, of some of its context, as something like a revelation, from which he 
cannot simply turn back to his previous way of life.    
 Having experienced this revelation of Beauty, however, what is it that moves the 
lover from his fascination with the physical beauty of the body which has caused this 
reaction, to the search for a beloved with a certain type of soul?  Plato does not address 
this transition explicitly here in the Phaedrus, but we may imagine, from what he has said 
elsewhere, how this transformation in the focus of the lover’s eros, from the physical to 
the spiritual or psychological, is meant to take place.  True Beauty, Plato has argued 
elsewhere, is not best approximated in this world by the physical.  Physical beauty is the 
most efficacious trigger for our recollection of true Beauty, because it is that aspect of 
 Such as “Self-control,” explicitly (Phaedrus 254b6-8).68
!26
beauty which is most easily accessible to us in this world, as something which can be 
directly perceived through the senses, without the assistance of a previously well-
developed understanding of what beauty is.  But once the lover has experienced his 
revelatory recollection of the true nature of beauty, he will realize that Beauty is 
approximated far more closely by “a soul that is beautiful and noble and well formed”  69
than it can be by anything physical, and that “the beauty of people’s souls is more 
valuable than the beauty of their bodies.”   Once he has realized this, the physical beauty 70
of a human body will no longer be enough to satisfy his newfound need to be near that 
which is beautiful.  He will be driven to seek out a kind of beauty which more closely 
approximates the true nature of beauty which he has come to understand, and this will 
require him to find a beloved who is beautiful in soul as well as body. 
 Why, then, does the lover not simply seek out the most actually beautiful soul 
which he can find to pursue as his beloved, rather than searching for a beloved who 
displays a certain sort of personality type or potential?  It seems that this must have to do 
with some aspect of his experience outside of the insight which he has achieved into the 
nature of beauty specifically.  Otherwise, his eros would carry him almost invariably 
towards the most already perfect soul he could find.  And the most obviously relevant 
aspect of his experience of the recollection of Beauty, in this connection, is the state in 




perfect being, providing him with a newfound insight into the nature of his own soul.  
The project towards which his revelation of Beauty directs him, then, is at least in part 
one of self-exploration and development.  This vivid recollection of a perfect being 
beyond the physical world of his everyday experience has opened his eyes not only to the 
paucity of the ‘reality’ which he currently inhabits, but also to the fact that he himself, in 
his most pure form, is a denizen not of this physical world, but of the world of soul which 
he inhabited when he first encountered this perfect being.  He has not only turned away 
from the physical and towards the psychological or spiritual in terms of his understanding 
of beauty, then, but also in his overall focus and prioritization, in his understanding of 
what is most important to and for himself.  He now sees that his true self, that self with 
which he should be most concerned, is his soul, and that the experience and interests of 
this soul extend far beyond the concerns of his current embodied self.  This new 
understanding must come with a corresponding shift in perspective as to what is most 
important to his own interests and satisfaction.  And surely some part of the newfound 
strength which he gains to combat the ‘bad horse’ in his soul is the realization, through 
this revelation, however partial, of his own true nature, that a gratification of those sorts 
of desires will never be enough to bring his soul real satisfaction.  What he most desires, 
he now realizes, is not to obtain or possess any given thing, but rather himself to be in a 
certain state, or become a certain sort of being.  And he now perceives the particular type 
of eros which he is experiencing in the context of this new understanding of himself and 
his desires more generally. 
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 But the sort of being which he now realizes that he most desires to be is not, 
importantly, one of the perfectly real beings themselves.  The perfectly real beings, like 
Beauty itself, are described in Plato’s analogical myth as perfectly static and unchanging, 
unmoving and unmoved, outside of the heavens which exhaust the dynamic world.   The 71
soul, on the other hand, both human and divine, is defined by its motion and change, and 
by a complete inability ever to be static or unchanging.  Every soul is in essence a “self-
mover,”  and “what moves itself... never desists from motion, since it does not leave off 72
being itself.”   There is a certain sense, then, in which a soul cannot, in principle, be 73
perfect, at least not in the complete sense in which the perfectly real beings are.  
However, Plato explicitly describes the souls of the gods, and the others among the souls 
in heaven who are most successful in becoming like the gods, as perfect.  At the time 
when our un-embodied souls attended the divine banquet of knowledge, he argues, “we 
who celebrated it were wholly perfect, and free of all the troubles that awaited us in time 
to come.”   Presumably, then, these souls are perfect in some sense other than that in 74
which the perfectly real beings are.  Moreover, there seems to be a sense in which even 
an embodied human being may be ‘perfect,’ since “A man who uses reminders of these 
things [presumably, the perfectly real beings, and possibly his other experiences in 






is the only one who is as perfect as perfect can be.”   The kind of ‘perfection’ being 75
hinted at here, then, seems not to be the complete perfection which one finds in the 
perfectly real beings, but rather, the kind of ‘perfection’ which we can attribute to a thing 
which has become as perfect as a thing of that sort could possibly be.  Even the gods, it 
seems, are not really ‘wholly’ perfect, nor are they themselves the most wholly divine 
beings, but acquire both their perfection and their divinity, to some extent, derivatively, 
from their proximity to the perfectly real beings.  It is only these perfectly real beings 
outside of heaven which are fully perfect, and which make up the “realities by being 
close to which the gods are divine.”   The gods themselves then, are not completely 76
perfect beings, but rather, the most perfect possible souls.  And so when we, as souls, 
aspire to be perfect, what we must aspire to be is like them.   
 When the lover experiences his revelatory recollection of Beauty, then, it seems 
that he becomes aware, to whatever extent, of at least three things: first, the existence 
and, to some extent, the nature of the perfectly real beings; second, the existence and, to 
some extent, the nature of the gods, and in particular of his own god; and third, the 
existence and, to some extent, the nature of his own immaterial soul.  He consequently 
comes to realize, however clearly or confusedly, several different things about the nature 
of his own aspirations.  He realizes, first, that he desires desperately to be in the presence 




accomplished in the very long term, and not in his embodied life on earth.  Second, he 
realizes that he himself was once a much more perfect and contented being than he is 
now, and that he desires to be this sort of being again, to become again his more perfect, 
and most perfect, self.  He further realizes, it seems, that this most perfect self which he 
once was possessed a certain sort of perfection, and that it achieved this particular sort of 
perfection by emulating the most perfect example of perfection of that kind, in the person 
of a particular god.  Third, he realizes that he desires desperately to be in the presence of 
this god again, just as he does to be in the presence of the perfectly real beings, but that 
this, also, is not something which he can achieve in this life.  He will thus set out to 
regain as much of his former perfection and closeness to the real beings and his god as is 
possible in this world, by emulating his god and pursuing insight into the nature of the 
real beings to whatever extent is possible for an embodied human being, perhaps with 
hopes, ultimately, of reclaiming his former existence.    
 To speak in this way of different kinds of perfection may seem strange, in a 
Platonic context, but we must keep in mind that the ‘perfection’ we are speaking of here 
is not the true or complete perfection possessed by the perfectly real beings.  Rather, it is 
the greatest perfection, the closest approximation to true perfection, we might say, which 
it is possible for souls to achieve.  And this degree of perfection, it seems, is the greatest 
perfection achievable by any being within the bounds of heaven.   But if the perfection 77
of the gods is only an approximation to complete perfection, the greatest possible 
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perfection achievable for souls, then it is only a certain degree of perfection which the 
gods possess, and there will always be some extent to which even the gods are lacking.  It 
becomes plausible, then, even on Plato’s view, that this same degree of perfection might 
be achievable in various ways.  Each of the gods, then, would represent one of the 78
possible ways in which a soul might most closely approximate true perfection, one of the 
ways in which a soul, to some extent inevitably imperfect by its very nature, might come 
to be as perfect as a soul can be. 
 In its un-embodied life in heaven, it then seems, the soul desired to be close to 
perfection in at least three ways.  First, it desired to be in the presence of the perfectly 
real beings, which embody a complete perfection of a kind unachievable for itself, but the 
understanding of which strengthened and fortified it to maintain itself in the most perfect 
state which was possible for it.  Second, it desired to be in the presence of its god, the 
embodiment and example of the most perfect state which a soul of its own disposition 
could possibly achieve.  And third, it desired to make itself as much like its god as it 
could, to actually become as perfect as its own disposition could possibly allow.  All of 
these aspirations of our un-embodied souls appear to be closely connected on Plato’s 
account; each kind of ‘closeness’ to perfection enables the furtherance and persistence of 
the others.  However, there is no obvious priority among them.  Do our souls, and those 
of the gods, desire to behold the perfectly real beings because this will strengthen them 
 That is, again, it becomes plausible within the context of the Phaedrus specifically.  Whether this view is 78
compatible with all of Plato’s arguments elsewhere, and in particular with some of his views on the unity of 
the virtues, is a further question, and one I do not mean to have claimed to address here.
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and keep them in their most perfect state as they go about the rest of their existence 
within heaven?  Or do they desire to be strengthened in soul and as perfect as possible 
because this is what will allow them to continue to behold the perfectly real beings?  Do 
they desire to follow their god because this will help them to perfect their own souls?  Or 
do they desire to perfect their own souls, at least in part, because this will allow them to 
follow their god more closely?  Aspects of the myth seem to hint at any or all of these 
answers.  And it seems important, for this point, that the souls who attain the rim of 
heaven and behold the real beings outside do not remain in this state of beatific vision 
indefinitely.  Although the ‘divine banquet’ is a deeply ecstatic experience for all of the 
souls, it does not exhaust their existence, nor is it the final aim of their existence, towards 
which they strive until it is achieved, and in which they then remain.  Their ‘home’ is 
within heaven, and their proper “work”  is here.  The answer to these questions, then, is 79
not at all obvious. 
 The fact that the answer is not obvious, however, may give us some helpful 
insight into the experience of the lover.  Having come to understand these three desires in 
himself, to be in the presence of the real beings, to be in the presence of his god, and to 
be in his own most perfect possible un-embodied state, through emulation of his god, he 
has also come to understand that none of these desires can be fully satisfied in his current, 
embodied, life.  Each of these desires, however, has an analogue in his current, embodied, 
life, and he will now recognize that he pursues these desires as the closest possible 
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approximation to the joys of his un-embodied life here in this world.  As each of these 
three aspects of his former existence were interconnected and mutually supporting, but 
were nevertheless to some extent distinct and independent sources of joy and satisfaction 
in his un-embodied life, each of which he desired and pursued, so too are their analogues 
in this world.  And while he now knows that, in the long run, his greatest desire is to 
regain these pleasures of his former life in heaven, he may also pursue their analogues 
here on earth for the independent sake of the similar joy and satisfaction they provide 
him, and not only instrumentally.  The lover may pursue recollection of the perfect 
beings, then, not only as a means to regaining his former life in heaven, but because the 
experience of this recollection is the closest thing possible in this life to the joy of 
beholding them directly in his former one.   He will attempt to make his soul as much 80
like that of his god as possible, despite being separated from much of his own ‘divine’ 
nature by being bound up with a physical body, “locked in it like an oyster in its shell,”  81
not only because this might ultimately help him to regain his original state, but because 
this is the way of life that will allow him to be at his best and most contented with his 
own condition while he remains ‘down here.’  And, he will seek out closeness and 
intimacy with another human being who is like his god in character, not only because this 
may help him in his own process of emulating, and perhaps ultimately regaining his place 
beside, the god, but because this nearness to another soul which is like his god’s is the 
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closest joy which he can have in this life to his former nearness to the god himself.  And 
so Plato describes the lover as seeing his beloved, in the beginning, as to some extent a 
proxy for his god, treating him “like his very own god, building him up and adorning him 
as an image to honor and worship.”  82
 So, here is an answer to at least a part of our previous question: if the lover is 
driven to pursue a beloved by his revelatory recollection of the true nature of beauty, then 
why does he seek out a beloved of a particular personality type, rather than simply the 
most beautiful beloved he can find?  There is only one Beauty, after all, not different 
types.  The answer seems to be that, although at first the lover is motivated only by a 
confused desire to be near that which is beautiful, after his experience of recollection of 
the perfect beings, his desires have broadened.  While he still desires to be in the presence 
of someone beautiful, his aims have changed more than is explained only by his new 
understanding of what beauty really is.  He now, with his newfound insight into his 
former life in heaven, has discovered an additional desire: to be near someone who is like 
his god.  He now seeks out a beloved, then, who is both of these things, both beautiful in 
soul and body and of a character like that of his god.  But another part of our question 
remains unanswered: if the lover is driven by a desire to be near someone who is like his 
god, then why would he choose a beloved who displayed the mere potential to be like his 




 The answer to this part of our question seems slightly more complicated.  We 
have said that the lover desires, now, two different but related things: to be close to that 
which is beautiful, and to be close to a soul like that of his god.  That beauty with which 
he is most concerned now is not physical beauty, however, but spiritual or psychological 
beauty, the beauty of the beloved’s soul.  Combining these two concerns, then, and setting 
aside for the moment the interest which the lover does still retain, to some extent, in the 
physical beauty of his beloved, we might say that the lover now desires to be close to a 
soul which is beautiful in a specific way, that is, in that way of which his own god is the 
most perfect example.  We might say, then, that the lover desires to be close to a certain 
kind of beauty of soul.  The beauty of souls, however, unlike the beauty of bodies, is not 
directly perceptible through the senses.   Physical proximity alone, then, will not be 83
enough to reliably bring the lover into contact with this kind of beauty, in the way that it 
was enough to give him access to the physical beauty of the beloved through his faculty 
of sight.  To be close to the beauty of the beloved’s soul, the lover must find a way to gain 
some sort of access to the beloved’s soul or mind.  And to do this reliably would seem to 
require the trust and confidence of the beloved, a willingness on his part to share his 
thoughts and experiences, to more intimately and fully reveal the contents and the 
character of his soul to the lover.  With his newfound insight into the nature of both 
Beauty and the soul, moreover, the lover will presumably be able to realize this.  The sort 
of closeness he desires, then, is no longer the sort of thing which the lover might have 
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any hope of achieving solely through his own initiative, without the consent and 
assistance of the beloved.  And so the lover must find a beloved who not only displays the 
kind of beauty of soul to which he hopes to be near, but who is also willing to share that 
beauty with him, to trust him with a nearness to his soul, by giving him access, in a 
suitable sense, to his inner self and life. 
IV. Pedagogical Love 
 But what would move the beloved, initially, to do this?  The lover is motivated in 
his pursuit of the beloved by the desire he has to be close to the kind of soul which he 
believes the beloved to have, but what is to motivate the beloved to allow, and even to 
actively promote, such closeness between them?  Plato’s account of this initial stage of 
the relationship from the perspective of the beloved is somewhat vague in the Phaedrus, 
up until the point at which the beloved himself in turn falls in love with the lover.  And by 
this point in the relationship, it seems, there must already be an established degree of 
closeness and non-physical intimacy between the lover and the beloved.  What initially 
moves the beloved to allow the lover a place in his life, it seems, is the recognition by the 
beloved that the lover genuinely desires to help him and to offer him some good or 
benefit.  “Because he is served with all the attentions due a god by a lover..., and because 
he is by nature disposed to be a friend of the man who is serving him... as time goes 
forward he is brought... to a point where he lets the man spend time with him.”   And 84
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once he has allowed the lover to spend time with him, and begun to engage with him in 
conversation and joint activities, he comes to realize how deeply the lover desires not 
only to be near him, but to help and to benefit him.  “Now that he allows his lover to talk 
and spend time with him, and the man’s good will is close at hand, the boy is amazed by 
it as he realizes that all the friendship he has from his other friends and relatives put 
together is nothing compared to that of this friend who is inspired by a god.”   Notice, 85
here, the increased reliance on the language of philia, as opposed to eros, in this passage 
addressing the development of the relationship from the perspective of the beloved.  This 
is a point to which we will return again shortly.  For now, though, we see that it seems the 
beloved is initially drawn to the lover by the realization that the lover genuinely desires, 
and, perhaps, to some extent is actually able, to benefit him and offer him help.  There is 
an extent, then, to which the beloved is initially drawn to the lover by just what one might 
be led to expect by a more traditional Greek understanding of the dynamic within such 
relationships: the expectation of some benefit to himself. 
  And this is in line with much of what we see brought forward in Plato’s 
arguments in the Lysis, where one of the central troubles driving the aporia seems to be 
the question of how it can be possible for both parties to a friendship to benefit one 
another, when the capacity to offer benefit seems, on the face of it, to imply a position of 
superiority, at least in that respect in which the benefit is offered.   It is a central element 86
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of Plato’s arguments in the Lysis that friends must be of benefit, or ‘useful,’ to one 
another.  To him it seems, on the face of it, however, that “like is useless to like insofar as 
they are alike.  And to admit that the useless is a friend would strike a sour note.”   If the 87
friends are to benefit one another, then, it seems initially as though the benefits they offer 
one another must be different.  Moreover, this discussion of friendship in the Lysis is 
dramatically nested within a discussion of eros.  The dialogue with Lysis is conducted at 
least partially for the benefit of his hapless lover, as a lesson from Socrates in how to 
“carry on a conversation with him instead of talking and singing the way... you’ve been 
doing,”  and so, presumably, to more successfully engage his attention.  And if there is 88
any conclusion in the Lysis which seems to be taken seriously as a culmination of the 
dialogue, it is not one about friendship in general, but about its specific application within 
erotic relationships, the claim that “the genuine and not pretended lover must be 
befriended by his boy.”   This question, then, of how the parties to a relationship are to 89
benefit one another unless each is offering something in which the other is “deficient,”  90
along with the presumption that one cannot offer to another something in which one is 
equally ‘deficient’ oneself, seems to be treated as an equally important and thorny 
problem in the specific case of erotic love.  If “a thing desires what it is deficient in,”  it 91
seems initially, then that which the lover desires in or from the beloved, and that which 
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the beloved desires in or from the lover (if, indeed, the beloved feels desire toward the 
lover at all) must be different, and the traditional view of such relationships as essentially 
asymmetric is maintained.  If this really is the case for the lover and beloved, though, 
Plato’s argument in the Lysis implies, then it is so for reasons which apply equally well to 
all friendships.  And the claim that all friendships are essentially asymmetric, especially 
in the strong way in which erotic relationships have been traditionally conceived of as 
being, looks quite a bit more difficult to swallow.  This again, though, is a point to which 
we will later return.  For now, let’s focus on the emphasis which the Lysis places, here 
and elsewhere, on the thought that in order for the lover to gain the beloved’s affection, to 
be ‘befriended by his boy,’ he must be able to offer the beloved some benefit which the 
beloved will recognize as such.  What sort of a benefit could we expect this to be, in the 
context of Plato’s account in the Phaedrus? 
 Given the lover’s newfound focus on the goods of the soul and the world of the 
gods and the perfectly real beings, and consequent understanding of love as, at least in 
large part, an avenue for honoring and pursuing these goods, it seems reasonable to think 
that he would search for a beloved who would likewise value, or at least be strongly 
inclined to value, these same sorts of goods.  And, given Plato’s view of human virtue, it 
seems likely that in searching for a beautiful soul, of whatever sort, he would be 
searching for a soul who would also value such goods highly.  In attempting to offer some 
benefit to his beloved, then, as a way of winning his trust and affection, it seems 
reasonable to think that the lover would want this benefit to be of the sort which a 
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beautiful soul would think valuable.  The beloved’s appreciation of a lover’s generosity 
with less genuinely admirable goods, perhaps even such unworthy ones as the money or 
social advancement which seem to be promised (but rarely delivered) by the lovers 
condemned in Socrates’ and Lysias’ earlier speeches, would display a conspicuous 
deficiency in the very qualities of soul to which the ‘genuine’ lover is most attracted in a 
beloved.  A beloved’s receptivity to benefits of this sort from a prospective lover, then, 
might be a strong indication to the lover in search of a beautiful soul that he had chosen 
his beloved unwisely.  The sort of benefits which such a lover could be expected to offer 
his beloved, then, in order to initially attract his attention and gain his trust, would seem 
most likely to be benefits to the beloved’s soul, and in particular to those aspects of his 
soul which the lover has come to see as most highly valuable: his personal virtue and 
philosophical understanding of the gods and the real beings.  In responding positively to 
the offer of such benefits, then, and perceiving their exceptional value, the beloved will 
only be further confirming his lover’s belief that he is indeed a beautiful soul, with his 
natural ability to recognize the truly valuable un-effaced by his time spent away from 
heaven.  
 And to be in a position to offer such benefits to the beloved in the development of 
his soul, it seems natural to think, the lover must pursue a beloved who is at least not 
significantly his own superior in these respects.  Since the lover himself, then, is still far 
from having achieved his hope of fully emulating his god, his beloved, likewise, if he is 
to attract him with the promise of benefit in this respect, must possess the potential for 
!41
such an achievement, but not yet its full realization.  The lover’s search for a beloved, 
then, is constrained by two parameters upon the beloved’s degree of achievement with 
respect to the perfection of his soul: the lover’s desire for a beautiful soul will attract him 
to those of significant achievement with respect to virtue, while his desire for intimacy 
with such a soul will drive him towards those whose degree of achievement is not so high 
as to place them beyond his own capacity to assist in this respect.  These opposite 
pressures, it seems, one providing a lower and one an upper limit upon the realized virtue 
of the beloved, will drive him towards the pursuit of a beloved with a degree of virtue 
roughly similar to his own.  To a soul in this condition, the philosophical and 
psychological insight which the lover has recently gained through his experience of love 
will present a significant and attractive benefit, an advantage in the pursuit of virtue 
which the beloved does not yet share, and one which may allow the lover to win his 
attention and trust. 
 At this intermediate stage of the relationship, then, in which the beloved has 
accepted the lover’s advances, and admitted him into a trusted place among his social 
intimates, but does not yet return his love, the relationship between the two is still 
broadly pedagogical.  The lover relies upon the insight love has granted him into the 
nature of their god, the real beings, and souls like their own to guide the beloved in his 
nascent emulation of that god and pursuit of philosophy and virtue.  The benefits which 
each receives, in turn, remain very different: the beloved receives the lover’s assistance in 
pursuing greater wisdom and virtue, while the lover receives (primarily) the pleasure of 
!42
closeness to the beloved’s burgeoning spiritual beauty.  Already at this stage in the 
relationship, then, the benefits which love has brought to both parties are considerable.  
The frenzy and discomfort which eros had initially induced in the lover have been 
soothed and assuaged by the combination of his own increased understanding and 
psychological discipline and his success in attaining some physical and psychological 
intimacy with the object of his desire.  The more disturbing signs of ‘madness’ which had 
marked his initial experience of love have been replaced by a level of contentment with 
these achievements, and enjoyment of the company of his beautiful beloved.  For the 
beloved’s part, it seems, such a relationship is likely to be both educationally rewarding 
and socially unburdensome.  Lovers of this sort “show no envy, no mean-spirited lack of 
generosity, toward the boy, but make every possible effort to draw him into being totally 
like themselves and the god to whom they are devoted,”  and so the beloved will find 92
himself with much to gain, and little of importance to lose.  A relationship which never 
progressed beyond this stage, perhaps, would be nothing to be ashamed of, as the 
‘madness’ of love, thus properly pursued by the lover, has already brought much benefit 
to both parties, and done little harm, if any, to either.  Crucially, though, a love which 
never progressed beyond this stage would still have fallen far short of providing the 
‘greatest benefit’ to the lover and beloved of which Plato argues that love is capable.  
And, perhaps even more crucially, at this stage the lover has done very nearly everything 
he can to respond to his experience of love correctly.  If the relationship which he now 
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shares with his beloved is to offer its fullest benefit to either one of them, this further 
development is no longer in his hands.  The success of their love now depends not 
primarily upon the lover’s agency, but on that of the beloved. 
V. The Beloved Becomes a Lover 
 If all goes as it ideally should between the lover and beloved, then after they have 
spent some time together in this sort of a relationship, the lover guiding and assisting the 
beloved, and the beloved rewarding him with affection and social intimacy, the beloved, 
in turn, will find himself unexpectedly stuck by his own transformational experience of 
eros:   
 Think how a breeze or an echo bounces back from a smooth solid object to its source; that is how  
 the stream of beauty goes back to the beautiful boy and sets him aflutter.  It enters through his  
 eyes, which are its natural rout to the soul; there it waters the passages for the wings, starts the  
 wings growing, and fills the soul of the loved one with love in return.  93
Just as the lover initially was, then, the beloved is taken off guard by a sudden 
confrontation with the seemingly disproportionate power which beauty has over him.  
Unlike the lover’s, however, the beloved’s shocking experience of beauty is not elicited 
directly by a sensory encounter with an ‘image’ of beauty in one of the ‘things down 
here,’ but is in some crucial sense mediated by his existing relationship with the lover.  
The beauty which he thus encounters, moreover, is not just any beauty, or even the beauty 
of the lover himself,  but in some sense an ‘echo,’ or reflection of the beloved’s own 94
beauty, which he seems to have previously taken little notice of.  And, though it is the 
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beloved’s own beauty he sees, he is initially unable to recognize himself in it.  This 
experience of beauty, then, is every bit as maddening and disorienting for him as it was 
for his lover.   “The boy is in love, but he has no idea what he loves.  He does not know, 
and cannot explain, what has happened to him.... He does not realize that he is seeing 
himself in the lover as in a mirror.”  95
 If he too responds to his love correctly, it seems, this experience of confronting 
his own beauty in the ‘mirror’ of the lover will lead him along a precisely similar journey 
of revelatory recollection and psychological self-development.  Just as the lover was, he 
now finds himself overwhelmed by the urge to be close to the seeming possessor of this 
earthly beauty, the lover who has made this beauty visible to him.  Just as the lover did, 
he finds relief for his frenzied state of soul only in the presence of his beloved other.  “So, 
when the lover is near, the boy’s pain is relieved... and when they are apart he yearns as 
much as he is yearned for, because he has a mirror image of love in him – ‘backlove’ – 
though he neither speaks nor thinks of it as love, but as friendship.”   And just as the 96
lover was, he is at first inclined to misinterpret this violent attraction as a primarily 
physical desire, driven by the desperate need he feels to be close to that which nourishes 
the wings of his soul, and by the unenlightened urgings of his own ‘bad horse,’ to mistake 
sexual intercourse for the most suitable way to calm his inner turmoil.  Afforded easy 




much less significant practical barrier to acting on these urgings than the lover had 
initially found.  In the throes of the first frenzy of erotic madness “he wants to see, touch, 
kiss, and lie down with”  the lover, and with few external circumstances to impede his 97
path toward doing so “of course, as you might expect, he acts on these desires soon after 
they occur.”   The beloved’s first encounter with eros, then, is in some ways even more 98
precarious than that of the lover, insofar as the immediate accessibility of his beloved 
other provides him with an even greater opportunity to go astray in his interpretation of 
what is happening to him.  Without an enforced passage of time between the dizzying 
onset of erotic symptoms and the practical possibility of a sexual encounter with the 
desired individual, provided in the lover’s case by the need for an extended seduction, the 
beloved seems in even greater danger of reacting unreflectively to his desire, forgoing the 
opportunity to be reminded of the world of the gods and the perfectly real beings in favor 
of the far easier path of surrendering to pleasure like a ‘four-footed beast.’ 
 And this, in turn, provides a new temptation for the lover as well.  “When they are 
in bed, the lover’s undisciplined horse has a word to say to the charioteer – that after all 
its sufferings it is entitled to a little fun.”   After all that he has done to tame the bad 99
horse in his soul, then, to bring it into harmony with the good horse, under the control of 
the charioteer, the lover is now likely to find himself in a position where all external 





and the long-term well-being of their relationship with one another have been removed.  
In his own confused struggle to understand the effect that eros is having on him, the 
beloved is still painfully torn between the pull of the bad horse in his soul and that of the 
good horse, and given, in addition, the faith which he has in the lover’s desire to do him 
good, may be easily swayed by attempts that the lover might make to initiate more 
serious sexual activity.  At this critical point in their relationship, then, the beloved is 
uniquely vulnerable to harm by a moment of weakness on the part of the lover.  “The 
boy’s bad horse has nothing to say, but swelling with desire, confused, it hugs the lover 
and kisses him in delight at his great good will.  And whenever they are lying together it 
is completely unable, for its own part, to deny the lover any favor he might beg to 
have.”   The beloved’s bad horse, however, is far from the dominant force in his soul.  100
Just as it had in the lover’s case, the increased proximity to his beloved other provokes 
not only a greater intensity in the straining of the bad horse, but also a powerful counter-
reaction.  The charioteer in the beloved’s soul, with the good horse under its command as 
an ally, will resist the urgings of the bad horse in his soul, and, if sufficiently strong, even 
the misguided pleadings of a briefly faltering lover, overcoming the forces of both these 
internal and external challenges “with modesty and reason.”  101
 The lover and beloved, then, are now both battling the bad horses in their 




seems, so that it no longer attempts to overpower the good horse and the charioteer by 
sheer force, as it did in its initial drive towards sex with the beloved, it has not fallen 
silent in attempts to persuade the charioteer to indulge it.  This sort of influence by the 
bad horse, though perhaps more subtle, may be even more dangerous, insofar as the 
charioteer, if mistakenly persuaded, has the power to direct the good horse into 
cooperation as well.  Should the bad horse succeed in misleading the charioteer, then, it 
seems there will be nothing left in the soul to combat it.  The beloved, in turn, has still to 
fight both battles with the bad horse in his soul, to restrain it by countervailing force into 
submission as the lover initially had, and to learn to reject its more subtle pleadings for 
complicity by his charioteer, before he can be confident that he has overcome its 
influence sufficiently for the success of his love.  As this common psychological struggle 
continues, if it is to be successful, then at some point in the development of their now 
mutual love the two parties will find themselves approaching a position of parity.  Each 
now both loves and desires the other, and each is engaged in an equivalent process of 
spiritual and psychological self-development which requires a growing philosophical 
knowledge of their own nature and the nature of the goods at which their eros aims in 
order to succeed.  At first the lover, already some way along this path of self-
development, may be able to assist the beloved in his own struggle against his bad horse, 
but eventually the beloved will catch up with him along this path, and by the time that 
they have both succeeded in this struggle, they will find themselves in a roughly 
equivalent position.  The advantage in insight which the lover initially enjoyed, by virtue 
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of his revelatory experience of love, will be gradually effaced by the beloved’s own 
progression through this same revelatory experience.  If both are successful in their 
response to love, then, “if the victory goes to the better elements in both their minds,”  102
then the fundamental asymmetry of their relationship will be dissolved.  The distinction 
between their roles as lover and beloved will become a primarily historical (and perhaps 
social/conventional) one, with little importance for the continuing dynamic within their 
relationship. 
 And such a relationship will, Plato makes a point to emphasize, continue, not just 
until the fury of passion has run its course, but throughout both parties’ lives, and even 
into the afterlife.  Having mutually conquered the influence of their respective bad 
horses, under what one might imagine to be some of the most challenging circumstances 
possible, the pair of lovers “are modest and fully in control of themselves, now that they 
have enslaved the part that brought trouble into the soul and set free the part that gave it 
virtue.”   This better part of their souls, in turn, “will lead them to follow the assigned 103
regimen of philosophy”  in the remainder of their lives together, and if they do this, 104
then “their life here below is one of bliss and shared understanding.”   Notice here, that 105
Plato is no longer speaking of two lives, but of one.  The lovers who have come this far, it 






definition of a life.  From this point forward they will share not only time and activities, 
but in some important sense have a single life in common.  And this shared life will be 
one of a sort which Plato has already claimed in his analogical myth will bring them the 
greatest possible achievement for an earthly human being:  
 No soul returns to the place from which it came for ten thousand years, since its wings will not  
 grow before then, except for the soul of a man who practices philosophy without guile or who  
 loves boys philosophically.  If, after the third cycle of one thousand years, the last mentioned souls 
 have chosen such a life three times in a row, they grow their wings back, and they depart in the  
 three-thousandth year.  106
To ‘love boys philosophically,’ it seems, is an obvious candidate for what the palinode 
has just been explaining to us how to do.  By the end of this explanation, however, it 
seems we have come to a potentially surprising conclusion: that it is not specifically 
loving boys philosophically which grants this great benefit, but loving philosophically, at 
all.  There seems little sense in which the original beloved of our “philosophical pair”  107
could be plausibly considered a paiderastes, philosophical or otherwise.  However, an 
early regrowth of the wings of the soul is now claimed equally for him.  The pair of 
philosophical lovers, “after death... have grown wings and become weightless, they have 
won the first of three rounds in these, the true Olympic Contests.  There is no greater 
good than this that either human self-control or divine madness can offer a man.”   This 108
then, is the ‘greatest good fortune’ which Socrates has set out to argue that love, properly 





 Somewhat surprisingly, however, the palinode’s account of love does not end 
here.  Even for those who ultimately fail to ‘follow the assigned regimen of philosophy,’ a 
love which has come this far will have created a powerful and lasting bond between the 
parties:  
 If... they adopt a lower way of living, with ambition in place of philosophy, then pretty soon when  
 they are careless..., the pair’s undisciplined horses will catch their souls off guard and together  
 bring them to commit that act which ordinary people would take to be the happiest choice of all;  
 and when they have consummated it once, they go on doing this for the rest of their lives....  So  
 these two also live in mutual friendship (though weaker than that of the philosophical pair), both  
 while they are in love and after they have passed beyond it.  109
And this pair, too, will have won a great reward by their love, though, again, not as great 
as that of the ‘philosophical pair:’ “In death they are wingless when they leave the body, 
but their wings are bursting to sprout, so the prize the have won from the madness of love 
is considerable.”   Moreover, even in death they will remain together, and be jointly 110
granted a happy afterlife as a consequence of their success in love: “those who have 
begun the sacred journey in lower heaven may not by law be sent into darkness for the 
journey under the earth; their lives are bright and happy as they travel together, and 
thanks to their love they will grow wings together when the time comes.”   Though this 111
pair has failed to win the great reward reserved for philosophers and those who love 
philosophically, then, and so it seems that they will have to wait at least the full ten 
lifetimes to reclaim their wings, they are nevertheless to be seen as having gained some 





advantage which is not to be gained by those who respond to their experience of eros in a 
way which does not lead to the forging of such lasting and mutual bonds, even when it 
does lead to an otherwise rewarding and even constructively virtuous relationship, as in 
the case of the broadly ‘pedagogical’ pairing we discussed before.  Moreover, the 
advantage thus gained by these lovers is not only cast in terms of the acquisition of a 
more blessed afterlife, this blessedness itself is in turn closely linked with the fact that the 
journey they take there is no longer taken alone.  It seems that the advantage which this 
lesser pair of lovers gains, then, both in the afterlife and in their more ideal position with 
respect to regrowing their wings, may not only be caused by the lasting and mutual 
friendship which keeps them together through life and the afterlife, but perhaps at least 
partially constituted by that friendship as well. 
 And it is here that Socrates abruptly ends his palinode to love, with a description 
of the benefits not of the highest kind of eros, but of this ‘second best’ sort of 
relationship, and a reminder that the speech has been directed, hypothetically, not to an 
aspiring lover, but to a prospective beloved.  “These are the rewards you will have from a 
lover’s friendship, my boy, and they are as great as divine gifts should be.”   The 112
implication seems to be, then, that even though this lesser pair of lovers does not gain the 
‘greatest good fortune’ with which love is capable of providing us, they have nevertheless 
gained more than enough to make all of their struggles and great risks worthwhile.  
Despite acknowledging the serious risks of being badly led astray by one’s own ‘bad 
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horse’ in the earlier stages of love, that is, as well as the potentially dangerous effects that 
love may have on the behavior of an unworthy lover, and even given the likelihood that 
both parties may still fail to love ‘philosophically’ even after the most dramatic battles in 
their wars with their respective bad horses have been won, Socrates is nevertheless 
recommending this arduous process to the beloved whole-heartedly, as one well worth 
undertaking.   
VI. How Love Moves the Beloved 
 It seems that we must now ask, again, then, what exactly we should take to have 
happened to the beloved, now himself become a lover, in the course of this process of 
falling in love.  What are we to make of the development of this ‘mirror image of love’ in 
the beloved, as Plato has described it to us here?  The first question to ask in this respect 
would seem to be how we are to understand Plato’s claim that it is in some sense the 
beloved’s own beauty which triggers his initial experience of love, in light of the further 
claim that this beauty is mediated, in some crucial way, by the person or presence of his 
lover.  There seem to be several obvious candidates for how we might interpret this claim.  
First, from the suggestion that ‘the stream of beauty’ ‘enters through his eyes,’ we might 
infer that the beauty in question is of a literally visible, that is, physical, sort.  The claim 
would then be that it is the beloved’s encounter with his own physical beauty, facilitated 
in some way by his lover, that touches off his experience of eros.  There are several 
reasons why this version of the claim should strike us as implausible, however.  
Remember, first of all, what it is about physical beauty that makes it so uniquely suited to 
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elicit an erotic response: the fact that it “alone has this privilege, to be the most clearly 
visible”  of all the ‘images’ we can encounter of the real beings here on earth.  And the 113
‘visibility’ in question here, importantly, is literal, not figurative.  It is because we can, 
unexpectedly, catch literal sight of an ‘image’ of Beauty as we go about our daily lives, 
experiencing a shock of recognition as this ‘image’ confronts us through “the sharpest of 
our bodily senses,”  that the ‘beauty down here,’ as opposed to the many less literal 114
‘images’ of the other perfect beings, is most likely to provoke an unsought for experience 
of recollection in our souls.  And this link with direct perceptibility, it seems, is the only 
advantage that physical beauty enjoys in this respect.  Were physical beauty in any way 
more intrinsically lovable than, or even, perhaps, as lovable as, the other earthly ‘images’ 
of beauty, it seems, and, more specifically, than spiritual or psychological beauty in 
particular, then the transformation in focus which the lover’s initial attraction to his 
beloved undergoes upon his dawning awareness of Beauty’s true nature would be 
prevented.  Moreover, even beauty as such, physical and otherwise, it seems, is not 
intrinsically more suited to serve as a spark for eros than are the earthly ‘images’ of other 
perfect beings, except insofar as it enjoys this advantage with respect to direct 
perceptibility: “It would awaken a terribly powerful love if an image of wisdom came 
through our sight as clearly as beauty does, and the same goes for the other objects of 





or self-control, etc.) is possible, however.  These qualities of soul, like souls themselves, 
it seems, can only be inferred from our direct perceptions of physical bodies.  If the 
beauty which touched off the beloved’s overpowering experience of eros were physical 
beauty, then, it seems that this beauty would need to be something he perceived directly, 
though his bodily senses.  But in what way could the lover facilitate such a direct sensory 
encounter between the beloved and his own physical beauty, which would make any 
sense of the description Plato gives us of his role in the beloved’s experience of eros?  
The imagery here is of an indirect encounter with the earthly beauty he confronts: an 
echo, reflection, or ricochet.  This beauty ‘bounces back’ to the beloved, with whom it 
had originated, from the lover who had first been struck by it.  Since the lover, 
presumably, does not literally reflect back an image, then, the talk of ‘seeing’ in this 
context seems best taken as figurative.  If this beauty is not literally seen by the beloved, 
though, it seems best taken not to be physical beauty, given that, aside from its advantage 
in direct perceptibility, physical beauty is in fact less suited to touch off an experience of 
recollection, and so eros, than are those non-physical ‘images’ of beauty which more 
closely resemble Beauty itself. 
 The most likely candidate for the beauty the beloved experiences in this way, 
then, is not beauty of the body, but of the soul.  And given Plato’s claim that this is the 
beloved’s own beauty, reflected back to him in some way by the lover, it seems safe to 
assume that it is in some sense the beauty of the beloved’s own soul.  But what are we to 
make of this claim that the beloved somehow ‘sees’ the beauty of his own soul ‘in the 
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lover’ in this indirect way?  Given what we have already said of the relationship between 
the lover and beloved up until this point, there seem to be at least two fairly obvious 
readings we might give of this claim.  First, we might emphasize the talk of the lover as a 
‘mirror’ of the beloved’s beauty over the claim that this beauty is the beloved’s own in a 
highly particular sense, and recall that the process of falling in love we have traced on the 
part of the lover has ensured a high degree of similarity between the souls of the lover 
and beloved.   If the lover has chosen his beloved wisely, we have argued, then the 116
beloved’s soul will be very much like that of the lover along both of the axes according to 
which Plato has argued that souls are divided into general types.  In searching for a soul 
like that of his god, the lover will have sought out a beloved of the same unchanging 
character type as his own, as determined by ‘the god in whose chorus he danced’ before 
his birth into this world.  And in searching for a soul which is not already so 
accomplished in virtue as to be beyond his own ability to aid in this respect, while 
already as beautiful as he is capable of winning given this constraint imposed by his own 
worthiness as a suitor, he will have sought out a beloved whose degree of 
accomplishment in the development of his soul is relatively comparable to his own.  As 
the beloved comes to know the lover well, then, through the time they spend together and 
their many conversations with each other, both philosophical and otherwise, he will come 
to know a soul which is in many of the most important ways very much like his own.  In 
coming to know the lover well, then, the beloved is coming to know a soul whose beauty 
 If, at least, the lover has followed it out correctly.116
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closely ‘mirrors’ his own, in both type and degree.  Remember, moreover, that the lover’s 
own spiritual and psychological development has already been greatly improved beyond 
that which he had achieved prior to his ‘possession’ by eros by the philosophical insight 
and internal struggle towards self-discipline and understanding which have been required 
of him by his experience of love thus far.  There is a sense in which, then, the current 
beauty of the lover’s soul is not only a mirror image of the beloved’s, but its causal 
consequence as well, insofar as it is the effect that the beauty of the beloved’s soul has 
had on him which has caused him to develop his own soul to the extent that he currently 
has.  This relationship of both similarity and causal dependency between the beauty of the 
lover’s soul and that of the beloved’s, then, would seem to give us a plausible reading for 
both how the beloved could be said to see ‘himself in the lover as in a mirror,’ and how 
the beauty he saw there could be said to ‘bounce back’ to him as in some sense its 
original ‘source.’  On this reading, then, the earthly beauty which sets off the beloved’s 
experience of eros is primarily that which he finds in the soul of the lover, as he comes to 
know him well through their growing social intimacy, and is best seen as his own beauty 
only at the level of types, and by a strong analogy, through the close similarity between 
their two souls. 
 Another plausible reading is available, however, and one which we may have 
reason to prefer, in the context of our overall reading of the Phaedrus.  If we emphasize, 
instead, the claim that the beauty in question is the beloved’s own, in a more particular 
sense, and treat the talk of ‘mirrors’ and ‘echoes’ as a somewhat more abstractly 
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metaphorical description of the lover’s role in enabling this experience, another fairly 
obvious reading of how the beloved might come to confront this spiritual or 
psychological beauty is suggested by the nature of the ‘pedagogical’ relationship in which 
we have described the lover and beloved as already engaged.  Remember that among the 
chief benefits the lover has offered the beloved in order to attract his attentions and gain 
his trust is assistance and direction in the development of his soul towards greater virtue, 
and so, greater beauty.  And it is in large part the insight the lover has gained into the 
nature of their common god and of human souls of the unchanging type that he and the 
beloved share which has allowed him to offer this guidance.  However, it seems that a 
general understanding of the various types of soul, both unchanging and qualitative, 
would be of relatively little use to him, either in offering this guidance to the beloved, or 
in the development of his own spiritual or psychological beauty, without at least some 
further understanding of the application of this general knowledge to the particular cases 
of himself and his beloved, the specific strengths and failings of his own and his 
beloved’s souls with respect to both their current qualitative type and their approximation 
to the ideal of the unchanging, ‘divine,’ type, at the emulation of which they ultimately 
aim.  Moreover, we have argued that in choosing a beloved the lover has sought out 
someone with a soul which he takes to fall within a relatively specific range of present 
development with respect to virtue and understanding.  And if he is to be correct in this 
assessment of his beloved’s current standing with respect to virtue, as it seems that he 
must, if their love is to be successful, this requires not only a general knowledge of the 
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nature and types of souls, but an understanding of the particular features of this individual 
beloved’s soul, insofar as these cause and constitute strengths and weaknesses for the 
beloved with respect to his progress in virtue.   And this is a theme we see taken up 117
elsewhere in the Phaedrus as well: if one is to expertly guide another soul in a given 
direction, it is not enough to know the destination at which one aims.  One must also 
understand the position from which the soul one hopes to guide begins, in order to know 
what words or actions will best serve to move that particular soul in the desired direction.   
 In the second half of the Phaedrus, where Socrates turns his attention to the topic 
of rhetoric, he argues that if there is any such thing as a true art of rhetoric it can only be 
the art of “directing the soul by means of speech, not only in the lawcourts and on other 
public occasions but also in private.”   And to do this artfully, he argues, to direct the 118
souls of others in a manner which is not haphazard, “empirical and artless,”  but 119
grounded in a true body of knowledge, and therefore reliably effective, will require 
careful study of the soul: “this is therefore the object towards which the speaker’s whole 
effort is directed, since it is in the soul that he attempts to produce conviction.”   To 120
artfully guide the souls of others towards conviction on a given topic, the true rhetorician 
must deploy a careful understanding of the psychology of his audience, not only of 
 Whether this knowledge will amount only to something like a very accurate sense of where this 117
individual’s soul fits into a general taxonomy of souls of the sort that Plato has begun to lay out for us, or 
whether it will concern a more individualized understanding of the particular features of this individual’s 
psychology seems unclear, and may depend at least in part upon how fine-grained we take Plato’s full 





psychology in general, although he must have this, but also of the ways in which different 
souls vary, the various kinds of souls, and the ways in which each of them responds to the 
various kinds of speech, again, not only in general, but with respect to the given topic at 
hand, since, presumably, various kinds of soul will be more receptive to various sorts of 
persuasion with respect to certain topics than to others.   And in order to deploy this 121
knowledge effectively, it is not enough for the rhetorician to possess it in the abstract; he 
must be able to reliably apply it to each of the individual souls to whom he has occasion 
to address himself: to “put his theory into practice and develop the ability to discern each 
kind clearly as it occurs in the actions of real life.”   If he has learned his art well, then, 122
he will “not only be able to say what kind of person is convinced by what kind of speech; 
on meeting someone he will be able to discern what he is like and make clear to himself 
that the person actually standing in front of him is of just this particular sort of 
character.”   And all of this knowledge, both of theory and application, is required, if he 123
is to artfully “direct the soul”  of an individual he intends to persuade, whether in public 124
or in private.  Moreover, Socrates argues, when such direction is done properly, with art, 
by someone who knows the truth about the topic on which he speaks, it can produce not 
only conviction in the souls of those so guided, but virtue as well.    125






 If the lover, then, during what we have called the ‘pedagogical’ stage of his 
relationship with the beloved, is engaged in a process of guiding the beloved towards 
both greater philosophical understanding and greater personal virtue, and, furthermore, if 
we may reasonably take philosophical understanding to at least partially involve the 
acquisition of the proper convictions with respect to what is true, then he is engaged, at 
this point in their relationship, in an activity of which true rhetoric is the art: ‘directing 
the soul’ of his beloved ‘by means of speech’ in order to “impart to it the convictions and 
virtues”  towards which he hopes for his beloved to aspire.  Of course, for him to be 126
able to do this in the special case of his beloved will not require him to be in possession 
of the full art; one need not be a true rhetorician in order to succeed in love.  But what is 
broadly required in order to reliably guide any given soul in any given direction will 
presumably be the same in both cases: a knowledge of the topic at hand, and a knowledge 
of the soul to be so guided.  The true rhetorician possesses the art insofar as he is able to 
identify and know the type and nature of any soul with which he is presented, and so to 
reliably guide the soul of anyone he encounters in the way he desires with respect to any 
topic of which he has knowledge.  His knowledge of souls is exhaustive and general, and 
applicable in any given case.  The lover, on the other hand, need only be able to reliably 
guide one specific individual’s soul: that of his chosen beloved.  The knowledge of souls 
which he needs to accomplish his aim, then, in addition to an understanding of the nature 
of souls as such, and of human souls in general, need not extend to an exhaustive 
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understanding of all of the various types of human souls and their manifestations in and 
interactions with the world.  He need only have this sort of detailed knowledge of the 
nature of a given soul and its likely responses in the case of the one specific soul which 
love requires him to successfully guide, the soul of his beloved. 
 The successful lover, then, in engaging in the project towards which love, at this 
stage of the relationship, directs him, attempting to guide his beloved towards a greater 
emulation of their common god, and so, a greater personal virtue and beauty of soul, will 
need to possess and correctly apply a careful understanding of his beloved’s soul, both as 
it currently is, and as it is capable, at its best, of becoming.  And a significant part of his 
doing this, it seems, given the way in which his own recent progress in virtue has been 
driven by his newfound insight into the nature of his own soul, both as it now is, and as it 
stands with respect to his god and its own most perfect possible state, will be an attempt 
to convey, to whatever extent he can, some portion of his insight into the nature of his 
beloved’s soul to the beloved himself.  In guiding the beloved towards a greater 
realization of his potential for virtue, it seems, the lover must, at least in part, be guiding 
him towards a greater understanding of his own soul and its beauty, both that which it 
already possesses, and that of which it is ultimately capable.  When the beloved comes to 
see ‘himself in the lover as in a mirror,’ then, in the course of this process, it seems 
natural to read what has happened to him in the following way: the lover, in articulating 
to the beloved the beauty and potential for beauty which he has come to ‘see’ in the 
beloved’s soul, the beauty which has led him to choose this particular individual as the 
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one that he loves, out of all of ‘those who are beautiful,’ has succeeded in bringing the 
beloved to ‘see’ himself as the lover now ‘sees’ him, to understand the beauty of his own 
soul as the lover does.  On this second reading, then, it is this new insight into the beauty 
of his own soul which touches off the beloved’s revelatory recollection of true Beauty 
and experience of eros: the beauty he confronts through the surprising glimpse into his 
own true nature afforded by his conversations with his lover. 
 On either of these readings, then, we can see that the beloved begins his own 
progress through the course of eros not only from a position of somewhat heightened 
risk,  but also one of relative advantage, compared with that of the original lover.  127
While the lover had initially been moved to his recollection of true Beauty by an 
encounter with a physical ‘image’ of beauty in the world, the beloved’s own recollection 
is sparked by an encounter with an instance of beauty of soul, which already much more 
closely resembles true Beauty than physical beauty ever can.  Moreover, insofar as a 
perception of beauty of soul will already require some degree of intellectual grasp or 
understanding of the nature of that beauty, in order to recognize it as an ‘image’ of beauty 
at all, in contrast to the way in which physical beauty can simply strike one as such 
through the senses, completely unreflectively, the beloved will begin his own experience 
of love already armed with some portion of the philosophical resources for interpreting 
this experience correctly which the lover had been forced to develop for himself in the 
 Subject as he is to a greater danger of acting precipitously upon his own sexual desires, both as a 127
consequence of the immediate accessibility of his beloved other, and as a possible result of misplaced trust 
in the persuasions of a lover who has himself wavered in resisting the bad horse in his soul. See above, pp. 
45-47.
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disorienting aftermath of his initial revelation.  The original lover himself, furthermore, 
so long as he maintains his hard-won control of the bad horse in his soul, will provide an 
additional resource on which the beloved can rely during his initial struggle to correctly 
interpret this experience, offering the beloved the benefit of the understanding gained 
from his own recent struggle with the dizzying onset of love.  And once the beloved has 
successfully navigated the initial confusion which his revelatory recollection of Beauty 
has created in his soul, and been led by this process, as the lover was, to a new 
understanding of what his soul most centrally desires, he will find that he is already in 
possession, in the person of the lover, of a close social intimate who is ideally suited to 
satisfying his deep desire to be close to a soul which is beautiful in that way of which his 
god is the most perfect example.  For all of the same reasons for which the initiating 
lover, if he chose his beloved wisely, understood the beloved to be ideally suited to 
satisfying this desire in him, he is now himself equally suited to satisfying it in the 
beloved.  Moreover, the beloved will now have, as the lover initially did not, not only a 
beloved, in the person the original lover, who is capable of satisfying this driving desire 
in him, but also one who both understands and shares all of the other deepest desires 
which this process of love has brought him to recognize within himself.  Returning his 
attention to the things of this world, the beloved, now become a lover, will find that his 
lover, now become a beloved, is equally driven to pursue both the otherworldly desires 
which he has discovered in himself and the earthly analogues to them which are 
achievable within this life.  He will not only share these same desires, moreover, but will 
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share the same understanding of them and his reasons for having them that the beloved, 
now a lover, has come to have, and so the same vision of himself and his soul, and his 
place in the wider order of the world and the heavens.  And, because this lover, now his 
beloved, also desires to lead his beloved, now a lover, towards the greatest possible 
emulation of their shared god, and therefore to help him achieve his own greatest possible 
perfection of soul and philosophical recollection of the perfectly real beings, the lover, 
now beloved, not only desires all three of the same earthly aims for himself that the 
beloved, now a lover, has newly come to recognize as his own deepest earthly desires, 
but also desires them for the beloved.  The beloved, now lover, then, emerges from his 
transformative experience of the first shock of love to find, already waiting for him, a 
lover, now beloved, who is wholly devoted to helping him achieve what he has newly 
come to recognize as his own most deeply held earthly desires.   And it is only at this 128
point in their relationship, when the beloved has emerged from his struggle to interpret 
his experience of eros, having drawn the correct conclusions, and chooses, with the same 
self-awareness of what he most truly desires which the original lover had had in choosing 
him, to take the original lover as his own beloved, that the original lover comes to have as 
 Or, at least, this is clearly so in the case of the first two such earthly desires: to recollect the perfect 128
beings and to emulate his god. In the case of the third desire, to be close to another soul like that of his god, 
things seem slightly more complicated.  Given that the lover desires, 1) to be close to the beloved, and 2) to 
himself emulate their shared god as closely as possible, and, further, that the kind of closeness to the 
beloved which he now desires is reciprocal, requiring that the beloved should also be close to him, it will 
follow that the lover desires that at least one set of sufficient conditions for the satisfaction of this third 
desire of the beloved’s should obtain.  That is, in desiring that the beloved should be close to him, and that 
he himself should become a soul as much as possible like that of their shared god, the lover desires a state 
of affairs in which the beloved’s desire to be close to a soul like that of his god will be satisfied.  Whether 
this comes to the same thing is questionable, and the question has caused many difficulties in the 
philosophy of both friendship and love, but it seems reasonable, at least, in the present context, to treat the 
two as coming close enough for our purposes.  
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a partner in love that which the original beloved had already had from the beginning: 
another soul wholly devoted to helping him achieve his own greatest earthly good. 
 At the beginning of their relationship, then, the lover desired the greatest possible 
goods of this life not only for himself, but also for his beloved, but the beloved did not 
yet desire these goods for the lover, and desired them even for himself only confusedly, 
insofar as he did already recognize both virtue and knowledge as goods worth acquiring.  
The lover, then, desired deeply that the beloved should have that which was in fact best 
for him,  and which the beloved did, moreover, to some extent already desire for 129
himself.  But the beloved did not, in return, desire that the lover should have that which 
was best for him, or even that the lover’s own desires should be satisfied.  After the 
beloved’s own experience of eros, however, this asymmetry in what each desires for the 
other has disappeared.  The beloved, turned lover, now both understands and desires that 
which is in fact best for him every bit as much as the lover, now beloved, initially did.  
The original lover, then, now desires that his beloved should have not only that which is 
objectively speaking best for him, as he has from the beginning, but also that which his 
 Again, though, the picture is in fact somewhat more complicated than this.  Although Plato’s later 129
arguments seem clearly to assume that the lovers will desire what we have called the three ‘otherworldly’ 
goods for one another, as well as what we have called the three ‘earthly’ goods, none of the claims he 
explicitly makes seem to offer us arguments as to why this should be so.  Insofar as what we have called the 
‘earthly’ desires are not only analogous to the lovers’ ‘otherworldly’ aims, however, but are also 
instrumentally related to them, such that the full satisfaction of these ‘earthly’ desires would seem to imply 
the satisfaction of the ‘otherworldly’ ones, it again seems to be the case that by desiring that one another’s 
‘earthly’ desires should be satisfied the lovers are also desiring that the sufficient conditions for the 
satisfaction of their ‘otherworldly’ desires should obtain.  It may be, then, that Plato takes it to follow from 
the fact that the lovers desire the sufficient means to the satisfaction of one another’s ‘otherworldly’ desires 
that they also desire that these desires should be satisfied.  If this is so, however, then this is, again, a move 
which many contemporary readers might question.  For present purposes, however, I would like to set such 
questions to one side.
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beloved, now a lover, most deeply desires for himself, since what the original beloved 
most desires and what is in fact best for him will now coincide.  The original beloved, in 
turn, in desiring what is in fact best for his beloved, the original lover, now also desires 
that the original lover should have that which he most desires.  Each now desires for the 
other to have, then, that which the other most desires for himself, and in doing so desires, 
both for himself and the other, that which is genuinely best.  
VII. From Love to Friendship 
 And, if one is a student of ancient philosophy, then all of this should be beginning 
to sound somewhat familiar.  The themes emerging here in the Phaedrus’ account of love 
are ones which play a central role in Aristotle’s well known discussions of friendship in 
both his Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics.  In the Rhetoric, Aristotle initially defines 
friendship in terms of one’s wishing one’s friends to have that which one believes to be 
good: 
 We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good 
 things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these  
 things about.  A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return: those who think  
 they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends.  130
As he elaborates upon this idea, however, it begins to seem clear that, on his considered 
view, it is not enough for friends to wish one another that which they believe to be good, 
in this way; they must also, at least to some extent, wish that which is actually good for 
one another.  Someone who is your friend, he goes on to argue, “shares your pleasure in 
 Aristotle. Rhetoric. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. (New 130
York: Random House, 2001) 2.4 1380b35-1381a4.  Hereafter ‘Rhetoric.’
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what is good, and your pain in what is unpleasant.”   And, “since we all feel glad at 131
getting what we wish for, and pained at getting what we do not,”  a friend will wish for 132
one to have one’s own wishes satisfied, when one wishes for that which is good.  Friends 
will also be those “to whom the same things are good and evil... for in that case they must 
have the same wishes, and thus by wishing for each other what they wish for themselves, 
they show themselves each other’s friends.”   Although it seems ambiguous, here, 133
whether those ‘to whom the same things are good and evil’ should be taken to mean those 
who believe the same things to be good and evil, or those for whom the same things are, 
in fact, good and evil, it seems that Aristotle intends to claim in the passage overall that 
those who are friends will be both of these things.  Our friends, he argues, will be those 
“who think the things good which we think good, so that they wish what is good for us; 
and this, as we saw, is what friends must do.”   These arguments seem to assume, then, 134
that there are, in fact, three things which our friends must wish for us: that which is good 
for us, that which they believe to be good for us, and that which we believe to be good for 
us.  And these three things must coincide, at least as a rule, if a friendship is to be 
 Rhetoric 2.4 1381a4-5.131
 Rhetoric 2.4 1381a7-8. 132
 Rhetoric 2.4 1381a8-12.133
 Rhetoric 2.4 1381a17-19.134
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practical.   Only if they do coincide do the arguments given above plausibly follow.  If a 135
friend ‘shares your pleasure in what is good,’ first of all, then it must be the case that you 
do take pleasure in that which is good.  And since ‘we all feel glad at getting what we 
wish for, and pained at getting what we do not,’ it must then be the case that you also 
wish for that which is good, since if you did not wish for it, then getting it would bring 
you pain, rather than pleasure.  And if your friend is to share this pleasure, then your 
friend must also wish, as you do for yourself, that you should have that which is good.  
Insofar as you and your friend both wish for you to have what is good, then, the wishes 
you have for yourself and the wishes your friend has for you will coincide.  And, given 
Aristotle’s commitment to the claim that that which we wish for is that which we believe 
to be good, insofar as we wish for that which is in fact good, we will be correct in our 
beliefs about what is good.  Since our friends are those who wish us to have that which 
they believe to be good, then, and your friend wishes you to have that which you believe 
to be good, and that which you believe to be good is in fact good, your friend will also 
believe to be good that which is in fact so.  Without these intermediate steps, the final 
claim above, that it follows from the fact that we agree with our friends about what is 
good that our friends will ‘wish what is good for us’ seems like a non-sequitur.  If we 
 Or, at least, if a good friendship is.  It seems possible, given Aristotle’s vacillation elsewhere over 135
whether, and to what extent, the vicious can be said to be friends, that he might accept the possibility of a 
‘friendship’ in which both parties shared the same false beliefs about what things were good for them.  
Such a friendship, however, would be harmful, rather than beneficial, to both parties, however well 
intentioned they might be in their actions towards each other.  And this sort of a harmful relationship does 
not seem to be what Aristotle has in mind when he typically speaks of friendship, or in his discussion of it 
here, since he seems generally to be committed to the position that friendship is both beneficial and a good.  
C.F. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe. (New York: Oxford U.P., 
2002.) 9.12 1171b37-1172a15.  Hereafter ‘Nicomachean Ethics.’
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supply the claim that our own beliefs about what is good for us are correct, however, we 
can begin to see how the argument is meant to follow.  The argument that friends will 
wish ‘for each other what they wish for themselves,’ then, seems to turn on a further 
claim: that that which is good for us will also be good for our friends.  And the thought 
behind this claim would seem to be something along the following lines.  We can all be 
safely assumed to wish for what we believe to be good for ourselves.  It has been argued 
that we will also wish for what we believe to be good for our friends.  If that which we 
believed to be good for ourselves, and that which we believed to be good for our friends 
were different, however, then these two wishes might easily come into conflict, and we 
would be forced to choose between pursuing our own perceived good and pursuing that 
of our friends.  Such a divergence between what we took to be in our own interest and 
what we took to be in theirs, then, would threaten our mutual well-wishing and trust.  
And the same will be true of our friends’ beliefs about what is in their interest and in ours.  
It will follow, then, that if our friendship is to be a stable one, we should each believe that 
that which is good for us is also good for the other.  And, given what has been said above, 
that these beliefs should be true.   
 And it seems from Aristotle’s presentation of a similar account of the features of 
friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, not as his own developed theory, but rather, as the 
endoxa, or received opinions, from which he intends his own arguments to begin, that 
this sort of an understanding of what constitutes a good friendship was already, at least to 
some extent, current in Greek culture at his time:   
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 People take a friend to be someone who wishes for and does what is good, or appears good, for the 
 sake of the other, or someone who wishes the friend to exist and to live, for the friend’s own  
 sake; .... Others take a friend to be someone who spends time with the other and makes the same  
 choices, or who feels grief and pleasure with his friend.  136
Moreover, something very like these broad outlines of the features to be expected of 
friendship would seem to be operative at various junctures in Plato’s own dialogues.  In 
particular the claims that a friend will wish, and attempt to bring about, that which is 
good, or which he believes to be good, for his friend,  that a friend will share in the 137
pleasure and grief of his friend,  that a friend will wish the same things for his friend’s 138
sake that he wishes for his own,  and that a friend will himself be a good and a benefit 139
to his friend  all appear to be brought into play, in one form or another, by either 140
Socrates or his interlocutors in the course of significant arguments.  Whether or not he 
endorses these claims about what constitutes a friendship, then, Plato seems very clearly, 
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.4 1166a3-9.  136
 See, e.g., Polemarchus’ suggestion in Republic II.332a that “friends owe it to their friends to do good for 137
them,” Socrates’ claim in Republic III.413c4-5 that the guardians’ “conviction that they must always do 
what they believe to be best for the city” is evidence of their philia for it, and Socrates’ inference in Lysis 
207d4-7 from the claim that Lysis’ parents feel a strong philia for him to the claim that they “would like” 
for him “to be as happy as possible.”  Though it might be argued that the latter two examples are not cases 
of the specific sort of philia which interests us in a discussion of friendship, it seems reasonable to think 
that if philia in this somewhat wider sense implies such a concern for the well-being of its object, then 
philia in our narrower sense, as a specific variety of this broader kind of affection, will share this feature.
 This claim is implicit in Socrates’ contentions in Republic V.462d6-e1 & V.464d3-4 that “whenever 138
anything good or bad happens to a single one of its citizens” the people of the Kallipolis, and the guardians/
auxiliaries in particular, “will share in the pleasure or pain,” and that they will all “as far as possible, feel 
pleasure and pain in unison,” if we accept Vlastos’ plausible reading of these features of the citizens’ 
relationships with one another as intended to follow from the strong ties of philia which their way of life 
and upbringing are designed to foster among them (see Vlastos, 11-13, though I contest many of his more 
substantial claims as to the significance and nature of this philia). 
 See, e.g., Socrates’ claim in Republic III.412d4-5, that “Someone loves something most of all when he 139
believes that the same things are advantageous to it as to himself,” where the kind of ‘love’ in question is 
philia. 
 See, e.g., the exchange between Socrates and Polemarchus in Republic I.334b7-335a3, beginning with 140
Socrates’ question “Speaking of friends, do you mean those a person believes to be good and useful to him, 
or those who actually are good and useful, even if he doesn’t think they are?” (Republic I.334b7-c2).
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at least, to be aware of them.  And in many cases it seems plausible to think that he does 
endorse such claims.   It seems significant, then, that the point at which the language 141
Plato chooses to employ in describing the relationship between the lover and beloved 
shifts from primarily that of eros to primarily that of philia is also the point at which their 
relationship first acquires many of these features most closely associated with friendship.   
 And, one of the most crucial of these features, it seems, the acquisition of which 
marks one of the clearest breaks from any previous stage of their relationship, is 
reciprocity.  Such reciprocity is emphasized as a defining feature of friendship in both 
Aristotle’s brief discussion in the Rhetoric, above, and his more extended treatment of the 
different kinds of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics.  And, although Plato seems 
clearly to think that philia, as such, need not be reciprocal, since one might also have 
such ‘friendly feeling’ towards abstract or corporate entities such as wisdom or one’s 
polis, which need not be capable of returning it,  it also seems quite plausible to think 142
that he considers philia in the sense of ‘friendship’ to be a particular kind of philia in this 
broader sense, just as he has noted that the eros with which he is most centrally 
concerned in the palinode is that particular kind of eros which one feels towards other 
 This is obviously a claim which requires more support, but this is not the place to argue it fully.  I 141
believe, however, that a case can be made for Plato’s endorsement of several of the above claims on the 
basis of his arguments in Republic Books III-V, which I take to rely on these claims to support the 
proposedly unifying effects of the philia cultivated among the guardians/auxiliaries of the Kallipolis by 
their education and communal lifestyle.  It is my hope to make this case in a future paper. 
 At least, not presumably, although a case could be made that corporate entities such as a polis are 142
capable of this.
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persons,  rather than towards any other thing.  And just as this particular kind of eros 143
has its own distinctive features, it seems reasonable to think that this particular kind of 
philia will as well.  Aristotle, of course, will make this argument explicitly: that although 
one can use the word philia to mean many different things, even speaking of the ‘love’ 
some people have for inanimate objects, such as wine,  in this way, this is clearly not 144
the sort of love we mean when we use the word philia in the more specific sense of 
‘friendship.’  Rather, “friendship, people say, is good will between reciprocating 
parties,”  as well as, he will go on to argue, a mutual recognition of this good will by 145
both parties, and appropriate actions taken accordingly.  Furthermore, as Julia Annas has 
argued persuasively, it seems as though this same conclusion, that the sort of philia we 
mean when we use the word to pick out anything resembling ‘friendship’ will require 
reciprocity of feeling, is suggested by Plato’s own, ostensibly aporetic, arguments in the 
Lysis.     146
 The first aporia which Socrates claims to have generated on the topic of 
friendship in the Lysis centers on the question of who should be considered a friend, the 
person who loves or feels friendly feeling for someone, or the person for whom such love 
or friendly feeling is felt.  And this question is explicitly posed, at the outset, with respect 
 Specifically, towards ‘beautiful boys,’ by his initial characterization at Phaedrus 249e4 (see above, p.15) 143
though, as we have seen, this characterization evolves significantly over the course of the palinode.
 See Nicomachean Ethics, 8.2 1155b27-32.  Note, also, that this particular example, of the ‘love of wine,’ 144
is one which had been previously used by Plato in the Lysis.
 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.2 1155b33-34. 145
 Annas, 532-533.146
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to that love or friendly feeling which is felt towards other persons: “when someone loves 
someone else, which of the two becomes the friend of the other, the one who loves, or the 
one who is loved?”   Socrates quickly leads Menexenus, Lysis’ closest friend, to agree 147
that neither one who loves in this way without being so loved in return nor one who is so 
loved without also so loving can be rightly called a friend, since if either were the case, 
then one could easily become “a friend of a nonfriend, and even of an enemy”  or “an 148
enemy to a nonenemy, or even to a friend.”   And this, Socrates maintains, “doesn’t 149
make any sense at all... it is simply impossible to be an enemy to one’s friend and a friend 
to one’s enemy,”  as Menexenus readily agrees.  The clear implication of the intuition 150
on which this conclusion rests, then, that one cannot be ‘a friend of a nonfriend,’ is that 
each party to a friendship must be a friend of the other, if there is to be any such thing as 
a friendship at all.  And when Socrates suggests the claim that friendship must be 
reciprocal as a possible answer to their worry about who will be a friend, proposing that 
“unless they both love each other, neither is a friend”  so that “nothing is a friend of the 151
lover unless it loves him in return,”  Menexenus is initially inclined to agree.  He is led 152
to reject this claim only when Socrates introduces the question of whether one could then 








might be commonly said to feel philia, but which could not be reasonably said to feel it 
back:   
 So, there are no horse-lovers unless the horses love them back, and no quail-lovers, dog-lovers,  
 wine-lovers, or exercise-lovers.  And no lovers of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in return.   
 But do people really love them even though these things are not their friends, making a liar of the  
 poet who said:     
   Happy the man who has as friends his children and 
   solid-hoofed horses, 
   his hunting hounds and a host abroad?  153
Menexenus responds that he doesn’t think this poet was a liar, and so the suggestion is 
dismissed, and their arguments move on.  Notice, though, that this claim is only brought 
under suspicion at all by the introduction of worries beyond the scope of the original 
question, which was specifically about which of two people was a friend, when one of 
them loved the other.  And even once these worries have been raised, Socrates puts 
forward a suggestion as to how they might be plausibly resolved: that when people are 
lovers of horses, or of wine, or of wisdom, or of other such things, they do in fact love 
these things, and this love is philia, of a sort, but not of that sort which is friendship, and 
‘these things are not their friends.’  The only real argument offered against the claim that 
friendship is reciprocal, then, is that if it were correct, the cited piece of poetry would fail 
to be literally true, thus ‘making a liar of the poet.’  While Menexenus may find this a 
convincing argument, it seems highly unlikely that we are meant to, given what we know 
of Plato’s attitudes towards poetry.  Moreover, Socrates goes on to rely, without further 
comment, on the presumption that friendship is reciprocal, and seemingly symmetrically 
 Lysis 212d8-e6. This part of the argument may seems especially strange to us, since it relies on a largely 153
verbal point that the common Greek words for such things as ‘horse-lover,’ etc., were compounds involving 
philia: ‘horse-lovers’ above is ‘philippoi,’ for example, ‘wine-lovers ‘philoinoi,’ and ‘lovers of wisdom’ 
‘philosophoi,’ or ‘philosophers.’ 
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so, in his own later arguments, which take it as given that friends must “be prized by each 
other”  “value each other”  and “yearn for one another when apart.”   As Annas has 154 155 156
pointed out,  these arguments clearly assume that to be a friend requires not only that 157
one love, but also that one be loved, since, on the one hand, Socrates maintains that 
“whoever doesn’t love is not a friend,”  while, on the other, he asks Lysis, “how can 158
anything be a friend if it is not prized?”   Clearly “it can’t,”  Lysis promptly replies, 159 160
since, as Socrates argues, whatever someone “didn’t prize he wouldn’t love.”   It seems 161
that the case can be plausibly made, then, that Plato would accept reciprocity as one of 
the defining features of personal friendship. 
 Again, then, it does not seem accidental that a shift in Plato’s language, from 
primarily that of eros, to primarily that of philia, occurs at just that point in his account in 
the Phaedrus where the relationship between the lover and beloved first acquires any sort 
of reciprocity: the point at which the beloved first begins to feel affection for the lover, 
and chooses to allow him a place in his life as a trusted social intimate.  That is, the point 
at which the beloved first ceases to be purely the object of the lover’s unilateral eros, and 










their relationship.  Having come to see how genuinely the lover appears to desire to help 
and to benefit him, we should remember from our arguments above, the beloved 
eventually decides to let ‘the man spend time with him.’   And he makes this decision, 162
Plato argues, ‘because he is by nature disposed to be a friend (philos) of the man who is 
serving him.’   He is so naturally ‘disposed,’ furthermore, towards those whom he 163
believes to genuinely mean him well, it seems, even when he is not well disposed 
towards the prospect of an erotic relationship: “even if he has already been set against 
love by schoolfriends or others who say that it is shameful to associate with a lover.”   164
And once he has allowed the lover to ‘talk and spend time with him,’  he is even more 165
deeply ‘amazed’  by the extent of the genuine ‘good will’  this person displays 166 167
towards him in all of his behavior.  And so he comes to realize, it seems, that this lover is 
not only a lover, and certainly not a ‘lover’ in the sense with which his ‘schoolfriends’ 
have no doubt made him familiar, a person who desires and pursues him with promises of 
benefit in order to win his favors, but who has no further interest in his well-being than 
this, the sort of lover criticized so effectively in Socrates’ and Lysias’ earlier speeches.  
Instead, he is a lover who is also a friend.  And a friend, it seems, not independently of 
being a lover, but rather, as a consequence of being a lover, in that way which is most true 
 See above, p. 37; Phaedrus 255b1-2.162
 See above, p. 37; Phaedrus 255a3-4.163
 Phaedrus 255a4.164
 See above, p. 38; Phaedrus 255b4.165
 See above, p. 38; Phaedrus 255b5.166
 See above, p. 38; Phaedrus 255b5.167
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to the divine nature of love: a ‘friend (philon) who is inspired by a god.’   As he comes 168
to know the lover and his true intentions well, then, he is shocked to discover ‘that all the 
friendship he has from his other friends and relatives put together is nothing compared 
to’  the friendship of this lover who is also a friend.  And notice, here, exactly where all 169
of this language of ‘friendship’ begins to be deployed: the beloved is initially ‘disposed’ 
to be a friend to the person who is ‘serving’ him, and so begins to take the time to come 
to know him better, and to better understand the motives he may have for doing all of 
these good things for him.  This disposition seems to become a reality, though, and the 
lover begins to be spoken of not only as his lover, but also as his friend, at the point at 
which the beloved comes to be fully aware of the extent of the ‘good will’ which the 
lover feels for him.  And ‘good will,’ here, is ‘eunoia,’ the same ‘good will’ which we 
saw above in Aristotle’s report that ‘friendship, people say, is good will between 
reciprocating parties.’   Indeed, this ‘pedagogical’ stage of the relationship between the 170
lover and beloved, as Plato describes it briefly here, seems to map fairly well onto one of 
the lesser sorts of friendship which Aristotle describes in his later account of the different 
kinds of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics.   For our purposes, though, we need 171
only note here that several of the key features of friendship as Aristotle has argued above 
that many would define it, and as Plato himself seems to acknowledge that it might be 
 See above, p. 38; Phaedrus 255b7.168
 See above, p. 38; Phaedrus 255b5-7.169
 See above, p. 73; Nicomachean Ethics, 8.2 1155b33-34.170
 Specifically, friendship between unequals because of excellence or the good, see Nicomachean Ethics, 171
8.13 1162a34-1162b14, c.f. 8.8 1159a34-1159b8.
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plausibly defined, now seem to be in place between the lover and beloved, most crucially, 
reciprocity of both ‘good will’ and benefit. 
 The most significant break with all previous stages of their relationship, however, 
and the one on which Plato himself places the greatest emphasis, seems not to happen 
here, when the beloved enters into this ‘pedagogical’ relationship with the lover, but 
rather with the transition from this stage of their relationship to one of the two highest 
sorts of relationship in which Plato argues that eros can possibly result.  The point at 
which the relationship between the lover and beloved is most drastically and significantly 
transformed seems clearly to be that at which the beloved in turn falls in love with the 
lover, and himself succeeds in correctly pursuing this love.  It is the two sorts of 
relationship which can come from this transformation in the beloved’s feelings for his 
lover, if he is able to correctly interpret and respond to them, which Plato argues will 
offer love’s greatest rewards, those which are ‘as great as divine gifts should be,’  and 172
which cannot be offered by any earlier stage of their relationship.  While what we have 
called the ‘pedagogical’ stage of their relationship may be pleasant, harmless, and even 
mildly spiritually or philosophically rewarding, if the full benefits of eros are to be 
gained, Plato argues, their relationship must progress beyond this stage.  This might 
initially lead us to dismiss the importance of the emphasis on friendship which we see 
beginning to emerge in Plato’s description of this earlier stage of the relationship.  To do 
so, however, would be a mistake.  This new emphasis on the element of friendship 
 See above, p. 52; Phaedrus 256e4.172
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between the lover and beloved, which we see emerging here, with the shift in the 
beloved’s role from that of a purely passive object, to that of an actively consenting, if 
still primarily receptive, participant, continues to be a significant feature of Plato’s 
account of the two highest kinds of love, as the beloved’s role shifts even further, from 
that of a primarily receptive participant, to that of a fully equal and active partner in a life 
lived together with the lover. 
 And it is in Plato’s description of these two highest sorts of relationship in which 
eros can result that his shift to reliance on the language of philia become most telling.  
Though he relies again, as one would expect, primarily upon the language of eros in his 
description of the beloved’s own experience of eros and his struggle to interpret and 
respond to it correctly, just as he had in describing the original lover’s experience, once 
the beloved has emerged from this struggle largely victorious, as the original lover had, 
now able, as the original lover eventually was, to express his love with the appropriate 
‘reverence and awe,’ Plato’s emphasis on the language of philia returns.  In the few lines 
describing the highest possible sort of relationship to which eros can lead, that of the 
‘philosophical pair,’ who ‘follow the assigned regimen of philosophy’ and live a life of 
‘bliss and shared understanding’ on this earth, growing wings together after death, neither 
the language of philia nor that of eros is explicitly used.   When Plato turns to 173
describing the second best sort of relationship, however, that of those who waver from 
 See above, pp. 49-50; Phaedrus 256a7-b7.173
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this highest possible course of eros by putting ‘ambition in place of philosophy,’  he 174
does so in terms of philia, while maintaining that this aspect of the description applies 
even more appropriately to the best sort of relationship than to this lesser one: ‘these two 
also live in mutual friendship (though weaker than that of the philosophical pair), both 
while they are in love and after they have passed beyond it.’   Those engaged in the 175
highest sort of relationship to which eros can lead, then, the ‘philosophical pair,’ now 
‘live in mutual friendship,’ just as this lesser pair does, but their friendship is stronger 
than that of this less ‘philosophical’ pair, and, presumably, just as, or even more, lasting.  
Most surprisingly, then, it seems to follow from this claim, in the case of the second-best 
sort of relationship at least, and most likely in that of the best sort as well, that this 
‘mutual friendship,’ though born of eros, no longer depends on eros for its continued 
strength and stability: though the friendship begins ‘while they are in love,’ it can 
continue, undiminished, even ‘after they have passed beyond it.’   
 Moreover, the benefits conferred by this final stage of the relationship in either its 
best or its second-best form, in both this life and the afterlife, seem not to be attendant 
upon the continuation of eros, which may or may not persist, between the members of 
each ‘pair,’ after this stage in their relationship has been achieved, but rather upon this 
lasting and ‘mutual friendship’ which their shared experience of eros has forged.  These 
two highest sorts of personal relationship, then, which Plato has argued will grant human 
 See above, p. 51; Phaedrus 256c1.174
 See above, p. 51; Phaedrus 256c7-d1.175
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beings the greatest possible benefits, are only indifferently erotic, after they have been 
attained.  The importance of eros to this process, it seems, is largely as the means of 
attaining them.  The benefits conferred by the highest sorts of life lived together, then, as 
such, are the benefits conferred by the highest sorts of friendship, not just the highest 
sorts of love.   And though such friendship may also be erotic, as time moves forward, 176
it need not be.  Nothing of significance is lost should the passion which brought these 
pairs together burn out.  And, in the final passage of the palinode, where Socrates 
concludes his praise of love by returning briefly to the topic of the ‘non-lover’ of Lysias’ 
speech, to contrast the paucity of what such a person can offer with the rich possibilities 
of a rightly pursued love, he does so, quite pointedly, in the language of friendship.  
While the sexually motivated quid-pro-quo of a “non-lover’s companionship 
 I have made a slide, over the course of this paragraph, from speaking of the two highest forms of 176
relationship in which eros can result to speaking of the two highest forms of relationship, full stop, and 
from claiming that these two highest forms of relationship in which eros can result are friendships to 
claiming that these two forms of friendship are friendship’s highest forms.  While the reader would be right 
to be suspicious of this slide, no slight of hand is intended.  I take these two moves to be justified to the 
following extent: although Plato does not explicitly claim that these two sorts of relationship are the highest 
sorts of personal relationship possible, he has argued that they are the sorts of personal relationship which 
provide the individuals engaged in them with the greatest possible benefits.  And these are not only the 
greatest possible benefits which personal relationships can provide, he has claimed, but the greatest 
possible benefits which anything can provide to an embodied human being.  Furthermore, it seems 
reasonable to think, given what has been argued, that Plato is attributing relative value to different sorts of 
personal relationship on the basis of two factors: 1) the benefits which they provide to their participants and 
2) the intrinsically valuable and disvaluable features they possess.  If this is correct, then it seems that in 
order for any sort of personal relationship to be a ‘higher’ one, in his estimation, than the two highest sorts 
of relationship described in the palinode, it would need to be so on the basis of some intrinsically more 
valuable or less disvaluable features it possessed, while still providing its participants with the same 
benefits as these two highest sorts of relationship resulting from eros.  The defining features of these two 
highest sorts of relationship which Plato describes, however, would seem to be the very features which 
allow them to provide these benefits to their participants.  While it is conceivable, then, that there might be 
other sorts of personal relationship or friendship which provided these same benefits to their participants on 
Plato’s view, it seems that these other sorts of relationship or friendship would need to resemble the two 
highest sorts of relationship described in the palinode in all of the defining features which we have 
discussed in order to do so.  It seems reasonable, then, to move forward under the assumption that the 
highest forms of friendship, on his view, if not identical to those described here in the palinode, will at the 
very least resemble them in all of the immediately relevant respects.
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(oikeiotes)”  he argues, can provide nothing more than “cheap, human dividends,”  all 177 178
of the ‘divine gifts’ detailed in the palinode can be rightly hoped for from “a lover’s 
friendship (philia).”  179
VIII. Friendship in its Highest Forms 
 It seems that this final account of the two highest sorts of relationship in which 
eros can result, then, is not only an account of the best sorts of erotic relationship, but 
also of the best sorts of personal friendship.  And given that it seems, from what we have 
said above, that the erotic and sexual elements of these two sorts of relationship have 
become largely indifferent, with their continuation or cessation having little effect upon 
the benefits offered to the participants in them by their continuing relations with each 
other, once this stage of their relationship has been reached, it seems that we should now 
ask what the features of these best kinds of relationship are, independently of the 
distinctively erotic characteristics which they may or may not continue to have.  And if 
we examine the features of these two sorts of relationship as friendships, keeping in place 
all of the features they have come to have through the historical process of their 
participants’ eros, but abstracting away from anything exclusively erotic in their ongoing 
relationships with each other, we will find ourselves facing a surprisingly familiar 
description of the best sorts of personal friendship. 
 Phaedrus 256e4-5: τοῦ µὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης. 177
 Phaedrus 256e6.178
 Phaedrus 256e3: ἐραστοῦ φιλία. 179
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 We will find, that is, that these two sorts of relationship, considered as friendships, 
share nearly all of the features most closely associated with the best sort of personal 
friendship described in Aristotle’s account in the Nicomachean Ethics.  Although the 
exact characteristics of this best sort of friendship, often referred to as ‘virtue friendship’ 
or ‘character friendship’ are widely debated, there are number of defining features, some 
shared with other kinds of friendship, and some unique to this one best kind, which are 
generally taken to be central to Aristotle’s account.  First of all, as we have already 
discussed somewhat above, all kinds of friendship, on Aristotle’s view, and so this best 
kind as well, require some sort of “reciprocal loving of which both parties are aware,”  180
and a corresponding reciprocal good will or desire for the good of the other, on which 
each party is prepared to act wherever possible and appropriate.   In every kind of 181
friendship, then, and in this best kind as well, each party will provide, or at the very least 
desire and attempt to provide, some good or benefit to the other.  In the case of this best 
kind of friendship, moreover, as in the case of many of the other broadly better kinds of 
friendship, that which each party provides to the other, and so that which each of them 
receives from the relationship, will also be of the same kind of good or benefit, and to a 
roughly similar degree.  In these better kinds of friendship, then, and so in the best kind 
of friendship in particular, there will be both a qualitative and a quantitative equality in 
the benefits offered to each of the participants, so that “in all respects each party gets the 
 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3 1156a8-9.180
 Although the nature and extent of this good will will vary among types of friendship, on Aristotle’s 181
view.
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same or similar things from the other, which is an attribute friendship should have.”   182
Furthermore in the best kind of friendship, as it seems is not the case in any of the other 
kinds of friendship on Aristotle’s account, each of the friends is also himself, in his own 
person, a good and a benefit to the other, “for the good person, in becoming a friend, 
becomes a good for the person to whom he becomes a friend,”  “for the good are both 183
good without qualification and of benefit to one another,”  and Aristotle will argue at 184
length that the parties to this best kind of friendship must always themselves be good. 
 That such friends are a good to one another in this way is also a consequence of 
another unique feature of this best kind of friendship: that it, unlike any of the other kinds 
of friendship, is a mutual love based exclusively upon the features of the friends’ own 
characters, independently of any of their incidental traits, such as wealth, influence, or 
charm.  Such friendships based exclusively upon the friends’ own characters, Aristotle 
argues, must be built, at least in large part, on a mutual admiration and respect felt by 
each party for the other on account of his personal virtue or excellence: “being friends 
because of excellence, and because of what the parties are in themselves”  each friend 185
will love the other “by reference to the person he is.”   In this way “the good will be 186
friends because of themselves; for they will be friends in so far as they are good.”   187
Nicomachean Ethics, 8.4 1156b34-35.182
 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.5 1157b33-35.183
 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3 1156b13-14.184
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.10 1171a18-19.185
 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3 1156a18.186
 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.4 1157b3-4.187
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Those who have truly bad characters, on the other hand, are unable to create or maintain 
such friendships on the basis of their characters alone, and “it is clear that the only ones 
who are friends because of themselves are the good; for the bad get no gratification from 
each other,”  except incidentally.  Because such friends are friends ‘because of 188
themselves,’ furthermore, and love one another because of their own most stable and 
lasting qualities, the friendships they forge on this basis will also be stable and lasting 
ones.  While other sorts of friendship, and particularly, Aristotle argues, the traditional 
sorts of “erotic friendships”  characterized by the exchange of very different sorts of 189
goods between very different and unequal parties, will be unstable and quick to dissolve, 
unlikely to last over the course of a lifetime, “friendships based on character – being for 
their own sake – do last,”  “for since their own attributes are lasting, so is their 190
relationship to each other.”    191
 It is not, however, only virtue or excellence of character, assessed absolutely, on 
which such relationships are based, but rather, Aristotle argues, equality or similarity in 
such virtue or excellence.  It is always, he maintains, to some extent true that “‘equality 
and similarity make amity’, and most of all the similarity of those similar in 
excellence,”  and so “it is the friendship between good people, those resembling each 192
 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.4 1157a19-20.  188
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.1 1164a3.189
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.1 1164a12.190
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other in excellence”  that will be the most “complete”  and the best.  It is not only 193 194
excellence of character, then, that brings such friends together, but also similarity of 
character: “for every kind of friendship is because of some good or because of 
pleasure, ...and in virtue of some sort of resemblance between the parties, and to this kind 
of friendship belong all the attributes mentioned, in virtue of what the friends are in 
themselves, since in this respect they are similar.”   And this similarity of character 195
between friends of the best sort will be manifested in their sharing of the same values, 
aims, and pursuits, and of the same sorts of activity in which they take the greatest 
pleasure, and upon which they place the greatest emphasis in their lives, “for nothing is 
so characteristic of friends as living together... but it is not possible for people to spend 
their time with each other if they are not pleasant, and do not enjoy the same things.”  196
So, while “like-mindedness too is evidently a feature of friendship,”  and can be found 197
to various extents in other kinds of friendship as well, it is notable in particular that “this 
sort of like-mindedness is found among decent people, ...both with themselves and with 
each other, ... they have the same objectives... and they wish for what is just and what is 
advantageous, and also make these their common aim.”   It will be most natural and 198
easiest, then, for the good and the decent to ‘live together’ in the way that close friends 
 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3 1156b7-8.193
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desire, and, furthermore, most mutually beneficial for them to do so, since those activities 
which they value most highly and devote themselves to most consistently will be virtuous 
ones, which will in turn help to maintain and develop their virtue of character, “and 
whatever it is that for each sort of person constitutes existence, or whatever it is for the 
sake of which they choose to live, it’s this they wish to spend time doing in company with 
their friends... each kind spending their days together in doing whichever of the things in 
life most satisfies them.”  199
 This best sort of friendship, then, will both require and foster a deep knowledge 
and understanding of each friend’s character by the other, if each is to love the other for 
the sake of his character, and to be right in doing so.  And so, “this type of friendship also 
requires that the parties have acquired experience of each other, and a close acquaintance 
with one another’s character, which is very difficult to achieve.”   This knowledge of 200
each other’s character will naturally grow over the course of their friendship with each 
other as well, as they spend their time “living together, conversing, and sharing their talk 
and thoughts; for this is what would seem to be meant by ‘living together’ where human 
beings are concerned.”   This knowledge of each other’s character, in turn, will foster 201
not only love, but also trust, between them, since they will know one another to be both 
good and trustworthy, with the confidence one rightly has in one’s judgements “about a 
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.12 1171b37-1172a6.199
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person one has scrutinized oneself over a long period.”   It will also allow each of them 202
to offer greater help, comfort, and pleasure to the other than they would have been able to 
do without the aid of this knowledge, since in all of their conversations with and actions 
towards each other they “will know the character of the person affected, and the things 
that give him pleasure and pain,”  and choose the most appropriate course accordingly.  203
Moreover, through their interactions they will not only come to know each other’s 
characters well, but will also gain insight into their own characters, and develop both 
their own and their friend’s virtue further through emulation of one another’s better 
qualities and correction of one another’s failings, as well as through shared endeavor 
towards virtuous activity: “for the good man, in so far as he is good, delights in actions in 
accordance with excellence, and is disgusted by those flowing from badness,”  so that 204
good men who are friends “become better by being active and correcting each other, for 
they take each other’s imprint in those respects in which they please one another.”  205
 If we have made our case well, then each of these defining features of Aristotle’s 
much-discussed ‘virtue friendship’ should by this time find an obvious parallel among 
those which have emerged from our analysis of the evolving relationships between 
Plato’s two most successful ‘pairs’ of lovers or friends in the Phaedrus.  Furthermore, on 
at least one plausible reading of Aristotle’s claim that a friend of this best sort “is to his 
 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.4 1157a22-23.  202
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.11 1171b4-5.      203
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.9 1170a8-10.   204
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.12 1172a12-14. 205
!89
friend as he is to himself (for his friend is another self),”  such that “friendship in its 206
superior form resembles one’s love for oneself,”  this will also be true of the parties to 207
these two highest kinds of relationship in the palinode.  Insofar as they are of the same 
character, share the same aspirations, know one another’s souls as they know their own, 
desire the same goods for one another that they desire for themselves, take pleasure in 
one another’s goods and successes in the way that they take pleasure in their own, and 
consider one another’s goods integral to their own well-being in much the same way as 
those goods which accrue to them more directly, each of the members of Plato’s two 
‘pairs’ of friends or lovers will love and relate to the other in much the same way that he 
does himself.     208
 There is a crucial element of Aristotle’s account of the best kind of friendship, 
however, which is conspicuously absent from these two best kinds of friendship as 
described by Plato.  As we saw above, in Aristotle’s initial definition of friendship in the 
Rhetoric, he makes a point of claiming that when you are truly a friend to someone, you 
desire that which you believe to be good for that person ‘not for your own sake but for 
his,’ and this apparent contrast, between that which one desires for one’s own sake, and 
that which one desires for the sake of one’s friend, is generally taken to be a central 
element of his account of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics as well.   We have 209
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.4 1166a31-32.   206
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already seen this aspect of his account in the Nicomachean Ethics appear above in his 
recounting of what ‘people take a friend to be’: someone who wishes the good, or 
apparent good, of his friend ‘for the sake of the other,’ or ‘for the friend’s own sake.’  
This provision appears elsewhere in the account as well, and often in the context of the 
ways in which the best kind of friends’ love for one another is like the love which they 
have for themselves, for example, in the claim that “the one who is most a friend is the 
friend who wishes good things for the one for whom he wishes them, for the other’s sake, 
even if no one will know; and these features belong most to oneself in relation to 
oneself....”   Though we have seen, then, that Aristotle sometimes uses similar wording 210
in the Nicomachean Ethics to mean something very different from what it would appear 
to mean in the Rhetoric passage, as when he claims above, for example, that the love 
which one feels for one’s friends is ‘for their own sake’ when it is ‘based on character,’ 
insofar as one then loves them ‘because of themselves,’ and so ‘for the sake of’ the 
persons who they most essentially are, it seems clear that he also deploys this sort of 
wording in a sense very much like that with which he used it in the Rhetoric.  
 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.8 1168b2-5.210
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 In the Nicomachean Ethics, then, there seem to be (at least) two importantly 
different senses of ‘for their own sake’ at work in Aristotle’s account.   On the one hand, 211
there is a sense of ‘for their own sake’ in play with which the natural contrast would be 
something like ‘for the sake of their political connections,’ or ‘for the sake of their dinner 
parties,’ or even, it seems, ‘for the sake of their pleasant sense of humor.’  Here, it seems 
that ‘for the sake of’ is being used to pick out those things about the friends in question 
on account of which one feels affection for them or chooses to be their friend, those 
things about them by which one is motivated to pursue or maintain a friendship with 
them.  And in this sense of ‘for their own sake’ it seems that the two best sorts of 
friendship which we see in the Phaedrus are as much ‘for the friend’s own sake’ as 
Aristotle’s own best kind of friendship, insofar as these two best sorts of friendship are 
equally based on the most essential aspects of each party’s own character.  But there is 
also a sense of ‘for the friend’s own sake’ in play in the Ethics which, as in the Rhetoric, 
invites a contrast, instead, with that which is ‘for your own sake,’ or perhaps even ‘for the 
sake of’ other people or entities in which one takes an interest, such as one’s family or 
polis.   This sense of ‘for the sake of’ would seem to be indicating something more like 212
 For helpful discussion of the different ways in which Aristotle employs this expression (and the several 211
Greek expressions it commonly translates) in his accounts of friendship see Michael Pakaluk. Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction. (New York: Cambridge U.P., 2005) 263-271; Kelly Rogers. 
“Aristotle on Loving Another for His Own Sake.” Phronesis, 39.3 (1994): 291-302, especially 291-293; 
Whiting, 283-287; & Jennifer Whiting. “Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for 
Themselves.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65.2 (Sep. 2002): 274-276.  See also Jennifer 
Whiting. “Impersonal Friends.” The Monist, 74.1 (Jan. 1991): 3-29, where I take one significant thread in 
her argument to be that these seemingly different uses of the expression are in fact much more closely 
related than they initially appear.
 See, e.g., acting “for the sake of” one’s “fatherland” at Nicomachean Ethics 9.8 1169a20. 212
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the person (or entity) on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, one takes oneself to act, or to 
feel, as one does.  And it is this sense of the claim that one’s goodwill or love for one’s 
friend, in the best kind of friendship, must be ‘for the friend’s own sake,’ with its implied 
contrast, which brings into play the much fraught debate over the respective roles of 
‘egoism’ and ‘altruism’ in Aristotle’s theory of friendship, and in the ethics of friendship 
in general, and the related (and sometimes conflated) debate over whether the best sort of 
friend, either in Aristotle’s theory or in matter of ethical fact, may value his friend’s good, 
or even his friend, instrumentally, or only as a final good.  Though this is a debate too 
sweeping to engage with in any detail here, it is worth noting, I think, that Plato does not 
feel the need to explicitly draw such a contrast in the Phaedrus, despite drawing a very 
clear distinction between those who genuinely do desire the good of those for whom they 
feel eros, and those who are merely willing to promote that good insofar as it is an 
effective means to achieving their other desires, without taking any further interest in it.  
And, while this is a point which would likely require its own paper to argue convincingly, 
I would like to at least suggest here that this difference between Plato’s approach and 
Aristotle’s is not an insignificant one.  Nor, I think, does it reflect a simple failure on 
Plato’s part to consider a problem of which Aristotle was more fully aware.   
 I would like to suggest, rather, that Plato’s lack of attention to this question in the 
Phaedrus is tied to his commitment elsewhere to the claim that final and instrumental 
value are by no means incompatible, and, furthermore, that a given individual may 
simultaneously value a given thing both instrumentally and as an end, without his 
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ascription to it of one kind of value in any way diminishing his ascription to it of the 
other.  In fact, as one may recall from the well-known passages in Book II of his 
Republic, Plato has seemed to endorse the view that “the finest goods,”  those which we 213
both do and should value most highly, are of the “kind of good we like for its own sake 
and also for the sake of what comes from it – knowing, for example, and seeing.... We 
welcome such things, I suppose, on both counts.”   He will go on, in the Republic, to 214
argue that justice, and all the other virtues, are of this kind of good: such that we naturally 
value them both for their own sake and for the sake of their consequences, that is, both as 
final and as instrumental goods.  And to value things in this way, it seems, is on his view 
to value them more highly, not less so, than those things to which we ascribe exclusively 
final value, such as “joy... and all the harmless pleasures that have no results beyond the 
joy of having them.”   If we take this claim seriously, then, it seems that much of the 215
debate over how one should value the friend and his good, and, consequently, the related 
debate over the roles of egoism and altruism in such relationships, will need to be re-
framed in a Platonic context.  And, by taking this claim seriously, we can begin to see a 
principled motivation for the seemingly curious lack of priority in the various goods of 
the world of the soul depicted in the palinode, where, as we have seen, each of the central 
goods in the soul’s un-embodied existence would seem to be treated simultaneously as an 





others, as well as for the corresponding lack of clear priority in Plato’s depiction of the 
lover’s motivations for pursuing a relationship with his beloved.   
 We may also, I think, begin to see a response to yet another of the supposed 
aporiai about friendship generated by Socrates in the Lysis.  How can it be, he there asks 
Menexenus, that anyone or anything can be truly called a ‘friend,’ except for “some first 
principle,”  “for the sake of which we say that all the rest are friends too.”   If 216 217
“whoever is a friend.... has to be a friend to someone.... for the sake of something,”  he 218
argues, and this ‘something’ will itself be a ‘friend’ as well, then “the friend is friend of 
its friend for the sake of a friend,”  and this regress can hardly go on forever.  So, 219
eventually, some “first friend”  must be reached, “which will no longer bring us back to 220
another friend.”   But wouldn’t it then be the case, he suggests, that “all the other things 221
that we have called friends for the sake of that thing may be deceiving us, like so many 
phantoms of it, and that it is the first thing which is truly a friend?”   If this picture has 222
things right, he argues, then “the real friend is surely that in which all these so-called 










friend.”   Rather, it seems, it will turn out that only the good itself is a ‘real friend,’ 224
since only the good is not “prized and loved”  for the sake of any other thing.  To reach 225
this conclusion, however, Socrates has implicitly generated a dichotomy between that 
which is ‘prized and loved’ as a final good, and that which is ‘prized and loved’ as an 
instrumental good or ‘for the sake of’ some other thing, such that Menexenus is led to 
infer that these two ways of loving or valuing any given thing are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive.   If we take the above claim from Republic Book II, seriously, however, 226
then this is a dichotomy that Plato rejects.  And without this dichotomy, the supposed 
aporia which Socrates goes on to generate from the conclusion that only the good is a 
friend will fail to follow.  We have several good reasons, then, it seems, to give this claim 
further attention in the context of Plato’s views on interpersonal friendship and love. 
 Lysis 220b5.224
 Lysis 220d3.225
 The example which Socrates deploys to secure Menexenus’ agreement that we do not in fact love those 226
things which we ‘love’ for the sake of something else, but only that thing for the sake of which we love 
them, is of items clearly valued exclusively as means or instrumental goods: the wine which a man believes 
will save his poisoned son, and the wineskin and cup required to administer it (Lysis 219d8-220a2).  It 
seems clear in this example that the man truly loves only his son, not the wine, wineskin, or cup, and 
Socrates leads Menexenus to generalize from this intuition to the claim that nothing is truly loved if it is 
loved for the sake of something else, presumably by way of an implicit conflation of the claim that that 
which is loved for the sake of something else is not truly loved with the claim that that which is loved only 
for the sake of something else is not truly loved.  But this latter move can only be valid on the assumption 
that all things which are loved for the sake of something else are loved only for the sake of something else, 
an assumption which we have seen that we have reason to think Plato rejects.  Furthermore, Socrates’ use 
of a man’s love for his son as the example of ‘true’ love in this case serves to highlight the problem with 
this assumption in the context of the Lysis as a whole, since his initial conversation with Lysis had seemed 
to suggest that fathers (and mothers), in particular, should be taken to love their sons for the sake of other 
things.
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IX. The Philosophical Friends 
 Leaving aside, for the moment, though, discussion of the ways in which Plato’s 
two highest sorts of friend in the Phaedrus may or may not be said to love each other ‘for 
the sake of the other,’ or to wish one another’s good ‘for the friend’s own sake,’ it seems 
that a different contrast with Aristotle’s later account may offer us a useful insight into the 
nature of these two highest relationships described by Plato.  Although both of these two 
highest sorts of relationship on Plato’s account share nearly all of the most important 
features of Aristotle’s ‘virtue friendship,’ and, it seems, to an equivalent extent, on 
Aristotle’s account the possession of these features is treated as sufficient to identify a 
friendship as one of the highest possible sort, while on Plato’s account one of these two 
kinds of friendships is seen as significantly superior to the other, not only in quality, but 
in kind.  And this is because, Plato has argued, although both of these friendships share 
all of the features we have noted in common with Aristotle’s ‘virtue friendship,’ as well 
as the others which we have briefly discussed above, in the highest kind of friendship the 
pair of friends ‘follow the assigned regimen of philosophy’ in their life lived together, 
whereas in the second-best kind they instead have ‘ambition in place of philosophy,’ as in 
some sense filling the same central role.  And this single difference, it seems, is 
conceived of as deeply affecting the overall natures of these two kinds of friendship, 
despite all the rest they have in common.  Plato’s explanation of this crucial difference, 
however, is frustratingly brief.  What are we to take it to mean, for the nature of these two 
kinds of friendship, that the parties engaged in them ‘follow ... philosophy,’ or put 
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ambition in its place?  What exactly is the ‘place’ of philosophy in the life of the 
‘philosophical pair,’ which is somehow usurped by ‘ambition’ in the lesser pair’s case?  
While there does also seem to be a difference in the centrality of the specifically sexual 
aspects of these two pairs’ relationships, Plato casts this difference as a consequence of 
the difference between the roles that philosophy and ambition play in their respective 
lives together, and the resultant differences in their personal characters, rather than in any 
way a cause of the important differences between their two relationships or ways of life.  
If we are to find an explanation for the superiority of one of these kinds of friendship to 
the other, then, it seems that we must look for it in the respective roles philosophy and 
ambition play in the shared lives of the friends. 
 As a first attempt we might take the claim that the ‘philosophical pair’ ‘follow the 
assigned regimen of philosophy’ to mean that they live their shared life together in that 
way which is ‘assigned’ by philosophy, that is, in that way in which philosophy dictates 
or directs that they should do.  To say this much, however, does little to reduce the 
ambiguity implicit in the claim, since there are still at least two fairly obvious 
interpretations we might give of what this means.  On the one hand, we might take it to 
mean that they live their life together in accordance with a ‘regimen’ the specifications of 
which are contained in or implied by philosophy, where ‘philosophy’ is conceived of as a 
body of knowledge from which practical rules or recommendations for conduct can be 
drawn or inferred.  On this reading Plato would be claiming that the ‘philosophical pair’ 
live their lives in accordance with a ‘regimen’ dictated by philosophy in much the same 
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way in which we might ordinarily say that someone lives his life in accordance with a 
‘regimen’ dictated by medicine, that is, according to that way of life which medicine, 
understood as a body of knowledge both containing and implying certain practical rules 
or recommendations, tells him, or allows him to see for himself, is the best or most 
appropriate way for him to live.  One might think, then, on this reading of the claim, that 
for the ‘philosophical pair’ to live in accordance with the ‘regimen of philosophy,’ is 
simply for them to live their life in that way which is prescribed for them as best by the 
new knowledge of themselves and their place in the cosmos which they have gained 
through their revelatory recollections and experience of eros.  If this is the way we should 
read the claim, however, then it seems that the majority of the important progress which 
the ‘philosophical pair’ will make during their time spent together has already been made 
by the time that they have reached this final stage of their relationship, during the initial, 
turbulent, course of their eros.  It is through this process, after all, of their initial erotic 
‘possession’ and struggle to make sense of and respond to it correctly, that they have 
come to have their transformational insights into the natures of their own souls, the souls 
of the gods, and the world of the perfectly real beings, as well as to forge the psychic 
concord in themselves which will allow them to reliably implement the lessons of these 
insights in the course of their future lives.  Viewed in this way, the continuing relationship 
between the ‘philosophical pair’ after this final stage of their relationship has been 
reached looks relatively unimportant, more like an extended period of resting on their 
laurels won in love than like a highly laudable or fruitful form of interaction in its own 
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right.  The philosophical and ethical significance of their lifelong friendship, then, would 
seem to be secondary, on this reading, to that of the briefer period of intense eros through 
which it was formed.  Even if we leave aside, however, the more general question of 
whether it would be appropriate to think of ‘philosophy,’ in the context of the Phaedrus, 
in this way, as referring to a given body of knowledge which one might come to have 
through various philosophical activities, reading the claim in this way would leave us 
with a much more obvious problem: if the ‘place’ of ‘philosophy’ in the life of this 
highest pair of friends is that of a newly-learned body of knowledge from which they can 
infer practical guidance as to how to live their lives, then in what plausible sense could 
‘ambition’ come to occupy this ‘place’?  ‘Ambition’ would hardly seem to be the sort of 
thing which could be thought of as constituting a body of knowledge, analogous to 
medicine or other such arts, from which one might draw or infer practical guidance.  If 
we are to preserve the parallel which Plato draws, then, between the ‘place’ of philosophy 
in the life of the ‘philosophical pair’ and that of ‘ambition’ in the life of the lesser pair of 
friends, then it seems we must read this claim in a different way.    
 Fortunately, the second most obvious way in which we might read this claim 
seems more promising in this respect.  And this second reading would also seem to be 
suggested by the language of the passage itself.  The word translated as ‘ambition’ in the 
passage above is ‘philotimia,’ which could also be translated as ‘love of honor,’ just as 
‘philosophy’ could be translated as ‘love of wisdom.’  The parallel roles which 
‘philosophy’ and ‘ambition’ play in the lives of the greater and lesser pair of friends, then, 
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are each being played by a certain kind of love, and, moreover, by a certain kind of 
philia.  Where ‘ambition’ has taken the place of ‘philosophy’ in the lives of the lesser pair 
of friends, then, what has happened would seem to be much more clear: the role most 
appropriately played in the life of the friends by the love of wisdom has come to be 
played by the love of honor instead, and so the same ‘place’ which the love of wisdom 
fills in the life of the best kind of friends has come to be occupied by the love of honor in 
the lesser pair’s case.  On this sort of reading, it seems, ‘philosophy’ is not meant to refer 
to a body of knowledge and its associated applications, but rather to something much 
more like a system of values or motivations, in much the same way that ‘ambition’ 
typically does.  And this reading would be very much in holding with the sorts of claims 
we are accustomed to hearing from Plato’s Socrates, that to be a philosopher is to value, 
love, and pursue wisdom, rather than to have it entirely.   The way in which 227
‘philosophy’ directs the best pair of friends towards its ‘assigned regimen’ in their life 
together, then, would be less analogous to the way in which we might ordinarily say that 
something like medicine does this than the way in which we might ordinarily say that 
something like health-consciousness does.  Just as the love of health and desire to be 
healthy would lead the individuals who had it to live their lives in certain ways, according 
to that ‘regimen’ which they took to best advance them in the pursuit of their goal of good 
health, both for themselves and, potentially, for others, the love of wisdom, or of honor, 
would likewise lead the individuals who had them to live their lives in those ways, or 
 See, e.g., Phaedrus 278d4-6; Lysis 218a4-b3.227
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according to those ‘regimens,’ which they took to best advance them in their pursuits of 
wisdom and of honor, respectively.  The ‘place’ of philosophy in the lives of the best kind 
of friends, then, would be that of a shared value, aim, or guiding principle, according to 
the pursuit and glorification of which they ordered and organized their shared life 
together.  The crucial difference between the best and the second-best kinds of friendship, 
then, would be a difference in the highest shared value, the shared passion, pursuit, or 
project, according to which these two respective kinds of friends organized their common 
life.  Where the shared life of the ‘philosophical pair’ would be one devoted to a common 
passion for and collaborative pursuit of wisdom, the shared life of the lesser pair would 
be one devoted to a common passion for and collaborative pursuit of honor instead.    228
 And on this reading it does not seem to be the case that the most important work 
of the friends’ lives together has already been done by the time that they reach this 
highest stage of their relationship.  Rather, the benefits offered by the course of their eros 
have provided them with the foundations on which to build, in the best of such 
friendships, an ongoing, collaborative, pursuit of wisdom, throughout the rest of their 
lives and beyond.  Their revelatory recollections of the worlds of the souls and the 
perfectly real beings have provided them with a desire for wisdom which they had 
formerly lacked (or at least failed to consciously recognize) by offering them a new 
 Plato does not specifically address in the Phaedrus what such a shared life of pursing honor might be 228
like, in contrast to that of pursuing philosophy.  It is an interesting question to ask, however, since this 
account would seem to imply that such a life would not be a bad one, and might very well be positively 
virtuous in many ways, although inferior to that of the philosophical pair.  I hope to explore this question 
further in a future paper. 
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awareness of the existence of a world of pure truth beyond the margins of their ordinary 
experience, as well as of their own capacity to know this world through the direct 
perceptions of their un-embodied souls and their resulting ability to recollect its truths 
during their current, embodied, lives, while simultaneously opening their eyes to the 
otherworldly joys of their un-embodied souls and so to their own deep and inborn desires 
to draw as close as they possibly can to the truths and perfections of these transcendent 
worlds.  The psychic concord which they have created and learned to maintain through 
their successful struggles with the initial violence of their eros, moreover, has provided 
them with the stability of character and rule of reason in their souls which they will need 
if they are to reliably follow the courses of action and overall way of life towards which 
the rational parts of their souls direct them as those most conducive to their pursuit of 
wisdom, as well as most in holding with the demands of wisdom itself, insofar as they 
may come to have it, and with the honor and respect which they owe to wisdom, in all of 
its manifestations, as something they both value highly and know to be ‘divine.’  In 
addition to this newfound understanding of and desire for wisdom, furthermore, and the 
necessary stability and responsiveness of soul required in order to pursue this newfound 
desire, their experiences of eros have also provided them with two further resources on 
which to rely in their ongoing pursuit of wisdom: the first of these, in holding with what 
has been gradually emerging as a unifying theme in the Phaedrus, is the insight they have 
been granted into the natures of their own individual souls, both as souls of a given type, 
and as particularly positioned instances of that type, and the second, it now seems 
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plausible to claim, is the partner and aid in the project of philosophy which they have 
gained in the person of their lover turned friend. 
X. Friendship and the Nature of Philosophy 
 But here we come up against what would appear to be a confusion in our 
argument.  Haven’t we argued above that the ‘philosophical’ type of soul is one among 
the immutable ‘divine’ types into which souls are to be divided according to the god ‘in 
whose chorus they danced’ in heaven?  Are not the ‘philosophers’ among us, that is, to be 
identified not with the most accomplished of the souls belonging to each of these ‘divine’ 
types of soul, as it seems that our ‘philosophical pair’ are, but rather with the most 
accomplished among those souls who are naturally followers of Zeus?  Fortunately for 
our argument, it seems that the answer to this question is both more complex, and much 
more interesting, than we might initially be led to expect.  It would seem, in fact, that 
Plato’s account in the Phaedrus provides us with two different senses in which human 
beings might be rightly called philosophers: first if they are true lovers and pursuers of 
wisdom, as the members of our ‘philosophical pair’ now are, and, second, if they are both 
this and practitioners of the art of dialectic, which constitutes the most systematic and 
universal means of effecting such pursuit.  It is in the second sense, I would like to claim, 
that only the most accomplished followers of Zeus are properly to be called philosophers, 
while in the first sense a sufficiently accomplished soul of any of the many ‘divine’ types 
may also deserve this name. 
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 Recall, above, in our discussion of the ways in which the beloved might initially 
come to see ‘himself in the lover as in a mirror,’ the parallel we drew between the activity 
of the lover during the early, ‘pedagogical,’ stage of their relationship, and the activity of 
which Plato has argued, in the second half of the Phaedrus, that true rhetoric, insofar as 
there is such a thing, must be the art: that of ‘directing the soul by means of speech.’  We 
had begun, in that discussion, to see a unifying theme emerging between the discussion of 
love in the first part of the Phaedrus and the discussion of rhetoric in its second part: an 
emphasis on the crucial importance to both of these endeavors of the knowledge of souls.  
While both the successful progress of their love and the advancement of their own 
personal virtue depends, for the lovers, in large part on the developing insight into the 
natures of their own and one another’s souls which they have gained through their 
experience of love, the art of the true rhetorician, by Plato’s later arguments, can only be 
the art of understanding the natures of all human souls – their various types and the ways 
in which these types will manifest themselves in the behavior of individuals here in this 
world – and so the ways in which various individuals will respond, in various contexts, to 
various kinds of attempts at persuasion.  The true rhetorician, that is, must, on this view, 
be an expert psychologist, able to deeply understand, and so to effectively ‘direct,’ or 
manipulate, the soul of any individual whom he encounters.  The successful lover, on the 
other hand, must possess only a very specific portion of the knowledge and skill which 
the true rhetorician must have: he must understand the natures and particular 
manifestations not of all types of souls and their many variations, but only of that one 
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type of soul which he and his beloved share, and the ways in which it manifests in their 
two particular cases.  It seems, however, as though this parallel between the art of the true 
rhetorician and the activity of our successful lovers has been gradually effaced as they 
have moved beyond this ‘pedagogical’ stage of their relationship and into the equal 
partnership in life which they now share.  The parallel between the activity of the true 
lover and the art of the true rhetorician, that is, would seem to depend in large part upon 
the asymmetry between the lover and beloved which has now disappeared.  The true 
lover, during the pedagogical stage of their relationship, ‘directed’ the soul of his beloved 
towards greater understanding and virtue on the basis of the knowledge which he himself 
had newly gained through his experience of love, but which the beloved did not yet share.  
Once the beloved has himself become a lover, however, and achieved a position of parity 
with the original lover in respect to such knowledge, it seems that the time for unilateral 
‘directing’ is over.  Once the pair have reached this stage of their relationship, however, it 
seems that we can start to see an even more important parallel beginning to emerge: that 
between the activity in which the ‘philosophical pair’ are now engaged together, and the 
activity of which dialectic is the art. 
 True rhetoric, Plato has Socrates argue in the second half of the Phaedrus, the art 
of ‘directing the soul by means of speech,’ is an art that can only be fully mastered as a 
“side effect”  of studying the much broader art of “dialectic.”   Dialectic, in turn, he 229 230
 Phaedrus 274a1. 229
 Phaedrus 266c9.230
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defines as the art of making proper “divisions and collections”  of any given subject 231
into the appropriate natural kinds, and ranging the various elements of that subject 
correctly under their true definitions and the true definitions of the kinds to which they 
belong, so as to come to understand not only the true natures of the things being studied, 
but also of their relationships to one another.   This art, he argues, is required not only 232
for coming to systematically and comprehensively understand the various types of souls 
and of speech, as the true rhetorician must, but for coming to systematically and 
comprehensively understand any subject at all.  As an art of understanding, then, and not 
just of speech, dialectic, when practiced in speech, need not simply serve to impart to 
another information which the practitioner of the art already has.  Rather, where rhetoric 
alone, at its very best, can serve only to convey knowledge (or perhaps even only true 
belief) from the rhetorician to the listener, dialectic can be used to create new knowledge, 
not only in an interlocutor, but in the dialectician himself.  It is an art not only of 
speaking, Plato argues, but of thinking as well, and those who pursue it do so in order that 
they “may be able to think and to speak.”  233
 Where dialectic is employed in the composition of speeches, then, Plato implies 
that it need not serve only to present a position upon which the composer of the speech 
has already decided.  Rather, the reasoning employed in producing such a speech may 
itself be a means by which the truth of the matter is “discovered,” or by which the 
 Phaedrus 266b3-4.231
 See Phaedrus 265d1-266c2.232
 Phaedrus 266b4.233
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dialectician and his audience together are “led” closer to discerning that truth.   The 234
distinctive practice of this art, he argues, is first and foremost that of “seeing together 
things that are scattered about everywhere and collecting them into one kind, so that by 
defining each thing we can make clear the subject,”  while at the same time being 235
careful “to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and... not to 
splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.”   Recall here, however, the claim which 236
we saw Plato make at the very beginning of the palinode to love, that every human being 
‘must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding to bring many perceptions 
together into a reasoned unity,’  and that this “process is the recollection of the things 237
our soul saw when it was traveling with god.”   In light of this claim, the process of 238
‘collection and division’ which Plato describes for us here as the distinctive task of 
dialectic – bringing many scattered things together under the unifying definition of a 
single general kind, while carefully dividing up all such general kinds along their ‘natural 
joints’ until we “reach something indivisible”  – looks very much like a systematic way 239
of engaging in just such a process of recollection.  The art of dialectic, then, would be the 
art of systematically employing the resources provided to us by our natural ability to 
understand the ‘general forms’ required for the use of language in order to provoke 
 See Phaedrus 266a.  234
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 Phaedrus 265e1-3.236




further or more precise recollections of the corresponding general truths which our souls 
came to know in their travels with god.  And if this is the essence of the art of dialectic, 
provoking recollection in the soul in this way through the systematic use of language, 
then it is in principle equally well suited to doing so either in the soul of the dialectician 
himself or in the souls of others. 
 Where the dialectician has applied his dialectic to achieve a systematic 
understanding of souls, then, that is, where he has become a true rhetorician as well, he 
will be able to employ his dialectic to provoke recollection not only in the souls of other 
people who are much like himself, and so likely to be moved towards recollection by the 
same sorts of uses of language which are likely to move him, but also in the souls of 
anyone with whom he is able to engage in speech.  And from this, perhaps, we can begin 
to see at least one motivation for Socrates’ rather puzzling condemnation of writing in the 
midst of Plato’s own written work.  Such a dialectician, as it seems we must take Socrates 
himself to be, will have a keen awareness of the inevitable limitations of even the best 
sort of writing: a written work, once committed to paper, is incapable of adapting itself to 
the souls of its individual readers, “it continues to signify just that very same thing 
forever.... reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who 
have no business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it 
should not.”   A living dialectician, on the other hand, in his role as a true rhetorician, 240
can “determine which kind of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul... and offer a 
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complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one.... 
either in order to teach or in order to persuade.”   And when a dialectician pursues his 241
art for the right reasons, and practices it with the right goals in mind, in accordance with 
the right set of values, “so as to be able to speak and act in a way that pleases the gods as 
much as possible,”  realizing that “only what is said for the sake of understanding and 242
learning, what is truly written in the soul concerning what is just, noble, and good can be 
clear, perfect, and worth serious attention,”  then he is rightly to be called “wisdom’s 243
lover – a philosopher.”   244
 Plato implies very heavily, however, that this sort of philosophy, the practice of 
dialectic as a systematic art towards the end of pursuing wisdom for oneself and fostering 
its growth in others, is the province of the followers of Zeus.  So, Socrates tells Phaedrus, 
in the course of the palinode, that “we were with Zeus, while others followed other 
gods,”  and concludes his description of the philosopher-dialectician with the claim that 245
“such a man, Phaedrus, would be just what you and I both would pray to become.”   246
And where he finds someone with a talent for dialectic, Socrates claims, he will “follow 









behavior which he has described in a lover who has seen his god’s image in the soul of a 
prospective beloved.  And where Socrates has seen an image of his god, he has seen an 
image of Zeus.  When those who follow Zeus, then, ‘choose someone to love who is a 
Zeus himself’ insofar as he ‘has a talent for philosophy and the guidance of others,’  it 248
seems very plausible that the talent in question is an aptitude specifically for ‘philosophy’ 
as dialectic, and the corresponding gift for the ‘guidance of others’ which comes from its 
application to teaching other souls through the art of true rhetoric. 
 The philosophy, then, in which our ‘philosophical pair’ are engaged, at least in 
those cases where they are not themselves followers of Zeus, will not be the sort of 
philosophy as dialectic to which the Zeus-type souls are particularly suited, but rather, 
some other way of honoring and pursuing wisdom in their lives.  And this dual usage of 
‘philosophy,’ sometimes picking out a specific way of honoring and pursuing wisdom 
through the art of dialectic, and sometimes the much broader practice of honoring and 
pursuing wisdom in whatever way is suited to the nature of one’s own particularly 
situated type of soul, can account for what might otherwise seem to be oddly conflicting 
claims within the palinode about what is required for a soul to regrow its wings.  Having 
claimed, for example, that this prize is to be won both by loving philosophically and by 
practicing ‘philosophy without guile,’ Plato goes on, within less than a page, to claim that 
“only a philosopher’s mind grows wings.”   If this is not to be a contradiction, then, we 249
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must take it that practicing ‘philosophy without guile,’ that is, as we might now presume, 
employing the arts of dialectic and true rhetoric in the pursuit and teaching of truth, and 
loving philosophically are both ways of being a philosopher, since the souls of those who 
do both of these things will regrow their wings.  And here, it seems, Plato’s choice of 
Zeus as the god of the philosopher-dialecticians may be helpful to us in understanding the 
relationship between these two kinds of philosophy.  The role of Zeus, in the palinode’s 
description of the divine procession, is a universal, systematic task; he is charged with 
“looking after everything, and putting all things in order,”  while each of the other gods 250
is occupied only with “seeing to his own work.”   The dialectician then, in attempting to 251
understand the world comprehensively and systematically, is emulating the distinctive 
way of life of his god, ‘looking after everything, and putting all things in order’ in his 
own mind, following the unchanging patterns provided by the perfectly real beings 
outside of heaven in order to do this correctly, just as Zeus himself does in the cosmos as 
a whole.   If this comprehensive systemization is the element of dialectic that belongs to 252
the emulation of Zeus, then, what do we have left to say about the method by which the 
other types of souls pursue philosophy?  
 If what we have suggested above about the connection between dialectic and 
recollection is true, then it seems that dialectic is a systematic art of promoting 
 Phaedrus 246e5-6.250
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 This is my own, somewhat speculative, interpretation of the significance of Zeus’s role as the god of the 252
philosopher-dialecticians in this particular context, given the way in which Plato has chosen to characterize 
Zeus in the allegorical myth of the palinode.  Should this interpretation prove unconvincing, however, the 
remainder of the argument is intended to stand on its own.
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recollection through the use of the resources provided to all of us by our shared human 
capacity to understand language.  It is a systematic art, then, of promoting recollection 
through the use of language, either in private thought, or in speaking with others.  And 
the way in which such recollection is best promoted for any given soul, it seems, will 
depend upon the type of soul which it is, both in terms of its unchanging, divine, type, 
and its degree of accomplishment with respect to understanding and virtue.  In their 
experience of love, however, Plato has argued that our lovers have become ‘well 
equipped’ for finding ways of promoting such recollections in themselves in the process 
of pursuing ever greater emulation of their own particular god.  And, since the progress of 
their love has ensured that they will share a common type of soul, both in terms of divine 
type, and in terms of their general degree of accomplishment in virtue and in 
understanding, the ways in which recollection will be best promoted for each of them will 
be very much the same.  In their interactions and conversations with one another over the 
course of their shared life, then, the philosophical friends will be uniquely positioned, as 
well as motivated, to create new knowledge for themselves and one another in just that 
way in which the dialectician is able to do with any given soul whom he may meet,  by 253
engaging together in those uses of language which are most suited to promote 
 Or, perhaps, at least, any sufficiently accomplished soul he may meet.  The philosopher-dialectician may 253
not be able to engage in the collaborative creation of new knowledge with souls who are drastically less 
knowledgable and skilled than he is, and may be restricted in his conversations with them to guiding them 
towards the recognition of truths with which he himself is already very familiar, in his role as a true 
rhetorician.  Indeed, one might plausibly read Socrates’ engagement with Phaedrus in the dialogue as a 
whole as an example of just such rhetorical guidance of a less accomplished soul towards greater 
understanding and pursuit of the truth by a philosopher-dialectician in his role as a practitioner of true 
rhetoric.
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recollection in souls of the type which they share.  Where the philosopher-dialectician’s 
ability to engage in such collaborative creation of knowledge through “discourse”  with 254
any type of soul depends upon his systematic, universal, understanding of the natures, 
and therefore the needs, of all of the various types of soul, then, the best kind of friend’s 
ability to engage in this same activity of collaboratively creating knowledge depends 
instead upon his particular, personal, understanding of the natures, and therefore the 
needs, of his and his friend’s own souls. 
Conclusion: A Philosophical Life 
 If this reading of the Phaedrus proves a convincing one, then, Plato has provided 
us, here, not only with an account of the best kinds of friendship which anticipates many 
of the most compelling features of Aristotle’s much more celebrated account, but also 
with an intriguing picture of the importance of both personal love and personal friendship 
to the practice of philosophy.  The kind of philosophy which we are accustomed to 
associating with Plato, the rigorous, systematic, dialectical investigation of someone like 
a Socrates, is on this account a way of loving wisdom to which only a very specific sort 
of soul is naturally inclined.  Any other sort of soul, however, if sufficiently virtuous, is 
nevertheless equally capable of pursuing and honoring wisdom in that way to which its 
own type is naturally best suited, through the opportunity afforded by the powerful ability 
of interpersonal love and friendship to alter the course of our lives.  Personal eros and the 
enduring personal philia it creates when correctly pursued can, on this picture, offer any 
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one of us a way, through a shared lifelong passion for the perfect and true and 




The Union of Two Persons: 
Friendship and Virtue in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals
!116
Introduction: Friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals  
 Kant, like Plato, and perhaps even more widely, has been much criticized for a 
seemingly austere and impersonal system of ethics which appears to leave little room for 
our most important personal relationships as we typically understand them.  On many 
readings of his views it can require work to find a way to cast what we most often take to 
be central features of these relationships even as morally acceptable, much less as 
morally valuable in the way that we pre-theoretically take them to be.  He is not a 
philosopher, then, from whom we might be inclined to expect an especially illuminating 
account of friendship.  Also like Plato, however, the topic of friendship in particular, and 
even, if not nearly to the extent which we see in Plato's case, love, is one which tends to 
turn up unexpectedly across his works, though often in asides or incidental remarks to 
which he does not again return.  And, two fairly extended discussions of friendship do 
appear in his ethics, in his Lectures on Ethics,  given toward the beginning of his 256
philosophical career,  and in The Metaphysics of Morals, published towards the end of 257
his career, as the last of his major ethical works.  The latter of these is particularly 
fascinating, both because it seems much more to be intended as an exposition of his own 
considered views, and because it is appearing not only in the context of The Metaphysics 
of Morals, as the most developed stage of Kant's ethical thinking to which we are 
extensively privy, but in that of The Doctrine of Virtue specifically, in which Kant is 
 Though he did not write and prepare these for publication himself; they were first published in 1924, 256
from notes on his lectures by his students. [See: Immanuel Kant. Lectures on Ethics. Trans. Louis Infield. 
Forward by Lewis White Beck. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1963), p. x.]
 Or, at least, relatively so, before the publication of the Critiques or the Groundwork.257
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engaged in the project of crafting  a Kantian ethics of virtue, or, dare we say, virtue 258
ethics, and, as such, is in dialogue, in intriguing ways, with this broader project of the 
work.   
 Moreover, although this discussion of friendship appears, at first glance, to be 
both frustratingly brief and opaque, it is positioned within The Doctrine of Virtue in a 
way that suggests that Kant takes it to have a much more general significance for the 
work as a whole than we might initially infer from its content.  It is presented to us, that 
is, as the conclusion of the entirety of the Elements of Ethics, the significantly larger and 
more complex of the two main sub-divisions of The Doctrine of Virtue.  It is far from 
apparent, however, why Kant should take this odd little account of friendship to deserve 
what seems to be such pride of place.  What is it that he takes the broader meaning of this 
account of friendship to be for his overall account of virtue, such that it would make 
sense for it to serve as a conclusion to the Elements of Ethics in this way?  And what 
might this, in turn, if we could discover it, have to tell us about how best to read his 
account of virtue overall?  This offers us an appealing mystery.  The goal of this paper, 
then, will be a fairly limited one: to offer an attempt to make sense of Kant's account of 
friendship, as he gives it in these sections, as a kind of virtue friendship, of the sort with 
which we should now be familiar from Aristotle and Plato, but with some distinctively 
Kantian features.  And, on the basis of this reading, to offer some gestures, though only 
 Or, perhaps, explicating, depending upon how significantly one wishes to take the system he outlines in 258
The Metaphysics of Morals to diverge from those presented in his earlier works.  This paper attempts to 
remain agnostic on this larger question of Kant scholarship.
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very vague ones, in the direction of how we might begin to see a valuable role for certain 
types of personal relationships emerge from within Kant's account of virtue. 
I. Perfect Friendship & Moral Friendship 
 What Kant has to say about friendship in these sections, however, is far from 
clear, beginning with even so simple a question as how many different types of friendship 
he takes himself to be discussing, and what the features of these types of friendship are.  
At first glance he appears to be addressing, primarily, two kinds of friendship, to each of 
which he devotes its own section: "perfect friendship,"  which, though "practically 259
necessary"  as an "idea,"  is "unattainable in practice,"  and "[m]oral friendship"  260 261 262 263
which, by contrast, "is not just an ideal, but, (like black swans) actually exists here and 
there in its perfection."   The first of these, 'perfect friendship,' he initially describes, in 264
what would seem to be self-consciously Aristotelian language, as "the union of two 
persons through equal mutual love and respect,"  "an ideal of each participating and 265
sharing sympathetically in the other's well-being through the morally good will that 
unites them."   Though this sort of a friendship can never be fully attained "in its purity 266
 Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996)   259
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or completeness,"  Kant argues, we nevertheless have "a duty of friendship,"  and 267 268
presumably, given the context, friendship of this kind, such that "striving for 
friendship,"  even as an ideal which we know that we can never fully meet, "is a duty 269
set by reason."   The second type of friendship, 'moral friendship,' on the other hand, he 270
describes as "the complete confidence of two persons in revealing their secret judgments 
and feelings to each other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with mutual 
respect."   Where the first sort of friendship was initially cast in terms of its relationship 271
to duty, this second sort of friendship is first characterized in terms of its advantage to the 
friends: providing them with a way to meet the innate social "need"  that every human 272
being feels "to reveal himself to others."   While each of us is typically "constrained to 273
lock up in himself a good part of his judgments"  by considerations of prudence, Kant 274
argues, "cautioned by fear of the misuse others may make of his disclosing his 
thoughts"  or even, as it seems that each friend in this sort of 'moral friendship' will, 275
"disclosing his faults,"  this constant demand that we keep a close watch on how much 276
of our true thoughts and selves we reveal to each other is one which we naturally feel as 
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both burdensome and painfully isolating.  Within this rare sort of 'moral friendship,' 
however, Kant claims that each party is relieved of this burden; able to fully entrust the 
friend with such otherwise potentially hazardous disclosures, he is no longer forced to be 
"completely alone with his thoughts, as in a prison, but enjoys a freedom he cannot have 
with the masses, among whom he must shut himself up in himself."  277
 Already, then, with this fairly cursory description, and without delving further into 
the many complications raised by the text, we can begin to see some fairly obvious 
questions arising about these two sorts of friendship, and how they are meant to relate to 
one another.  Most obviously, perhaps, we might ask what is meant to be so 'moral' about 
the 'moral friendship' that Kant has described for us here.  He has seemed to characterize 
this sort of friendship primarily in terms of its ability to meet some of the friends' innate 
psychological needs, that is, in terms of what would look to be its satisfaction of certain 
of their natural interests, rather than in terms of any clear relationship it might have to 
their moral duty.  Instead, he seems to have argued that our 'duty of friendship,' insofar as 
he clearly takes us to have one, is a duty to strive after the ideal of 'perfect friendship' 
which he had initially discussed, despite our inability to fully realize this ideal in practice.  
One might reasonably expect, then, that it would be those friendships which most closely 
approximated this unattainable ideal, in the relevant respects, which would have the 
clearest claim to being called 'moral' ones, since it would be in pursuing these sorts of 
friendships that we would be acting on our moral duty of 'striving for friendship' as 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 217, 6:472.277
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conceived of in this ideal.  Why, then, are we offered this second characterization of a 
'moral friendship' so seemingly distinct in its characteristics from the ideal of 'perfect 
friendship' which Kant has outlined for us in the first section?  Are we meant to take it, 
perhaps, that this second sort of friendship is the closest we can come in practice to the 
unattainable ideal which 'perfect friendship' offers us, and so, that in 'striving' after 
friendship of that 'perfect' sort, it is only friendship of this lesser, 'moral,' sort which we 
can hope, at our most successful, to actually achieve?   
 At first, this sort of reading might seem promising, given what Kant has said 
about the possibility of actually finding 'moral friendship' in the world, however rare or 
difficult such friendships might be, in contrast to the unattainability of 'perfect friendship.'  
And we might, perhaps, see some further support for this thought in the point that Kant 
makes of claiming that 'perfect friendship,' to whatever extent it might be attainable, will 
also, in some important sense, be 'moral' in nature.  Such friendship, he argues,  
 cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage but must rather be a purely moral one, and the help  
 that each may count on from the other in case of need must not be regarded as the end and  
 determining ground of friendship – for in that case one would lose the other's respect – but only as  
 the outward manifestation of an inner heartfelt benevolence,...  278
As we turn our attention to the rest of the section, however, it seems clear that a more 
subtle understanding of the relationship between these two sorts of friendship will be 
required, if we are to make good sense of all of Kant's claims.  It is far from obvious, to 
begin with, that whatever he means to be claiming about 'perfect friendship' by calling it 
a 'purely moral' union is the same sort of point he intends to be making about 'moral 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 216, 6:470-71.278
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friendship' by giving it this title.  Moreover, in light of the rest of the section, it begins to 
seem increasingly unlikely that this is the case, and at least in part because, rather than in 
spite, of the passage above. 
II. Moral Friendship & Pragmatic Friendship 
   The first real trouble for this sort of a reading begins to appear when we notice 
that, although the structure of the two sections does seem to suggest that some sort of 
contrast is intended between 'moral friendship' and 'perfect friendship,' this is not a 
contrast that we ever see explicitly drawn.  Rather, 'moral friendship' is explicitly 
contrasted with what seem to be two further types of friendship, neither of which is itself 
clearly defined.  When 'moral friendship' is first introduced, at the beginning of the 
second section, it is explicitly contrasted not with 'perfect friendship,' but with "friendship 
based on feeling."   And this is a sort of friendship with which Kant has just appeared to 279
contrast 'perfect friendship' as well.  Towards the end of the first section, he has claimed 
that 
 [a]lthough it is sweet to feel in possession of each other in a way that approaches fusion into one  
 person, friendship is something so delicate (teneritas amicitiae) that it is never for a moment safe  
 from interruptions if it is allowed to rest on feelings, and if this mutual sympathy and self- 
 surrender are not subjected to principles...  280
Thus far, then, the simple sort of reading we suggested above might still seem fairly 
promising.  It appears here that 'perfect friendship' and 'moral friendship' are both being 
put forward as superior alternatives to some third type of friendship, one ostensibly 
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"common among uncultivated people:"  friendship which is 'based on feeling' or 281
'allowed to rest on feelings.'  Quite plausibly, then, given their commonality in this 
respect, 'moral friendship' might simply turn out to be that aspect of 'perfect friendship' 
which is actually achievable in practice.  Toward the end of the second section, however, 
Kant introduces a further contrast, which complicates this picture significantly.   
 We have said above that one of Kant's central claims about the 'moral friendship' 
outlined in this section is that, unlike 'perfect friendship,' it is actually achievable 'in its 
perfection.'  In putting forward this crucial claim, however, Kant in fact shifts from 
speaking simply of 'moral friendship,' as he had in contrasting this sort of friendship with 
friendship 'based on feeling' at the start of the section, to speaking, more narrowly, of 
"merely moral friendship."   It is this 'merely moral friendship,'  then, strictly 282 283
speaking, which he claims is achievable in its perfection, and which he goes on to 
contrast with what looks to be a new sort of friendship, first introduced here, what he 
calls 'pragmatic friendship:'  
 This (merely moral friendship) is not just an ideal but (like black swans) actually exists here and  
 there in its perfection.  But that (pragmatic) friendship, which burdens itself with the ends of  
 others, although out of love, can have neither the purity nor the completeness requisite for a  
 precisely determinant maxim; it is an ideal of one's wishes, which knows no bounds in its rational  
 concept but which must always be very limited in experience.  284
The initial 'this' in the passage above, however, seems to have no available antecedent 
except for the type of friendship which has been under immediate discussion in the 
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preceding two paragraphs, that is, 'moral friendship' more generally.  What, then, are we 
to make of the additional 'merely,' here?  The best light to be shed on this question would 
seem to come from examining the contrast in the service of which we see this 
qualification of 'moral friendship,' as 'merely,' being introduced, that with 'pragmatic 
friendship,' a friendship 'which burdens itself with the ends of others, although out of 
love.'   
 We may notice that, as a description of friendship, the 'moral friendship' Kant has 
just outlined above seems strangely lacking in many of the features that we typically 
associate with any sort of friendship we think worthy of the name.  Most glaringly, 
perhaps, this description omits any mention of affection between the two parties, or 
apparent concern for each other's well-being, beyond the fairly minimal concern required 
by the circumspection called for to make each party deserving of the other's confidence.  
While "the necessary combination of qualities"  for such 'moral friends' does include 285
certain affinities, there is no intimation of the sort of 'mutual sympathy' involved in 
'perfect friendship' or in 'friendship based on feeling,' or even of some more limited, or 
perhaps less emotional, investment in one party, or that party's well-being, by the other, 
beyond an investment in the benefit each party gains in relief from isolation and 
enjoyment of the frank conversation that the other provides to them.  Each party to such a 
friendship, Kant claims, must find in the other "someone intelligent – someone who, 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 217, 6:472.285
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moreover, shares his general outlook on things..."  who does not share the "base cast of 286
mind in most human beings to use... [one's confidences] to one's disadvantage"  and 287
who is not "indiscrete or incapable of judging and distinguishing what may or may not be 
repeated."   The friend must, instead, be willing to be "bound not to share the secrets 288
entrusted to him with anyone else, no matter how reliable he thinks him, without explicit 
permission to do so."   That is, it seems, each party must find in the friend those 289
qualities which make them instrumentally suitable to provide him with the sort of trusted 
confidant and intellectually satisfying opportunity "to discuss with someone what he 
thinks about his associates, the government, religion, and so forth..."  which he craves.  290
Beyond what is required for the success of this exchange, however, we see no indication 
of investment by either of the parties in the happiness or well-being of the other.  And this 
passage, in introducing the contrast with 'pragmatic friendship,' serves to highlight this 
absence.   
 That this is what the passage is doing, however, may be less than immediately 
obvious, since it is not the potentially motivating 'love' itself which is given as the 
defining feature of this contrasting kind of friendship, but rather, the adoption of the 
other's 'ends,' whether out of 'love' or otherwise.  In the context of Kant's lengthy 
discussion of love and benevolence in the preceding chapters, however, that the intended 
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contrast here is with a sort of friendship in which each friend takes an interest in the 
happiness or well-being of the other seems clear.  In these preceding chapters Kant has 
argued, repeatedly, that to wish another person well, to be benevolent towards them, or to 
take their happiness as one's own end, in at least the primary and most morally significant 
sense, can only be, if it is to be consistent with respect for them, to take that other 
person's ends, insofar as these are morally permissible (and not, perhaps, in one's own 
view, irrelevant or in some way harmful to their happiness) as one's own:  
 When it comes to my promoting happiness as an end that is also a duty, this must... be the  
 happiness of other human beings, whose (permitted) end I thus make my own end as well.  It is for 
 them to decide what they count as belonging to their happiness; but it is open to me to refuse them 
 many things which they think will make them happy but that I do not, as long as they have no right 
 to demand them from me as what is theirs.  291
He later goes on to say that "[t]he duty of love for one's neighbor can, accordingly, also 
be expressed as the duty to make others' ends my own (provided only that these are not 
immoral),"  presumably since, as he has said elsewhere, this 'duty of love' is, at least in 292
the first instance, a duty of "active, practical benevolence (beneficence), making the well-
being and happiness of others my end."   Elaborating on the duty of beneficence,  293 294
moreover, Kant emphasizes that it can be only such promotion of another's ends  that 295
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counts as a service to their happiness, and not the imposition of my own understanding of 
happiness upon them, although, as he has said above, such a difference in our 
understandings of happiness may license me to deny them certain things: 
 I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my concepts of happiness (except to young  
 children and the insane), thinking to benefit him by forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benefit  
 him only in accordance with his concepts of happiness.  296
In light of all this, then, it seems reasonably clear that we should take a sort of friendship 
which 'burdens itself with the ends of others' to be one in which the friends have taken up 
concern for and promotion of one another's happiness or well-being as a part of their 
friendship, that is, a sort of friendship in which each of the friends is broadly benevolent, 
and beneficent, toward the other. 
 The contrast Kant is drawing here, then, between 'pragmatic friendship' and 
'merely moral friendship,' is a contrast between a type of friendship in which each of the 
friends is directly invested in the well-being or happiness of the other, and, as it clearly 
seems that we should infer, a type of friendship in which this is not the case.  Since this 
'pragmatic friendship' has been so thinly characterized, moreover, described for us in only 
the one sentence quoted above, after which Kant immediately moves on to a new, though 
related, topic, there can be little doubt that it is this aspect of 'pragmatic friendship' on 
which the contrast is meant to hang.  What, then, does this tell us about our question 
above, of why Kant chooses to shift here to speaking of 'merely moral friendship,' rather 
than simply 'moral friendship' in general, as he had described it for us in the immediately 
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preceding passages?  As we have noted above, the description Kant has given us of 
'moral friendship' in general is one in which this aspect of investment by the friends in 
one another's happiness had already seemed to be conspicuously absent, and the explicit 
contrast here would certainly appear to draw attention to this absence.  Perhaps, then, the 
additional 'merely' in this passage is simply meant to draw attention to the relative 
deficiencies of this sort of a friendship, that is, of 'moral friendship' in general, in contrast 
to a 'pragmatic friendship' which, though unattainable 'in its perfection,' is seen to be 
superior to 'moral friendship' insofar as it possesses this element of investment by each of 
the friends in the other's well-being or happiness.   
III. Pragmatic Friendship & Perfect Friendship 
 Indeed, we may notice that this 'pragmatic friendship,' though scantly described, 
seems to share both of its central features with the 'perfect friendship' which Kant has 
outlined in the preceding section.  Might it be that he is not, in fact, introducing a new 
sort of friendship here at all, but, rather, referring back to the 'perfect friendship' to which 
he has already attributed these features?  Might he, that is, intend the contrast he is 
drawing here simply to be read as the expected one between 'perfect friendship' and 
'moral friendship' in general?  If this were his intention then the phrasing of this contrast 
in terms of 'pragmatic friendship,' rather than 'perfect friendship,' would seem to be 
frustratingly unclear, but that would hardly be so far out of character for Kant.  So, 
perhaps such a reading is not so implausible.  It would make good sense, moreover, of his 
use of the additional 'merely' here, as a simple indication of the relative deficiencies of 
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such 'moral friendship,' when compared to the 'perfect friendship' which he clearly takes 
to be superior on several fronts.  We have seen extensively, after all, that 'perfect 
friendship' possesses those qualities which would make a friendship count as a 
'pragmatic' one by these standards.  And we have seen this not only in Kant's claims 
about the mutual love between such 'perfect' friends, which we might attempt to interpret 
in terms of some other of the types of 'love' which he discusses in The Doctrine of Virtue, 
or about their 'participating and sharing sympathetically in one another's happiness,' 
which we might, perhaps, try to explain away as indicating some less 'practical,' or more 
sentimental, investment in one another's happiness or well-being than that which 
'pragmatic friendship' requires, but in explicit mentions of these friends' standing 
commitments to serving one another's "best interests,"  and looking after one another's 297
"needs."    298
 In discussing the social and psychological barriers that stand in the way of our 
'striving' after such 'perfect friendship,' for instance, even to the extent that it may be, in 
principle, (imperfectly) achievable in our experience, that is, what he calls "the 
difficulties in perfect friendship,"  Kant points out that what best serves the friend's 299
well-being or happiness, even, it seems, by the friend's own lights, may sometimes be at 
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That this is the way we should read Kant's topic in these passages on 'the difficulties in perfect 
friendship' is far from obvious, and will require more argument to make entirely convincing.  Hopefully, 
however, it can be granted here as plausible, for present purposes.
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odds with his pride, or with his perception that we duly respect him, and this tension can 
often lead to discord between us:  
 From a moral point of view it is, of course, a duty for one of the friends to point out the other's  
 faults to  him; this is in the other's best interests and is therefore a duty of love.  But the latter sees  
 in this a lack of the respect he expected from his friend and thinks that he has either already lost or 
 is in constant danger of losing something of his friend's respect...  300
It is a duty, then, this seems to imply, for each of the friends to strive to serve 'the other's 
best interests,' even when doing so may put a strain on the friendship itself.  And this is 
not, it seems from the proceeding chapters, a duty which we have with respect to our 
fellow human beings in general, or, at least, if we do, not with the sort of stringency we 
see suggested here.  Furthermore, each friend both expects that the other would come to 
his aid should he ever find himself in need, and worries that this may be too much to ask 
of his friend, or even an expectation which he might himself have difficulty living up to, 
should the occasion arise: 
 How one wishes for a friend in need (one who is, of course, an active friend, ready to help at his  
 own expense)!  But still it is also a heavy burden to feel chained to another's fate and encumbered  
 with his  needs.  301
This, Kant argues, is, at least in part, why, as we have seen him claim above, such a 
friendship 'cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage.'  Rather, as he goes on to say 
here, each friend understands that the other's 'benevolence' "should not be put to the test 
since this is always dangerous."   Instead of being motivated in their forming and 302
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sustaining of such friendships by the help which they can, quite legitimately, expect from 
one another, then, 
 each is generously concerned with sparing the other his burden and bearing it all by himself,  
 even concealing it altogether from his friend, while yet he can always flatter himself that in case of 
 need he could confidently count on the other's help.  303
It seems clear, then, that the 'burden' in question here is not just one of wishes or good-
will, but of actual, practical, aid, and so, given what we have seen above about the sort of 
aid which can be compatible with respect for the person to whom it is offered, of taking 
one another's ends as their own.  Such a 'perfect' friendship, then, like a 'pragmatic 
friendship,' will be one 'which burden's itself with the ends of others.'  As we have already 
seen, moreover, the second feature by which Kant characterizes this 'pragmatic 
friendship,' that of being 'an ideal of one's wishes, which knows no bounds in its rational 
concept but which must always be very limited in experience' seems also clearly to be 
one which 'perfect friendship' shares.   304
 A 'perfect friendship,' then, it seems, will always be a 'pragmatic friendship,' by 
Kant's (admittedly rather limited) characterization of friendships of this latter kind.  But, 
should we also take it that any 'pragmatic friendship,' to the extent that these occur in 
experience, will also, to that same extent, be a case of 'perfect friendship,' such that we 
can treat Kant's talk of these two types of friendship as largely interchangeable?  
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of pragmatic friendship's status in this respect to 'perfect friendship': that it 'can have neither the purity nor 
the completeness requisite for a precisely determinant maxim.'  As our argument progresses, however, it 
should become increasingly plausible that this, too, is a feature which 'perfect' and 'pragmatic' friendship 
share, to the extent that they are both to be understood as strivings after unattainable ideals. 
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Although this would simplify things considerably, upon further examination it would 
seem to be unlikely.  We can begin to see why when we turn our attention to Kant's 
subsequent discussion, immediately following this contrast between 'merely moral' and 
'pragmatic' friendship, of what he takes the difference to be between "a friend of human 
beings"  and a "philanthropist."   Here he argues that 305 306
 the expression "a friend of human beings" is somewhat narrower in its meaning than "one who  
 merely loves human beings" (a philanthropist).  For the former includes, as well, thought and  
 consideration for the equality among them....  – For, the relation of a protector, as a benefactor, to  
 the one he protects, who owes him gratitude, is indeed a relation of mutual love, but not of  
 friendship, since the respect owed by each is not equal.  307
Notice, first, then, that 'the respect owed,' here, cannot be the same sort of negative 
respect which we owe to all human beings simply in virtue of their personhood, since this 
will always be owed equally to all, by definition.  Rather, it must be some kind of respect, 
whatever this may be, which it is not only permissible that we afford to some in greater 
measure than to others, but in fact, in at least some cases, it seems, obligatory.   And 308
some type of respect like this, at least to the extent of being permissibly afforded to some 
in greater measure than to others, and perhaps even to the extent of being differentially 
owed in this way, is a type of respect which is needed in Kant's account of friendship, if 
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to some than we are obligated to afford to others, not, necessarily, that we are obligated to afford the parties 
different measures of such respect.  It may well be, and it seems, at least in the context of this discussion, 
that it likely is, entirely permissible to respect such parties equally, although this respect is only owed to 
some, and not to others.
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we are to make good sense of his characterization of 'perfect friendship' as a 'union of two 
persons through equal mutual love and respect.'   
 In striving after such 'perfect friendship,' Kant has argued, achieving and 
maintaining the required equality of respect between the friends, and the appropriate 
balance within each friend of this respect with the requisite love, is just as difficult and 
crucial a task as achieving and maintaining an equality between them in love:   
 For in his relations with his neighbor how can a human being ascertain whether one of the  
 elements requisite to this duty [of friendship] (e.g., benevolence toward each other) is equal in the  
 disposition of each of the friends?  Or, even more difficult, how can he tell what relation there is in 
 the same person between the feeling from one duty and that from the other (the feeling from  
 benevolence and that from respect)?  And how can he be sure that if the love of one is stronger, he  
 may not, just because of this, forfeit something of the other's respect, so that it will be difficult for  
 both to bring love and respect subjectively into that equal balance required for friendship?  309
If the respect in question here were simply that negative respect which is equally owed to 
all persons in virtue of their humanity, however, it could simply be presumed that it 
would be equal between the two parties, to the extent that neither friend was violating his 
general duties to the other as a human being.  Furthermore, it would make little sense to 
suggest, as this passage, though admittedly itself quite confusing, seems to do, that the 
respect which each friend had for the other would need to be modulated in proportion to 
his love, such that the 'relation... in the same person between the feeling from one duty 
and that from the other' was kept in an appropriate balance, since respect of this negative 
sort, to the extent that it is present, would not seem to be the sort of thing which comes in 
degrees.  Instead, as Kant has argued in the preceding chapters, such negative respect 
would seem to represent a sort of minimal threshold, beneath which one may not 
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permissibly fall, and "failure to fulfill the duty arising from the respect owed to every 
human being as such is a vice."  310
 The difference which would seem to be suggested here, then, between the 'friend 
of human beings' and the 'philanthropist,' if we assume, as it seems reasonable to do, that 
both such individuals maintain that negative respect owed to all human beings as such for 
those to whom they offer their help, such that neither one acts viciously, is the difference 
between an individual who is concerned to maintain an equality in respect between 
himself and those he benefits, and one who has no such concern for the asymmetry in 
respect between himself and those he helps which might be generated by this further sort 
of respect they come to owe him as their benefactor.  The 'philanthropist,' as Kant says, is 
one who 'merely loves human beings,' that is, it seems, in this context, who both offers 
them help of the morally permissible kind we have seen above, when feasible, that is, to 
at least some extent, takes their ends as his own, and who, as we see Kant go on to say 
here, "takes an affective interest in the well-being of all human beings (rejoices with 
them) and will never disturb it without heartfelt regret."   The 'friend of human beings,' 311
on the other hand, in addition to this 'love,' is distinguished by his further concern to 
maintain an equality in respect between himself and those whom he so loves.   
 If we return to our question about the relationship between 'pragmatic friendship' 
and 'perfect friendship,' then, keeping this distinction in mind, it seems that we could 
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reasonably infer, given the way in which 'pragmatic friendship' has been similarly 
described in terms of what we have seen to be Kant's understanding of 'practical love,' 
that a parallel relationship is at work here.  What is required for 'pragmatic friendship,' it 
seems, is only that the friends 'love' each other, in the appropriate sense, not that they 
share the further 'equal mutual... respect' which is called for by 'perfect friendship.'  Just 
as every 'friend of human beings' will be a 'philanthropist,' then, but not every 
'philanthropist' will be a 'friend of human beings,' since both of these call for the same 
sort of 'love,' but only the later requires this further concern for equality of respect, it 
seems that every 'perfect friendship' will be a 'pragmatic' one, but that not every 
'pragmatic friendship' will in turn be a 'perfect' one, and for similar reasons.    
IV. 'Merely' Moral Friendship 
 If 'pragmatic friendship' is not, then, as had perhaps seemed initially plausible, 
simply meant to be equivalent to 'perfect friendship,' but is intended, as we have argued, 
to be a distinct, though compatible, type of friendship in its own right, can we still 
plausibly explain the additional 'merely' with which Kant qualifies 'moral friendship' in 
contrasting it with 'pragmatic friendship' as a straightforward indication of its relative 
deficiency or inferiority as a type of friendship in the context of this contrast?  It would 
seem, in light of what we have said above, that we cannot.  If 'pragmatic friendship' is, as 
we have just argued, simply that type of friendship in which the friends show direct 
mutual concern for one another's happiness or well-being, adopting each other's ends as 
their own, such that any friendship displaying this feature will, whatever its other features 
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may be, count, to that extent, as a 'pragmatic friendship,' though it may be a friendship of 
another type as well, then it seems highly implausible that Kant should mean to say here 
that 'pragmatic' friendship will, in general, and regardless of what other features it may 
have, be superior, on the whole, to 'moral friendship.'  Though a 'pragmatic friendship' 
may be superior to a 'moral friendship' to the extent that it possesses this feature of 
investment by the parties in each other's well-being, that is, we have good reason to think 
that a 'moral friendship' may often, at least by Kant's standards, be a superior one on the 
whole.   
 This seems clear, for example, from the fact that it appears quite plausible from 
Kant's description of those friendships which are 'allowed to rest on feelings' that many 
friendships of this sort are also likely to count as 'pragmatic friendships' on his 
understanding.  He has described these friendships which 'rest on feelings,' after all, as 
ones in which the friends are united by the same sort of 'mutual sympathy and self-
surrender' which we see in the case of the 'perfect' friends, and come, as the 'perfect' 
friends also presumably do, to 'feel in possession of each other in a way that approaches 
fusion into one person.'  In contrast to a 'perfect friendship,' however, the friends in such a 
friendship fail to govern their relationship with the appropriate 'principles,' "limiting 
mutual love by requirements of respect."   Although the 'requirements of respect' here 312
could, perhaps, be simply those of that negative respect which is owed to all human 
beings in virtue of their personhood, so that the failings of the friends in this sort of a 
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relationship would amount to transgressions of their general duty, in contrast to what we 
take to be the case in 'pragmatic friendship,' it seems unlikely that such friendships are 
meant, at least typically, to be so flawed as to be actually immoral in this way.  More 
likely, given the context of this discussion as a contrast to 'perfect friendship,' in which 
the relevant 'principles' regarding the balance between love and respect are presumably 
concerned with that difficult balance between love and the additional sort of respect 
called for between friends which we have seen Kant discuss above, such friendships are 
not meant to be ones in which the parties fail to respect one another simply as human 
beings, but in which they fail to recognize and strive after this further, much more 
complicated, balance.  And, if this is the case, then these friendships will be ones, it 
seems, in which the relevant sort of 'love' is present, but the relevant sort of 'respect,' 
beyond that negative respect with is required for all human beings simply as persons, is 
not.  That is, they will, at least in some or many case, be 'pragmatic' friendships.  Kant 
has made it fairly clear, however, that he thinks very little of these sorts of friendships, 
not only in comparison to 'perfect friendship,' but, it seems reasonable to think, in 
comparison to the 'moral friendship' with which he also explicitly contrasts them.  If Kant 
takes 'moral friendship' to be broadly superior to friendship 'based on feeling,' however, 
as it seems we have good reason to take him to do, and many such friendships 'based on 
feeling' will themselves, in turn, be 'pragmatic' friendships by his standards, then it hardly 
seems likely that he takes 'pragmatic friendship' in general to be broadly superior to 
'moral friendship' in the way that he would need to do for this to plausibly explain the 
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additional 'merely' he deploys in the contrast between 'pragmatic' and 'merely moral' 
friendship which we have been trying to understand.   
 Fortunately, however, our discussion above would seem to suggest another 
possibility for what the additional 'merely' might be doing in this context: that is, it might 
be signaling that Kant is here contrasting 'pragmatic friendship' not with 'moral 
friendship' in general, but with 'moral friendship' considered merely as such, apart from 
any further features it might have outside of its definitional ones, or other sorts of 
friendship with which it might well be compatible and could be found combined.  This 
would be consistent with his use of such language elsewhere, moreover, as, for example, 
when we see him, in the subsequent discussion, describe the 'philanthropist' as one who 
'merely loves human beings,'  in contrast to the 'friend of human beings' who both 'loves 313
human beings' in this way and concerns himself, further, with maintaining an equality in 
respect with them.  Or, as when, in perhaps an even clearer example, much earlier in the 
text, he divides the duties of virtue to oneself into those which one owes to oneself "as an 
Animal Being,"  that is, as he has previously explained, insofar as one "views himself 314
both as an animal (natural) and a moral being"  and those which one owes to oneself 315
"merely as a moral being,"  that is, as he has also said, "as a moral being only (without 316
taking his animality into consideration)."   And if this is the purpose the additional 317
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'merely' is serving here, then this would seem to change the way we would most naturally 
read the relationship being suggested between 'pragmatic friendship' and 'moral 
friendship' in general.  If the contrast being drawn here is not between 'pragmatic 
friendship' and 'moral friendship' in general, that is, but specifically between 'pragmatic 
friendship' and 'moral friendship' considered merely as such, and if, furthermore, Kant 
feels the need to specify (however opaquely) that this is the case, as he did not in the 
instance of his earlier contrast between 'moral friendship' and 'friendship based on 
feeling,' then this would seem to suggest that the contrast here is not meant, as it might 
have initially appeared, to present these two types of friendship as mutually exclusive.  
The implication, in this case, would not be, as it might otherwise have appeared, that 
'moral friendship' is in any way incompatible with the sort of mutual concern and 
investment in one another's well-being or happiness which we found so strangely lacking 
in Kant's initial account of friendship of this type.  Rather, the passage would be 
emphasizing that these otherwise expected features, presented here as the defining marks 
of 'pragmatic friendship' instead, are no required part of 'moral friendship,' as such.  
Where 'moral' friends might well, perhaps, come to care for one another in this way, that 
is, and a given 'moral friendship' might well be, or come to be, a 'pragmatic friendship' as 
well, its doing so would play no part in its being a 'moral friendship,' and its failure to do 
so would in no way be a failing as a friendship of this sort. 
 What Kant has seemed to claim here, then, if we read the contrast in this, 
seemingly quite plausible, way, is that a friendship of the broadly transactional sort which 
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we have seen depicted in his 'moral friendship,' in which each of the parties trusts and 
respects the other, takes care and can be relied upon not to compromise the confidences 
of the other, and provides the other with the satisfaction of his natural need for honest and 
uninhibited social intercourse and intellectual exchange, is, insofar as this is the extent of 
the relationship, achievable 'in its perfection.'  But, should the friends, in addition to this, 
take a direct interest in the happiness or well-being of the other, adopting each other's 
ends as their own and positively promoting those ends to the extent that they are able, 
then the relationship between them will have become something other than just a 'moral 
friendship' of this sort, and, though it may perhaps remain a 'perfect' instance of 'moral 
friendship' considered merely as such, insofar as this additional feature is present it will 
have become, overall, a type of friendship which is no longer, in practice, perfectible. 
V. The Other's Faults 
  If this is the case, however, then, given what we have said above about the 
relationship between 'pragmatic' and 'perfect friendship,' it would seem to suggest a 
further question about how such 'moral friendship' might relate to 'perfect friendship,' as 
well, and one which might help to bring us closer to an answer about why Kant chooses 
to call this strangely restricted seeming type of friendship 'moral.'  That is, if 'pragmatic 
friendship' is, as we have argued, a necessary, though not a sufficient, component of 
Kant's 'perfect friendship,' and if 'moral friendship,' like 'pragmatic friendship,' may also 
be compatible with other sorts of friendship in the way that we have suggested above, 
might it be plausible that such 'moral friendship' is also a necessary, though not a 
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sufficient, component of 'perfect friendship,' such that the 'perfect friendship' which Kant 
has described would be one in which both of these two types of friendship, 'pragmatic' 
and 'moral,' were to be found together?  When read in light of Kant's arguments 
elsewhere in the Metaphysics of Morals, it would seem that some of the passages we have 
already examined above begin to offer us good reasons for reading the relationship 
between 'perfect friendship' and 'moral friendship' in just such a way.   
 In particular, Kant's argument that each of the perfect friends has a duty 'to point 
out the other's faults to him,' since 'this is in the other's best interests and is therefore a 
duty of love,' when read in conjunction with what he has said elsewhere, seems to drive 
us towards this sort of a reading.  As we have argued above, it seems clear that this duty 
of the 'perfect' friends to 'point out' each other's faults to them is one which is called for 
by the 'pragmatic' aspect of their 'perfect friendship,' that is, by their obligation, within 
such a friendship, to care for and promote one another's happiness or well-being.  This 
much seems clear from the reason Kant gives for why each friend must do this, that is, 
that it 'is in the other's best interests and is therefore a duty of love' given that, as we have 
also said, this 'duty of love'  is not one which they owe in the same way to those with 
whom they do not share such friendship.  But, there is something here that should make 
us pause, aside from the fact that Kant claims, rather cryptically, that this is a duty that 
the friends owe to each other, specifically, 'from a moral point of view.'  And this, it 
seems, is the question of exactly how this sort of pointing out of the friend's 'faults' to him 
is meant to so obviously be in his 'best interests,' especially in light of the negative 
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response to such criticisms which Kant goes on to describe the friend as likely to have, 
and the very real threat that he seems to take this sort of a response to pose to the overall 
well-being and continuation of their friendship.  It seems plausible, of course, that the 
'faults' in question might at times be of the sort which would in some way proximally 
undermine the friend's ability to effectively achieve his ends.  And, if this were the case, 
then it would be plausible to think that each friend's concern for the other's happiness, 
that is, on Kant's account, for his ends, insofar as this concern becomes, in the context of 
their friendship, not only an interest, but also a duty, might require him to try to assist his 
friend in overcoming these faults, for the sake of the ends in question.  It seems plausible, 
then, that this sort of pointing out of the friend's faults to him could be called for in some 
cases simply by the straightforwardly 'pragmatic' aspect of the friends' 'perfect 
friendship.'  However, it seems far from clear that this would always, or even often, be 
the case.   
 Instead, it seems that in at least many cases the friend's faults would not be of the 
sort which would proximally interfere with his pursuit or achievement of his ends in this 
way.  And, in these cases, it is far from obvious, given Kant's characterization of the 
'pragmatic' friends' concern for one another's happiness or well-being in terms of their 
taking up of one another's ends as their own, why we should take this sort of pointing out 
of the friend's faults to him to be in the service of his overall 'best interests' or 'happiness,' 
conceived of in the way in which these would need to be in order for his doing so to 
qualify as an act, much less as a duty, 'of love.'  Insofar as we take the well-being and 
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continuation of the friendship between the two, to which Kant seems to take the conflict 
and misunderstanding which can follow upon such a highlighting of the friend's faults to 
pose a potentially serious threat, moreover, to be among the friend's own ends, as it seems 
that we should, it would appear that such a pointing out of the friend's faults to him might 
not only fail to serve, but actually disserve, his happiness, so conceived, in such cases.  
How, then, should we explain Kant's apparent full confidence that such an action by the 
friend not only serves the other's 'best interests,' in some sense or another, despite the 
difficulties for their friendship it can cause, but, evidently, their happiness or well-being 
specifically, in the sense in which it would need to do so in order to qualify as a potential 
'duty of love,' that is, in the sense in which this requires a contribution to the pursuit or 
achievement of the friend's own ends? 
 It seems, initially, as though the answer to the first part of this question might in 
fact be something very like what one would expect it to be at first blush, that is, that it is 
in the friend's best interest to assist him in correcting his faults simply insofar as this 
helps him to have fewer and less serious faults over time, to become, to that extent, a less 
faulty, and so a better, person.  It seems quite plausible that Kant, in making his claim 
here, could be taking this simple sort of explanation to be a fairly obvious one, and 
surely, we might be inclined to think, this sort of an improvement in one's character or 
behavioral patterns over time could be rightly seen to be in one's best interests,  318
 Assuming, of course, as would seem to be the intended case here, that this was a genuine and chosen 318
self-improvement, the means of which were not at odds with one's autonomy or dignity.  More on this point 
later on.
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regardless of whether or not one reaped any further, more straightforwardly 'pragmatic,' 
benefits from it.  But, if we try to answer the first part of our question in this, seemingly 
quite obvious, way, it looks as though we may put ourselves into a difficult position with 
respect to the second part of our question, that is, with respect to the question of how 
such an action is not only in the friend's best interests, but, more specifically, in the 
service of his happiness, in the way in which this must be conceived in order for the 
action to be capable of being a duty of love.  And this is because, in the preceding 
sections of The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant has appeared not only to explicitly exclude any 
positive duty to the improvement of another's character, that is, to what he calls their 
'perfection,' from inclusion among one's possible duties and so, presumably, one's duties 
of love, but also to exclude this 'perfection' itself from the relevant conception of 
'happiness.'   
VI. Another's Perfection 
 "[I]t is a contradiction," he claims, in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, 
"for me to make another's perfection my end and consider myself under obligation to 
promote this."  319
 For the perfection of another human being, as a person, consists just in this: that he himself is able  
 to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require  
 that I do (make it  my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do.  320
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Moreover, he appears to to argue in a subsequent section that, whatever sort of benefit 
one might consider one's moral well-being to be to one, it would be a mistake to consider 
this a part of one's happiness: 
 Some people, however, make a distinction between moral happiness (which consists in   
 satisfaction with one's person and one's own moral conduct, and so with what one does) and  
 natural happiness (which consists in satisfaction with what nature bestows, and so with what one  
 enjoys as a gift from without).  Although I refrain here from censuring a misuse of the word  
 happiness (that already involves a contradiction), it must be noted that the former kind of feeling  
 belongs only under the preceding heading, namely perfection.  321
It would seem, on the surface, here, then, that Kant is making the claim that the sort of 
'satisfaction with one's person and one's own moral conduct' which such people argue 
constitutes a kind of 'happiness,' distinct from that 'natural happiness' which has non-
moral sources, is in fact not a type of happiness at all, but rather a component of, or 
identical with, the previously discussed moral 'perfection.'  And, if this were the case, 
then, insofar as a 'duty of love' is, as Kant has defined it, a duty which follows from our 
duty to make the happiness of others, specifically, our end, it would seem that we could 
not call a duty to promote the moral well-being of others, that is, their moral perfection, a 
duty of  love, however much in their 'interests' this might be, even if we were somehow to 
overcome his apparent denial, in the first passage above, of the possibility of our having 
such a duty.   
 But, perhaps, one might think, we can see a way out of this first part of our 
dilemma, in that Kant might appear to deploy, in this passage, a sense of 'happiness' 
which is clearly distinct from the one he deploys in defining our duties of love as duties 
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to promote the 'happiness' of others.  Elsewhere, as we have seen extensively above, he 
appears to take the 'happiness' of others, in the sense in which this is definitional of our 
duties of love, to be broadly equivalent to the satisfaction of their chosen ends, rather 
than to the sort of feeling of satisfaction with their actions or conditions which he seems 
to be discussing here.  Perhaps, we might think, he is not speaking in his own person 
when he calls either of these 'feelings' of satisfaction a kind of 'happiness,' but merely 
providing us with the mistaken definitions deployed by 'some people.'  And, if this is the 
case, then perhaps it is not so obvious that one's moral perfection could not be included in 
one's happiness, as he conceives it.  Unfortunately for such a response, however, Kant has 
just offered what appears to be a definition of happiness much along these same lines as a 
part of his own argument against the claim that one might have a duty to promote one's 
own happiness, in addition to the happiness of others:  
 Since it is unavoidable in human nature to wish for and seek happiness, that is, satisfaction with  
 one's state, so long as one is assured of its lasting, this is not an end that is also a duty.  322
It would seem, then, at least on the surface, that this possible equivocation is unlikely to 
offer us much help.  To the extent that it may constitute an equivocation within Kant's 
overall account of happiness, however, and so within his account of the duties of virtue as 
a whole, it may well pose a problem which requires more attention in its own right.    323
 For our present purposes, however, it may be more useful to turn to the reasoning 
Kant offers us for why such a 'feeling' of satisfaction with one's conduct and person 
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belongs under the 'heading' of 'perfection,' rather than that of happiness.  And the 
reasoning he offers us here is both strangely brief and decidedly odd: 
 For, someone who is said to feel happy in the mere consciousness of his rectitude already  
 possesses the perfection which was explained there as that end which is also a duty.  324
This is a puzzling argument for the claim above not just because it is the only support he 
explicitly offers us for what would seem to be a significant point, but because it would 
seem to imply that the 'perfection' in question is a prerequisite for this sort of feeling of 
'happiness,' rather than either subsuming or being identical with it in the way that the 
most obvious readings of the claim itself would suggest.  Moreover, after dismissing this 
proposed division of 'happiness' into the 'natural' and the 'moral' in such seemingly 
uncompromising terms, Kant appears to go on to deploy the distinction himself, in his 
very next argument.  The happiness only of others, he here claims again, can be seen as 
an end which is also a duty, an end which we must pursue by making the permitted ends 
of others, or at least some among these, our own ends as well.  But, he maintains, 
 time and again an alleged obligation to attend to my own (natural) happiness is set up in   
 competition with this end, and my natural and merely subjective end is thus made a duty (an  
 objective end). Since this is often used as a specious objection to the division of duties made  
 above (in IV[ ]), it needs to be set right.  325 326
He goes on to argue that, although "[a]dversity, pain, and want are great temptations to 
violate one's duty,"  and it might therefore seem as though one has a duty to make one's 327
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own "prosperity, strength, health, and well-being in general, which check the influence of 
these"  one's ends, "so that one has a duty to promote one's own happiness and not just 328
the happiness of others,"  this is a merely apparent difficulty for his claim that one has 329
no such duty.  And this is because, he argues, although there may be cases where one 
does have a duty to promote these various aspects of one's own well-being, in such cases  
 the end is not the subject's happiness but his morality, and happiness is merely a means for  
 removing obstacles to his morality – a permitted means, since no one else has a right to require of  
 me that I sacrifice my ends if these are not immoral.    330
Such a promotion of one's own happiness may indeed, under some circumstances, then, 
be a duty.  But, such duties do not imply that we have a duty to make our own happiness 
our end.  Rather, for example, 
 To seek prosperity for its own sake is not directly a duty, but indirectly it can well be a duty, that  
 of warding off poverty insofar as this is a great temptation to vice. But then it is not my happiness  
 but the preservation of my moral integrity that is my end and also my duty.  331
Although this section is titled "The Happiness of Others,"  then, his intention here 332
seems to be much less to argue that it is in fact our duty to have this as our end (an 
argument which he gives several sections later)  than it is to respond to what he sees as 333
the likely objections to his claim that it is only this type of happiness, and not our own, 
which we have a duty to take as our end.  That is, to defend his previous claim, in section 
IV, that "[p]erfection and happiness cannot be interchanged here, so that one's own 
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happiness and the perfection of others would be in themselves duties of the same 
person,"  but that only "one's own perfection and the happiness of others"  can be 334 335
counted among those ends which it is a duty for all human beings to have.   
 And, if this is his primary concern in the section overall, then this may help us to 
begin to understand his claim that so-called 'moral happiness' 'belongs only under the 
preceding heading, namely perfection' in a way that both makes sense of the odd way in 
which he argues for this claim, and starts to relieve us of some of our broader difficulties.  
If we approach this section as a whole as one in which his primary goal is to offer an 
argument against others' claims that there is such a duty to make one's own happiness 
one's end, that is, it becomes plausible that we should read the 'misuse of the word 
happiness' against which he takes himself to be arguing in the passage above not simply 
as the application of the word 'happiness' to so-called 'moral happiness,' or the drawing of 
a distinction between this and 'natural happiness,' but, rather, the deployment of this 
proposed distinction as an argument against his case that there is no such duty to make 
our own happiness our end.   
VII. Our Own Happiness 
 After beginning  the section with the argument against such a duty which we have 
just seen above, that our own happiness 'is not an end which is also a duty' because 'it is 
unavoidable for human nature to wish for and seek happiness,' Kant turns immediately 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 150, 6:387.334
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 150, 6:385.335
!150
from this to his discussion of the supposed distinction between 'moral' and 'natural' 
happiness without preamble, offering us only a mysterious 'however' to signal how he 
takes the two topics to be related.  'Some people, however' make such a distinction, he 
says, and this 'however' can only be meant with respect to the immediately preceding 
passage, in which he has offered us this argument against a duty to our own happiness.  It 
is far from immediately clear, though, why this proposed distinction between two types of 
happiness should pose any sort of 'however,' or, indeed, have any relevance at all, to that 
preceding argument.  It seems more than clear that Kant takes it to do so, though, not 
only from the wording of this initial transition, but from the fact that, having dispensed 
with the proposed distinction to his satisfaction with the odd response which we have 
already seen, that 'someone who is said to feel happy in the mere consciousness of  his 
rectitude already possesses the perfection... which is also a duty,' he begins the next 
paragraph by drawing the conclusion that "[w]hen it comes to promoting happiness as an 
end that is also a duty, this must therefore be the happiness of other human beings...."  336
Although the 'therefore' here could, perhaps, indicate a return to the topic of the first 
sentence of the preceding paragraph, skipping over the intervening discussion entirely, 
and drawing its conclusion exclusively from the argument offered there, this seems 
unlikely.  Rather, it seems to suggest that Kant takes this intervening discussion of the 
proposed distinction to contribute in some way to his argument for this point, and the 
conclusion he draws here to follow from the entire preceding paragraph.  It is less than 
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immediately obvious, however, what sort of contribution to this argument Kant could 
take his odd discussion of this proposed distinction to make.  If we examine more closely 
the argument that Kant takes himself to be offering in the first few lines of the passage 
though, in conjunction with claims he has made elsewhere in The Metaphysics of Morals 
about the nature of happiness, a plausible picture of how he might take these two points 
to be connected begins to emerge. 
 If we turn our attention to Kant's initial presentation of this argument against a 
duty to make our own happiness our end, in section IV, which he is recapitulating here, 
we can see that his presentation of the argument here is relying on an implicit premise, 
which was there made explicit: the crucial claim that "what everyone already wants 
unavoidably, of his own accord, does not come under the concept of duty, which is 
constraint to an end adopted reluctantly."   Without this additional premise, the 337
unavoidability of our pursuit of our own happiness by human nature has no obvious 
bearing on whether or not we could have a duty to this pursuit, and, so, the additional 
claim is clearly needed.  But, if we accept the proposed distinction between 'natural' and 
'moral' happiness, an obvious objection to the applicability of this premise, and so to 
Kant's argument, quickly becomes available.  Although it is true, on Kant's account, that 
all human beings unavoidably seek happiness, it is not true that we all seek this happiness 
in similar ways.  Rather, he has argued,  
 Only experience can teach what brings us joy. Only the natural drives for food, sex, rest, and  
 movement and (as our natural predispositions develop) for honor, for enlarging our cognition, and  
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 so forth, can tell each of us, and each only in his particular way, in what he will find those joys;  
 and, in the same way, only experience can teach him the means by which to seek them.  338
It is for this very reason, he claims, that eudaimonism (as he understands it)  can never 339
provide us with an adequate theory of morals, that, "[i]f the doctrine of morals were 
merely the doctrine of happiness it would be absurd to seek a priori principles for it."   340
Because we can only know what makes us happy through experience, he argues, and 
because experience will teach each of us differently in this respect, such that there is no 
single answer to what constitutes happiness for a being like us, but many different 
answers which vary widely from person to person, 
 All apparently a priori reasoning about this comes down to nothing but experience raised by  
 induction to generality, a generality (secundum principia generalis, non universalis) still so  
 tenuous that everyone must be allowed countless exceptions in order to adapt his choice of a way  
 of life to his particular inclinations and his susceptibility to satisfaction and still, in the end, to  
 become prudent only from his own or others' misfortunes.  341
If we accept the proposed distinction between 'moral' and 'natural' happiness, then, the 
following objection to Kant's argument against a duty to our own happiness can be made: 
although we must all by our nature seek happiness, we are not, by our nature, necessitated 
to seek happiness of any particular sort, or in any particular way.  We are not, therefore, 
'unavoidably' driven to seek moral happiness, specifically; although we must all seek out 
happiness of some kind, this may well end with 'natural' happiness.  To the extent that it is 
open to us to choose, then, whether or not we pursue such 'moral' happiness, the choice to 
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pursue happiness of this sort, rather than only of some 'natural' kind, is as much subject to 
'constraint' as any other choice, and so, just as subject to duty. 
 Deploying this objection, then, the opponent of Kant's claim that there is no duty 
to make one's own happiness one's end might contend that, given this distinction between 
'moral' and 'natural' happiness, Kant's argument fails.  Although his argument may show 
that we have no duty to pursue our own 'natural' happiness, they may claim, if we accept 
its premises, it gives us no reason to think that we cannot have a duty to make our own 
'moral' happiness our end.  And, read as a reply to this objection, Kant's otherwise cryptic 
remarks here begin to make much better sense.  How is it, we have wondered above, that 
he takes his claim that 'someone who is said to feel happy in the mere consciousness of 
his rectitude already possesses the perfection which was explained...as that end which is 
also a duty' to be compatible with, much less to support or explain, his claim that this 
'kind of feeling belongs only under the preceding heading, namely perfection'?  If we read 
these two claims as responding, not to the proposed distinction between 'moral' and 
'natural' happiness itself, but to the above counter-argument in defense of a duty to make 
our own moral happiness our end, we can understand the two claims as related in the 
following way.  In his discussion of 'perfection' in the preceding section, Kant has made 
explicitly clear that moral perfection is most centrally concerned not only with one's 
actions, but one's will:  
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 A human being has a duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition,  
 in which the law becomes also the incentive to his actions that conform with duty and he obeys the 
 law from duty.  This disposition is inner morally practical perfection.  342
But, if it is true, then, as Kant claims, that a genuinely 'moral' happiness can be 
experienced only by those who 'already possess the perfection' about which he is here 
speaking, such that moral 'perfection,' of whatever degree, is a necessary precondition for 
'moral' happiness, then making one's own 'moral' happiness one's end would thus be self-
defeating.  To take such 'moral' happiness as one's end, one would have to will its 
necessary preconditions, and so, to will one's own moral perfection, instrumentally to this 
end of 'moral' happiness.  To will one's moral perfection as a means to one's own 
happiness in this way, however, would be to do one's duty not 'from duty,' but from what 
Kant considers a 'pathological principle'  of expected benefit to oneself.  Since moral 343
perfection is constituted by that 'purest virtuous disposition,' then, 'in which the law 
becomes also the incentive' and one 'obeys the law from duty,' rather than from any such 
'pathological principle,' to make one's own 'moral' happiness one's end in this way would 
make one incapable of achieving that happiness, by making one incapable of the moral 
'perfection' which such happiness requires.  That is, such a will would, in one of Kant's 
senses, involve a 'contradiction,' by being so structured as to undermine its own end.  
Such an argument would point us back, again, moreover, to one of his earlier points 
against eudaimonism, not that there is no such thing as 'moral' happiness, but rather, that 
such happiness can play no significant role in moral motivation: 
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 When a thoughtful human being has overcome incentives to vice and is aware of having done his  
 often bitter duty, he finds himself in a state that could well be called happiness, a state of   
 contentment and peace of soul in which virtue is its own reward. – Now a eudaemonist says: this  
 delight, this happiness, is really his motive for acting virtuously. The concept of duty does not  
 determine his will directly; he is moved to do his duty only by means of the happiness he   
 anticipates. .... But there is also a contradiction in this subtle reasoning. For, on the one hand he  
 ought to fulfill his duty without first asking what effect this will have on his happiness, and so on  
 moral grounds; ...  344
And if this is the nature of the argument that Kant is making here, not against 'moral' 
happiness, per se, but against a specific conception of the role that such 'moral' happiness 
could play in our moral motivation, and it is this that he takes to constitute a 'misuse of 
the word happiness' and involve a 'contradiction,' of the sort that we have just discussed, 
then his apparent willingness to rely upon this very same distinction, between 'moral' and 
'natural' happiness, in his own subsequent arguments becomes much less mysterious.  
Moreover, we can now begin to see how he might take this argument, to which he takes 
himself to have gestured with the claim that perfection is a precondition for 'moral' 
happiness, to support his claim that such 'moral' happiness 'belongs only under the 
preceding heading, namely perfection.'  That is, he might mean by this claim, not, as it at 
first appears, that such happiness belongs only under the name of 'perfection,' and not that 
of 'happiness' at all, but, rather, that, insofar as such happiness can be achieved only as a 
consequence of moral perfection, and never by willing or aiming at that happiness itself, 
the discussion of such happiness belongs with the discussion of that perfection, not with 
that of other kinds of happiness.  That is, that the topic of such happiness rightly belongs, 
in his view, not here, in this section, with the discussion of 'the happiness of others' but, 
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literally, 'under the preceding heading, namely perfection,' that is, in the preceding 
section, "One's Own Perfection."  345
VIII. 'Moral' Happiness 
 Read in this way, moreover, Kant's arguments here no longer seem to stand in 
tension with his later claims about the existence of a distinctively 'moral pleasure' and 
"contentment,"  which, given what he has said elsewhere about the relationship between 346
'pleasure' and 'happiness,' would seem to sit uneasily beside a claim that there is no such 
thing as 'moral happiness' at all.  With respect to duties of "wide obligation,"  in 347
particular, for example, the fulfillment of which is "meritorious,"  he argues that 348
 ...there is a subjective principle of ethical reward, that is, a receptivity to being rewarded in  
 accordance with laws of virtue: the reward, namely, of a moral pleasure that goes beyond mere  
 contentment with oneself (which can be merely negative) and which is celebrated in the saying  
 that, through consciousness of this pleasure, virtue is its own reward.  349
Reading the passage in this way also allows us to make much better sense of Kant's later 
claims that we should, to at least some extent, treat the 'moral well-being' of others as 
among those factors to which we are required to attend by our duty to make their 
happiness our end: 
 The happiness of others also includes their moral well-being (salubritas moralis), and we have a  
 duty, but only a negative one, to promote this. Although the pain one feels from the pangs of  
 conscience has a moral source it is still a natural effect, like grief, fear, or any other state of  
 suffering.  350
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It would seem a very strange position to hold that, although pain with a moral source was 
a 'natural effect,' in this way, and a loss to one's moral well-being was a blow to one's 
happiness, pleasure or satisfaction with a moral source was not such a 'natural effect,' and 
an improvement in one's moral well-being was not a contribution to one's happiness.  If 
we read Kant's argument above in the way we have suggested, however, such that he is 
not dismissing the existence of 'moral happiness,' but only what he takes to be the implied 
contention that we could have a duty to make our own happiness of this sort our end, then 
we are required to attribute no such convoluted reasoning to him.  Rather, his position 
with respect to such happiness becomes a relatively straightforward one, in parallel to his 
position on happiness overall: although we have no duty to make our own moral 
happiness our end, we do have a duty, though only a wide one, to promote this sort of 
happiness for others, to the extent that it is an important component of their happiness as 
a whole. 
 But why, then, we might ask, is this duty to promote the 'moral' happiness of 
others 'only a negative one,' when our duty to promote the happiness of others overall is 
not restricted in this way?  And the answer to this, it would seem, points us back to two 
important ideas we have already seen.  The first, if we recall, is Kant's dual claim about 
the way in which it is possible for us, consistent with the respect which we are required to 
maintain for the autonomy of others, to make their happiness our end at all.  That is, that 
'I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my concepts of happiness ... only in 
accordance with his concepts of happiness,' and that 'it is for them to decide what they 
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count as belonging to their happiness,' although 'it is open to me to refuse them many 
things which they think will make them happy but that I do not.'  That is, that, in 
promoting the happiness of others, my positive duty can be only to promote those ends 
which they have set for themselves, or themselves consider to be part of their happiness.  
I cannot, without violating the respect which I owe to them, work to impose upon another 
the conditions of life which I consider to constitute or contribute to happiness, 
irrespective of their own ends or wishes, 'thinking to benefit him by forcing a gift upon 
him.'  Since my duty to promote the happiness of others, however, is a wide one, I am 
permitted to choose which of another's chosen ends I adopt as my own in discharging this 
duty to promote their happiness, and am not required to adopt as my own those ends of 
theirs which may strike me as misguided, 'as long as they have no right to demand them 
from me as what is theirs.'  The second, somewhat less obviously, is the claim about 
'moral' happiness, specifically, which we have deployed in reconstructing the objection 
against which Kant takes himself to be arguing above, and which it seems that he must 
himself accept, given what he has said about the nature of happiness in general.  That is, 
that, although it is unavoidable by human nature that we should all seek happiness, there 
is no such necessity in our nature to seek this happiness in any particular or uniform way, 
such that it is a matter of choice for each individual whether or not such 'moral' happiness 
will at all accord with 'his concepts of happiness,' just as it is a matter of choice whether, 
and to what extent, 'moral perfection' will be among his ends.  To the extent that it might 
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not, then, we can have no right, and thus no duty, to positively promote, on his presumed 
behalf, an end which may not be his own. 
 The case of moral pain, however, that is, of the 'pangs of conscience,' is, in Kant's 
view, entirely different.  This suffering, which follows upon the violation of duty, is, in 
his view, inescapable in human nature, insofar as the voice of conscience, as the voice of 
reason within us,  is ineliminable in even the most debased of human beings.  "For, 351
conscience is practical reason holding the human being's duty before him for his acquittal 
or condemnation in every case that comes under a law,"  and "every human being (as a 352
moral being) has it in him originally."   When conscience passes judgment on our 353
actions in this way, moreover, it cannot but "affect moral feeling by its act,"  and so, as 354
our "internal judge, ... pronounces the sentence of happiness or misery as the moral 
results of the deed."   This felt 'sentence' of conscience, then, like the judgment itself, 355
cannot be avoided, by any human agent.  Rather, 
 Every human being has a conscience and finds himself observed, threatened, and, in general, kept  
 in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an internal judge; and this authority watching over the law in 
 him is not something that he himself (voluntarily) makes, but something incorporated in his being.  
 It follows him like a shadow when he plans to escape. He can indeed stun himself or put himself  
 to sleep by pleasures and distractions, but he cannot help coming to himself or waking up from  
 time to time; and when he does, he hears at once its fearful voice. He can at most, in extreme  
 depravity, bring himself to heed it no longer, but he still cannot help hearing it.  356
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The 'happiness' in question here, however, is explicitly not the sort of 'positive' happiness 
involving 'moral pleasure that goes beyond mere contentment with oneself' which we 
have seen Kant discuss above in connection with virtue, but, rather, an exclusively 
negative 'happiness,' which comes with the absence of pain.  Since the 'verdict' of 
conscience, properly speaking, is always only one of "acquitting or condemning,"  he 357
argues, rather than of ascribing any merit,  
 It should be noted that when conscience acquits him it can never decide on a reward (praemium),  
 something gained that was not his before, but can bring with it only rejoicing at having escaped  
 the danger of being found punishable. Hence the blessedness found in the comforting   
 encouragement of one's conscience is not positive (joy) but merely negative (relief from preceding 
 anxiety); and this alone is what can be ascribed to virtue, as a struggle against the influence of the  
 evil principle in a human being.  358
The 'happiness' at stake here, then, is only that of avoiding moral suffering or pain, and 
that pain itself is a pain to which every human being, regardless of their own chosen ends 
or 'concepts of happiness,' is equally subject.  
 Unlike 'moral' happiness in the 'positive' sense, then, it seems that, insofar as we 
are licensed to presume, as it would seem that Kant believes we are, that any individual 
will have the avoidance of suffering or pain in general, and so, of any given type of pain 
to which they are subject, in particular, among their own ends, we are licensed to 
presume that they will have among their ends the avoidance of this moral pain or 
suffering.  To the extent that our duty to the happiness of others demands that we adopt 
the ends of others as our own, then, it would seem that we have a general duty, though 
only an imperfect one, to help our fellow human beings avoid this sort of moral pain, in a 
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way in which we do not have a corresponding duty to promote their 'positive' moral 
happiness, even by omission.   But why, then, again, is this duty 'only a negative one'?  359
That is, why does it require of us only omissions, rather than acts?  This, it would seem, 
has to do not only with the limitations which respect imposes on us with regard to the 
chosen ends of others, but also with the way in which this sort of moral pain, in 
particular, is related to individual instances of choice.   
 The object of such 'pangs of conscience,' Kant argues, is always "a deed,"  that 360
is,  
 An action... insofar as it comes under obligatory laws and hence, insofar as the subject, in doing  
 it, is considered in terms of the freedom of his choice. By such an action the agent is regarded as  
 the author of its effect, and this, together with the action itself, can be imputed to him...  361
  
Moreover, it is not the case, in his view, that our conscience can plague us in this way for 
an act which we did not realize was a moral infraction at the time that we chose it.  
Rather, "[i]n a case involving conscience..., a human being thinks of conscience as 
warning him (praemonens) before he makes his decision,"  and each of us, however 362
strongly we may find ourselves inclined to act contrary to our duty, 
 finds that as a moral being he is also holy enough to break the inner law reluctantly; for there is  
 no human being so depraved as not to feel an opposition to breaking it and an abhorrence of  
 himself in the face of which he has to constrain himself {to break the law}.  363
 Though we may be licensed to do so, in this way.359
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In any case where someone acts in such a way that their conscience may pain them for it, 
then, we must view this action as a legitimate exercise of their free choice, and, to the 
extent that it is at odds with their own end of avoiding the pain which their conscience 
will inflict on them for it, presume this cost to be one which they have chosen to accept, 
in service to some other of their ends.  Unless they violate our own right or another's by 
so acting, then, we can have no right, consistent with respect for them, to take positive 
action to stop them from acting in this way.  Thus, "[t]o see to it that another does not 
deservedly suffer this inner reproach is not my duty but his affair,"  and I can serve his 364
interest in avoiding this sort of pain, consistent with the respect I owe to him, only by 
omitting those actions on my own part which might somehow contribute to the likelihood 
that he will make a choice which is contrary to the demands of his conscience in this way.  
As a component of my duty to his happiness, then, 
 it is my duty to refrain from doing anything that, considering the nature of a human being, could  
 tempt him to do something for which his conscience could afterwards pain him, to refrain from  
 what is called giving scandal.  365
Since this is a matter of my duty to his happiness, however, and so, as a matter of 
promoting an end, a matter of judgment, "this concern for others' moral contentment does 
not admit of determinate limits being assigned to it, so that the obligation resting on it is 
only a wide one."  366
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IX. The Other's Ends 
 If Kant does accept the existence of such 'moral happiness,' then, as we have just 
argued above that he seems to do, as well as the potential importance of this sort of 
happiness to the overall happiness of others, to which end our 'duties of love' are directed, 
then perhaps it is plausible that the 'perfect' friend's duty 'to point out the other's faults to 
him' could be explained as a 'duty of love,' after all, and in just the relatively 
straightforward sort of way which we have already suggested above.  But, if this is the 
case, then how is it that this duty on the part of the friends has become not only a 
'positive' one, in the sense of a duty to action, rather than just to omission, but, moreover, 
it would seem, a duty to promote the friend's moral or characterological betterment, and 
so, his 'positive' moral happiness or joy, rather than just to protect him from moral 
infraction and pain?  An answer to this might begin to take shape from the reasons we 
have given above as to why our duty to the happiness of others in general does not, given 
Kant's claim that the 'happiness of others also includes their moral well-being,' generate 
for us a positive duty to promote the 'moral well-being' of our fellow human beings in 
general in this way.  That is, we may begin to find an answer in the fact that it would 
seem, as we have seen above, that the reason we do not have such a positive duty to the 
moral betterment of our fellow human beings in general is that positive actions toward 
this end on our part would be incompatible, given what Kant has said about the ways in 
which respect requires us to defer in our actions to promote the happiness of others to 
their own conceptions of happiness and their own chosen ends, with the respect which we 
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owe to them.  Since respect for them demands that we should not so act on their behalf, 
then, we can have no moral right so to act, and, therefore, no such duty.   
 As we have also seen above, however, the reasons that so acting would be 
incompatible with the respect which we owe to our fellow human beings are ones which 
may not fully apply in the case of our friends, or, at least, of certain kinds of friends, in 
certain circumstances.  As we have argued above, it is because we do not know whether, 
or to what extent, a given individual's own 'concepts of happiness' or chosen ends may 
include moral happiness or perfection that we cannot act positively to further these ends 
in the service of their happiness, without thereby violating the respect which we owe to 
them.  Similarly, in the case of preventing moral pain, the avoidance of which we can 
legitimately presume others to have among their ends, it is because we cannot know what 
other ends of theirs they may be serving with a given choice, or in what way, and so, 
cannot know to what extent that choice may, by their own lights, and not only by ours, be 
in some way a mistaken one, that we are not licensed to act positively, in at least certain 
limited ways, to prevent them from so acting.  Within the context of at least a 'moral' 
friendship,  however, we have reason to expect that our position would be different.  367
Such friends, who share 'complete confidence... in revealing their secret judgments and 
feelings to each other,' as well as their 'faults,' 'views,' and 'general outlook on things,' and 
each of whom relies upon his total trust in the other to fulfill his 'need to reveal himself,' 
could be justly expected to share a much deeper understanding of one another's 'concepts 
 Or, at least, a perfectly, or sufficiently well, realized instance of one.367
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of happiness' and chosen ends than we would be licensed to attribute to ourselves in the 
case of our fellow human beings in general.  Such friends, we might expect, would not 
only have a good enough sense of one another's chosen ends to know, in at least many 
cases, whether or not 'moral perfection' (or some more specific aspect thereof) was 
among those chosen ends, they might also, very reasonably, be expected to know one 
another well enough to infer, in at least many instances, the nature of the internal 
deliberations in which their friend would engage in the process of making a particular 
choice.  The 'moral' friends, then, we might reasonably expect, would be licensed, on the 
basis of this greater insight into one another's ends and deliberative processes, to take 
positive action to promote one another's 'moral well-being' or positive moral perfection, 
in a way that others were not, to the extent that they knew these actions to be compatible 
with their friend's own ends of moral perfection or 'concepts of happiness,' provided that 
these actions did not violate respect for their friend in some other way.   
 To the extent that the 'moral' happiness of others is among those aspects of their 
happiness to which our duties of love require us to attend, then, and it is only because we 
are not, under ordinary circumstances, able to act in the interest of another's moral 
perfection or well-being without thereby violating our required respect for them as human 
beings that we do not have a wide duty to act in this way as an aspect of our general duty 
to promote the happiness of others, we would expect that the 'moral,' friends, who are 
able so to act without violating respect for one another, would have a duty, though only a 
wide one, to act in this way.  That is, one would expect that the 'moral' friends, in virtue 
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of their special insight into one another's ends and characters, would, in contrast to the 
rest of us, have a wide duty both to promote their friend's positive 'moral perfection,' to 
the extent that this was among their friend's own ends, and to take positive action to 
prevent him from acting in ways for which his conscience would pain him, to the extent 
that such actions were not otherwise incompatible with the respect they owed to him as a 
fellow human being.  And, because these duties would be ones which followed from their 
duty to promote their friend's happiness, as an instance of their broader duty to promote 
the happiness of their fellow human beings in general, to the extent that the 'moral' 
friends did have such duties, these duties would be 'duties of love'. 
X. Perfect Friendship 
 But, if this is how one can come to have such duties to the moral well-being of 
another, through the special insight into their chosen ends and deliberative processes 
provided by the total confidence and trust found within this rare sort of 'moral' friendship, 
then why does Kant mention a duty of this sort only in discussing the nature of his 
'perfect' friendship instead, and not in his discussion of of this 'moral' sort of friendship at 
all?  The first part of our answer to this question would seem to be that, to the extent that 
he does take such duties to exist within a 'perfect' friendship, if we find the arguments 
above to be convincing ones, and unless we can provide an alternative way in which such 
duties might come to be possible within particular kinds of relationships despite their 
incompatibility in other contexts with the basic requirements of respect for other human 
beings, it would seem that Kant does assume, as we had wondered above if he might, that 
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a 'perfect' friendship of this kind will also, just in virtue of being such a friendship, be a 
friendship of his 'moral' sort as well.  Such a 'perfect' friendship will, then, as we had 
wondered above whether it might, turn out to be one in which both Kant's 'moral' 
friendship and his 'pragmatic' friendship are to be found together.  This would not seem to 
offer us an answer, however, if what we have said above is true, as to why he would 
neglect to mention any such additional duties to the moral well-being of others, which 
arise in the context of his 'moral' friendship in particular, in his discussion of friendship of 
this type.  Surely, such an opening up of new moral arenas in our duty to one another's 
happiness would be an effect well worth mentioning, if it were indeed a consequence of 
entering into such friendships.  If we look again at how Kant has defined such 'moral' 
friendship, however, in contrast to 'pragmatic' friendship in particular, we can see why he 
might choose to leave such a discussion of the new 'duties of love' which arise from this 
sort of a friendship aside from his discussion of the nature of such friendship itself, even 
if these new duties did arise, as we have argued above, specifically from the conditions 
within a  friendship of this kind. 
 And this is because, as we have seen, although the 'moral' friends do have the 
same 'duties of love' to one another's happiness that any of us have to the happiness of 
any other human being, they have no special interest in or obligation to the happiness of 
one another in particular, at lease in virtue of their 'moral' friendship merely as such.  It is 
'pragmatic' friendship, not 'moral' friendship, which 'burdens itself with the ends of 
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others.'   And it is precisely because of this interest which 'pragmatic' friendship 368
requires in the ends, or the happiness, of others, it seems, that such friendship cannot, in 
Kant's view, unlike 'moral' friendship, actually exist 'in its perfection.'  The 'merely moral' 
friends, then, though their intimacy may allow them to act in the interest of one another's 
moral well-being or happiness as a part of their duty to the happiness of others in general, 
have no particular reason to fulfill their duty to the happiness of others in this way rather 
than any other.  For them, this new ability to benefit their friends' happiness by 
contributing to their moral perfection is no different from any other opportunity to benefit 
the happiness of others they might come to have as a result of specialist knowledge.  
Though their ability, and duty, so to act, then, is a consequence of their 'moral' friendship, 
to do so is no part of that friendship as such.  Only where such 'merely moral' friendship 
is combined with 'pragmatic' friendship, in which the happiness or well-being of each 
friend becomes a special concern of the other's, does this new way of fulfilling their wide 
duty of love, through a service to their friend's moral well-being or happiness, become 
particularly salient.  If Kant's 'perfect' friendship is one in which these two sorts of 
friendship, the 'moral' and the 'pragmatic,' are to be found together, then, as we have 
 How exactly it is that Kant takes special interest in the happiness or well-being of another to relate to or 368
result in special obligation to that happiness or well-being is a serious question, and one to which the 
answer is not clear.  That he does take there to be an important relationship between the two, however, and 
a special obligation of some sort to exist to the happiness or well-being of certain of our social intimates, 
seems clear, not only from these passages on friendship themselves, but from elsewhere in the text.  This is 
most explicit, perhaps, in an unfortunately thorny passage at 6:451-2 (p. 200-1), where, in raising a problem 
for the duty of benevolence, he points out that "...one human being is closer to me than another, and in 
benevolence I am closest to myself." But, "[i]f one is closer to me than another (in the duty of benevolence) 
and I am therefore under obligation to greater benevolence to one than to the other but am admittedly closer 
to myself (even in accordance with duty) than to any other, then it would seem that I cannot, without 
contradicting myself, say that I ought to love every human being as myself, since the measure of self-love 
would allow for no difference in degree." 
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argued above that it is, and it is only in addressing friendship of this type that he 
explicitly addresses a friendship in which this is the case, then it is perhaps not so strange 
that it would also be here, in his discussion of this 'perfect' friendship, that he addresses 
this new kind of duty to our friends. 
XI. The Other's Perfection 
 Even if all of this is true, however, it would not seem to have fully solved our 
problem for explaining the 'perfect' friend's duty to 'point out the other's faults to him' in 
this way.  And this is because, as we have seen above, Kant has appeared not only to 
disallow the possibility of a duty to the moral perfection of others qualifying as a duty of 
love, but of any such duty to the moral perfection of others existing at all.  As we have 
already noted, he claims quite prominently in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue 
that 'it is a contradiction for me to make another's perfection my end and consider myself 
under obligation to promote this.'  And this would certainly seem, at first blush, to 
preclude any duty to the moral perfection of another.  How, then, could we be right in 
thinking that his argument here implies just such a duty to one another's moral perfection 
on the part of the 'perfect' friends?  The first answer we can offer to this worry, perhaps, is 
one raised by the arguments we have seen Kant himself make above with respect to the 
sense in which we can be said to have a duty, in some cases, to promote our own 
happiness, although it is never our duty to make our own happiness our end.  Recall, 
there, his claim that, in such cases, 'the end is not the subject's happiness, but his 
morality,' such that 'it is not my happiness but the preservation of my moral integrity that 
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is my end and also my duty.'  The promotion of my own happiness, in such a case, he 
argues, 'is not directly a duty, but indirectly it can well be a duty,' to the extent that it is a 
'permitted means' of furthering my required end of moral perfection.   Given the way 369
that we have characterized the duty we can come to have to promote the moral perfection 
of our friend, then, as a duty of love implied, under certain circumstances, by our duty to 
promote their moral well-being or happiness, as a part of our duty to promote their well-
being or happiness overall, it would seem that this sort of an argument might apply 
equally well in this case.  Just as in Kant's argument above it is not because we have 
made, or have a duty to make, our own happiness, 'directly,' our end that we come to have 
such a duty, in some cases, to promote our own happiness, but rather because we have 
made, as we have a duty to make, our own moral perfection our end, that we come, 
'indirectly,' to have such a duty, in the case of our 'perfect' friends' perfection it is not 
because we have made, or have a duty to make, their moral perfection, 'directly,' our end 
that we come to have this duty to promote their perfection, but rather because we have 
made their happiness, and so their own ends, our end, that we come, 'indirectly,' to have 
such a duty.  Our duty to the moral perfection of our friends, when we have it, derives 
from our duty to their happiness, and where they do not themselves have such moral 
perfection among their chosen ends, we can come to have no such duty.  The end, then, 
Kant might equally well claim in such a case, it seems, is not the subject's morality, but 
 Insofar as this can, at least sometimes, be served, Kant would seem to accept, by avoiding the near 369
occasion of sin.
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his happiness.  And so, it would seem, at least plausibly, that his argument above against 
the possibility of a duty to make another's moral perfection one's end would not apply. 
 One might worry that this sort of a response, however, when applied to our case, 
could potentially rely upon a messy distinction between final ends,  as 'ends' proper, 370
and 'ends' of other sorts, given Kant's characterization of our duty to make the happiness 
of others our end as a duty to make the ends of others our own.  Fortunately, we may be 
able to give another, and, perhaps, in some ways, more illuminating, answer to this worry, 
by engaging more directly with the somewhat puzzling argument which Kant offers us 
here in support of his claim that we can have no such duty to make the perfection of 
others our end.  He has argued, recall, that 'it is a contradiction for me to make another's 
perfection my end and consider myself under obligation to promote this' because 'the 
perfection of another human being, as a person, consists just in this: that he himself is 
able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty...'  And this, it would 
seem, is meant to be something which I can have no duty to promote, at least as an end, 
because 'it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do) something 
that only the other himself can do.'  But how, more precisely, is this argument intended to 
run?  What, exactly, is it meant to be, here, 'that only the other himself can do'?  Kant has 
argued extensively elsewhere that actually setting an end is something that only the 
person whose end it is can do.  As he has defined it, "[a]n end is an object of free 
 Though this is not, by and large, Kant's language.370
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choice,"  and, as such, he has argued, "only I myself can make something my end."   371 372
Moreover, "every action... has its end"  and "I can have no end without making it an 373
end for myself."   Although "I can indeed be constrained by others to perform actions 374
that are directed as means to an end,"  that is, to some end of theirs, although this end is 375
not my own, "[t]o have an end that I have not myself made an end is self-contradictory, 
an act of freedom which is yet not free."   So, perhaps this is what he has in mind, here.  376
But, even if we take Kant to be claiming here, as is far from clear from the somewhat 
ambiguous way in which he has put things, that another's perfection consists just in his 
actually so setting his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty (presumably on 
whatever occasions the need for him to set an end should arise), it follows from this only 
that the other's perfection consists in 'something that only the other himself can do.'  And 
this would not yet seem, on its own, to be enough to make the argument go through.  It is 
far from clear, that is, even given this, why we should think that I would be required to do 
that in which another's perfection consists simply in order to make that perfection my 
end, and take action to promote it.  This is not something which we seem to expect at all 
in the many much more ordinary cases of this sort which we encounter, and we typically 
take the fact that another's end consists in something that only they themselves can do to 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 149, 6:385.371
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pose no obstacle to our making it an end of ours as well, although this may make it 
somewhat more difficult for us to find ways of promoting it.   
 If you were to make it your end, for example, to play the piano, then this end of 
yours would certainly seem to consist in something that only you yourself could do; my 
playing the piano for you, or someone else's doing so, would not satisfy this end.  But this 
is no reason to think, it seems, that I could not, therefore, make it an end of mine that this 
end of yours should be realized,  and take action to promote it, say, by helping you to 377
access a piano, or learn to read sheet music.  And it is difficult to imagine what else Kant 
would mean, by making the end of another our own, than that we should make it an end 
of ours that that which is their end should be accomplished.  It seems, then, if we are not 
to attribute a simple confusion to Kant, that we should not take him to mean, here, that 
another's perfection is something that only he himself can have as an end, and be able to 
promote as such, simply because that perfection consists in an action or activity in which 
only he himself can engage.  Rather, it seems, Kant must take it to be obvious, in some 
other way, from the characterization he has given us here of what our perfection consists 
in, why making such perfection in another one's end, and promoting it as such, would be 
something that only the other himself could do.   
XII. Moral Perfection 
 And perhaps the place to start, in attempting to unravel why it is that Kant might 
think this, is with the somewhat frustrating ambiguity we have pointed out above in the 
 Or, perhaps, given Kant's language, we would want to say, make it an end of mine, also, that you should 377
play the piano, because this is an end of yours.
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way that he has characterized what the other's perfection consists in here.  It is unclear, it 
seems, from the way that he has put the claim, whether he means this perfection to 
consist just in the other's so setting his end, on the relevant occasions, and so, in 
something like an action or activity of his, or rather, as would seem to be the slightly 
more natural reading, modulo the further confusion introduced by its apparent 
identification with the thing 'that only the other himself can do,' in the other's ability so to 
set his end, and so, in something more like a developed capacity of his so to act.  
Fortunately, if we recall above, Kant's discussions elsewhere in The Doctrine of Virtue of 
the nature of our own perfection, and our duty to it, would seem to offer us strong 
guidance as to how we could best read this claim.  As we have already seen above, Kant 
claims quite clearly in his subsequent discussion of our own perfection that our moral 
perfection, at least, is not simply an action or activity, but rather, a disposition to action of 
a certain sort, specifically, 'the purest virtuous disposition, in which the law becomes also 
the incentive to... actions that conform with duty' and one 'obeys the law from duty.'  'This 
disposition' he claims, 'is inner morally practical perfection.'  However, he goes on to 
elaborate elsewhere, in his discussion of our duties of virtue to ourselves, that "this 
perfection consists,"  more precisely, in two  aspects: on the one hand,  378
 subjectively in the purity (puritas moralis) of one's disposition to duty, namely, in the law being  
 by itself  alone the incentive, even without the admixture of aims derived from sensibility, and in  
 actions being done not only in conformity with duty but also from duty.  379
and, on the other,  
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 196, 6:446.378
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 objectively in fulfilling all one's duties and in attaining completely one's moral end with regard to  
 oneself.  Here, the command is "be perfect." But a human being's striving after this end always  
 remains only a progress from one perfection to another.  380
One's moral perfection, then, it would seem, requires both that one's actions be always in 
accordance with one's duty, and that one always, in performing one's duties, be doing so 
from duty, in addition to requiring that one should be consistently disposed so to act.  
That is, it would seem, it consists not only in one's disposition to act always in 
accordance with one's duty, and from duty, regardless of all other incentives, but also in 
one's actually so acting.  This additional complexity, then, may explain for us the seeming 
ambiguity in Kant's characterization of the other's perfection above.  It is unclear, it 
seems, from the way that he has put the claim, whether the other's perfection is meant to 
consist in his actually setting his ends in accordance with his own concepts of duty, or 
rather, in his ability so to set his ends, because, on Kant's more developed understanding, 
which he has not yet gone on to lay out by this point in his arguments, it in fact consists 
in both, together: the disposition so to act, perhaps first and even primarily, insofar as 
'perfection' is seen here as a quality possessed by the agent, but, also, crucially, this 
disposition as realized in the actions towards which the agent is so disposed. 
 And this disposition itself, Kant argues, as a possible object of duty, an end which 
one can be required by duty to have for oneself, like one's "natural perfection"  insofar 381
as there can be a duty to this, "must be put in what can result from his deeds, not in mere 
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gifts for which he must be indebted to nature; for otherwise it would not be a duty."   382
One cannot have a duty, that is, to that which is merely a matter of fortune or fact, only to 
that towards which it is possible for one to take action.  This disposition, then, can not 
simply consist in that natural capacity for respect for the law and dutiful action with 
which Kant has argued that all human beings are, as rational agents, invariably gifted.  
Rather, like our 'natural perfection,' our moral perfection, as a 'virtuous disposition,' must 
be something which we can bring about in ourselves through our own actions, if we are 
to have a duty to make it our end.  One's duty to one's own perfection, then, Kant argues, 
both natural and moral, 
 can therefore consist only in cultivating one's faculties (or natural predispositions), the highest of  
 which is understanding, the faculty of concepts and so too of those concepts that have to do with  
 duty. At the same time this duty includes the cultivation of one's will (moral cast of mind), so as to  
 satisfy all the requirements of duty.  383
Unfortunately Kant offers us very little explanation, in his discussion of our moral 
perfection more specifically, of what this sort of 'cultivation of one's will' might entail.  If 
moral perfection is to be a matter of 'cultivation' at all, however, it would seem that the 
'disposition' in question cannot consist only in those standing commitments which result 
directly from the choice of our ends.  And we may, perhaps, begin to get a sense of what 
might be involved in such 'cultivation' from what Kant tells us elsewhere about the 
cultivation in oneself of virtue.  There he argues that, 
 It is... correct to say that the human being is under obligation to virtue (as moral strength). For  
 while the capacity (facultas) to overcome all opposing sensible impulses can and must be simply  
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 presupposed in man on account of his freedom, yet this capacity as strength (robur) is something  
 he must acquire; and the way to acquire it is to enhance the moral incentive (the thought of the  
 law), both by contemplating the dignity of the pure rational law in us (contemplatione) and by  
 practicing virtue (exercitio).  384
One might reasonably expect, then, it seems, that the pursuit of our moral 'perfection,' as 
the cultivation of the 'virtuous disposition' within us, would likewise involve such 
contemplation and practice.  Moreover, in discussing the duties of virtue to oneself, Kant 
argues that all such duties either stem, in the case of the "[n]egative duties,"  from a 385
human being's duty to "his moral self-preservation,"  that is, as he goes on to elaborate, 386
from his duty to "the preservation of his nature in its perfection (as receptivity)"  or, in 387
the case of the "positive duties,"  "concern his perfecting of himself,"  that is, "his 388 389
cultivation (active perfecting) of himself."   It seems plausible, then, that Kant's 390
arguments regarding these 'positive duties' to ourselves might also offer us some insight 
into what he takes to be involved in such 'cultivation' of ourselves, not only with respect 
to our 'natural' perfection, but our moral perfection as well. 
XIII. 'Know Yourself' 
   And here, in discussing our positive duties to ourselves, Kant makes a rather 
striking claim: that "the First Command of All Duties to Oneself"  is to  391
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 "know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself," not in terms of your natural perfection (your fitness or  
 unfitness for all sorts of discretionary or even commanded ends) but rather in terms of your moral  
 perfection in relation to your duty.  392
Pursuing this sort of self-knowledge, then, the knowledge of our own 'moral perfection' 
as it currently stands, in relation to what duty requires of us, would seem to be a crucial 
component of what Kant takes the cultivation of such moral perfection to entail, if all 
'positive' commands of our duties to ourselves are, as he has argued above that they are, a 
matter of our self-perfecting 'cultivation.'  And to have such self-knowledge, he goes on 
to elaborate, to know your own 'moral perfection in relation to your duty' in this way, is to  
 know your heart – whether it is good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or  
 impure, and what can be imputed to you as belonging originally to the substance of a human being 
 or as derived (acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral condition.  393
This sort of self-knowledge, however, is one which Kant has claimed repeatedly 
elsewhere is unachievable for us in its completeness, and to the attainment of which we 
can therefore, it seems, have only a wide or imperfect duty, of continual striving. 
 In two separate discussions of our duty to our own moral perfection specifically, 
both in the section we have seen above where he discusses the 'subjective' and the 
'objective' aspects of our moral perfection, and in his earlier discussion of "the cultivation 
of morality in us"  as a part of his broader discussion of "One's Own Perfection as an 394
End That Is Also a Duty,"  Kant puts forward arguments for his claim that our duty to 395
our own moral perfection can be only a wide or imperfect one which appear to be 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 191, 6:441.392
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 191, 6:441.393
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 155, 6:392.394
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 154, 6:391.395
!179
predicated on the unattainability of full self-knowledge of this sort.  In his discussion of 
'the cultivation of morality in us' he argues that the duty which each of us has "to do his 
duty from duty (for the law to be not only the rule but also the incentive of his actions)"  396
"[a]t first sight... looks like a narrow obligation, and the principle of duty seems to 
prescribe with the precision and strictness of a law not only the legality but also the 
morality of every action, that is, the disposition."   However, he maintains, this 397
appearance proves to be a misleading one,  
 For a human being cannot see into the depths of his own heart so as to be quite certain, in even a  
 single action, of the purity of his moral intention and the sincerity of his disposition, even when he 
 has no doubt about the legality of the action.  398
Much less, it would seem, can he do so across time and many cases, in the way that 
would be needed to acquire a full knowledge of his own 'moral perfection,' in its 
subjective aspect.  And we are prone to error and self-deception in our understanding of 
ourselves, it seems, not only with respect to the incentives and maxims at play in our 
individual acts, on his view, but also the extent and the strength of our standing 
commitments to the maxims and ends duty demands of us.  In the case of the first, Kant 
argues, for example, one "[v]ery often... mistakes his own weakness, which counsels him 
against the venture of a misdeed, for virtue (which is the concept of strength),"  while in 399
the case of the second, he rhetorically asks "how many people who have lived long and 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 155, 6:392.396
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 155, 6:392.397
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 155, 6:392.398
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 155, 6:392-3.399
!180
guiltless lives may not be merely fortunate in having escaped so many temptations?"   400
This second sort of self-deception, moreover, seems to be a particular worry of Kant's, 
and he notes specifically in his discussion of our duty to pursue self-knowledge that such 
knowledge benefits our virtue in part by serving to combat self-deceptions of this second 
sort, to "counteract that egotistical self-esteem which takes mere wishes – wishes that, 
however ardent, always remain empty of deeds – for proof of a good heart."   Whether 401
this second sort of mistake or self-deception can ever be completely escaped is a question 
Kant seems to leave open, but, with respect to the 'morality' of any individual act he is 
uncharacteristically clear: "[i]n the case of any deed it remains hidden from the agent 
himself how much pure moral content there has been in his disposition,"  no matter how 402
successful he may otherwise be in his pursuit of self-knowledge.  And it is because of this 
inevitable self-ignorance, he argues, that not only our duty of acting from duty in acting 
as duty demands, but also our retrospective duty of moral self-assessment in light of our 
actions, can be only a wide or imperfect one.  In the case of both of these duties, it seems, 
it is because 'a human being cannot see into the depths of his own heart' that "[t]he law 
does not prescribe this inner action in the human mind but only the maxim of the action, 
to strive with all one's might that the thought of duty for its own sake is the sufficient 
incentive of every action conforming to duty."        403
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 Similarly, in the section we have seen above, where Kant distinguishes the 
'subjective' and  'objective' aspects of our moral perfection, he argues that "[i]t is a human 
being's duty to strive for this perfection, but not to reach it (in this life), and his 
compliance with this duty can, accordingly, consist only in continual progress,"  for this 404
very same reason, that "[t]he depths of the human heart are unfathomable."  And here he 
seems to be at pains to make clear, having introduced the distinction, that our own moral 
perfection will always be to some extent opaque to us not only in its 'subjective,' but also 
in its 'objective,' aspect.  In the case of the first, he offers us, again, much the same 
reasons we have already seen, asking rhetorically,  
 Who knows himself well enough to say, when he feels the incentive to fulfill his duty, whether it  
 proceeds entirely from the representation of the law or whether there are not many other sensible  
 impulses contributing to it that look to one's advantage (or to avoiding what is detrimental) and  
 that, in other circumstances, could just as well serve vice?  405
While in the case of the second, the argument he offers here is new, 
 with regard to perfection as a moral end, it is true that in its idea (objectively) there is only one  
 virtue (as moral strength of one's maxims); but in fact (subjectively) there is a multitude of virtues, 
 made up of several different qualities....   406
And, he seems to take it, we can never know for sure, no matter how many of these 
'several qualities' we might come to posses, what other, further, qualities still called for by 
completely 'perfect' virtue might remain unknown to, or absent in, us.   "But" he 407
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 196, 6:446.404
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 The extent to which this is meant to be a consequence of the 'unfathomable' nature of the human heart, 407
and the extent to which it is meant to be a matter of the theoretical impossibility of fully enumerating this 
'multitude of virtues,' or, at least, of knowing whether one has done so fully or not, is not made clear.  This 
part of Kant's argument as a whole, in fact, is somewhat unclear, and I am rather unconfident in my reading 
of it here, though I hope to explore the point further in the future.
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argues, "a sum of virtues such that our cognition of ourselves can never adequately tell us 
whether it is complete or deficient can be the basis only of an imperfect duty to be 
perfect."   And it is because of this, he concludes, that "[a]ll duties to oneself regarding 408
the end of humanity in our own person are, therefore, only imperfect duties."  409
 But, if this is the sort of self-knowledge we mean when we talk about what 
cultivating moral 'perfection' requires of us, the ever-uncertain result of a process of self-
reflection taking place as an ongoing effort over time, prone to such self-serving errors 
and deceptions in addition to its ineliminable opacities, then such 'cultivation' would 
certainly seem, given all we have said, to be the sort of endeavor in which the 'perfect' 
friend, in his his capacity as 'moral' friend and confidant, invested with a 'pragmatic' 
friend's commitment to promoting our well-being or happiness, would be ideally suited to 
assisting us.  And indeed, it seems just in respect of this sort of self-knowledge that each 
friend is most likely to gain from the 'perfect' friend's efforts to 'point out the other's faults 
to him.'  It seems, then, that we have here not only a plausible way in which each 'perfect' 
friend might help to 'promote' the moral perfection of the other, but even a way in which 
the perfect friends, specifically, are uniquely well-positioned so to do.  Moreover, it 
would seem, in at least one important respect, that they are obligated by their duty within 
the friendship to offer this very sort of help.  What we can make of Kant's position on the 
'cultivation' of moral perfection, then, seems only to offer more support for the idea that 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 196, 6:447.408
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 197, 6:447.409
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giving such aid to their friend's 'cultivation' ought at least to be available to the 'perfect' 
friend as something they can do, within the context of their friendship, if not also as 
something to which they can have a duty. 
XIV. What Only The Other Can Do 
 So, it seems that we must ask again, then: how is it that Kant's argument here 
against the possibility of any such duty on our part is meant to run?  How is it that he 
takes himself to show that there would be a 'contradiction' in our taking up another's 
perfection as our end, and considering ourselves under obligation to promote it?  On the 
surface of the argument, the apparent identification of that which 'only the other himself 
can do' with his setting of, or ability to set, 'his end in accordance with his own concepts 
of duty' would seem to suggest that it is my setting of the other's perfection as my end 
that is meant somehow to function as a middle term here, so that the thing which it would 
be 'self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do)' would be to make the 
other's perfection my end, and it is because it would be 'contradictory' for me to be 
required to do this that it would be contradictory for me to consider myself under 
obligation to promote it as such.  If the argument is not to rely on the fairly 
straightforward mistake we have pointed out above, however, of assuming that one would 
need oneself to do that in which the other's perfection consists in order to have or 
promote that perfection as one's end, it is not at all clear how this claim is meant to be 
supported.  It would seem, rather, that, without presuming this mistake as an implicit 
premise, the argument simply asserts that making his perfection his end is something that 
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only the other himself can do, and concludes directly from this that no one else can do it.  
That is, it would seem that the argument either relies, here, upon a gross equivocation, 
maintaining that only the other can make his perfection his end, that is, his own end, 
because, presumably, only he can make any end his own, and sliding from this claim to 
the claim that no one else can make his perfection his end, that is, their end, since only he 
can do this, or upon a mere assertion, claiming, without support, that only the other can 
make his perfection an end at all, and concluding from this unsupported claim what is 
already contained within it: that no one else can make this perfection an end of theirs.  
But, perhaps this apparent identification is misleading, and the taking of another's 
perfection as one's end is not meant to be functioning in this way as a middle term in the 
argument.  Perhaps the argument is meant somehow to show more directly that making 
the other's perfection one's end and taking action to promote it as such, in conjunction, is 
'something that only the other himself can do,' and Kant's claim about what the other's 
perfection 'consists' in is meant to be playing a more subtle role in establishing this.  
Perhaps he intends us to take it, here, not that one must do that in which another's 
perfection consists, in order to make this perfection one's end, but, rather, more simply, 
that one must make that in which the other's perfection consists, or at least some aspect or 
component thereof, one's end, and must take action to promote that in which it consists, 
in order to promote it.  And this looks to be a much more plausible claim, and one which 
we can see why Kant might be inclined to presume.  But, have we not just argued above 
that it seems entirely probable that we should be able to do just this, at least in the case of 
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the perfect friend, given Kant's broader account of what constitutes and contributes to our 
own and others' moral perfection, specifically?  For what reason might Kant take it, here, 
then, that only the other could make it his end, and promote it as such, that he should be 
'able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty'? 
 If we are willing to attribute to Kant a mistake, it seems, and a much more 
understandable mistake, in this context, than those which we have discussed above, it 
may be that we can begin to make some better sense of this.  That is, if we recall, here, 
that Kant's overarching aim in this section is to argue that 'one's own happiness and the 
perfection of others' cannot be 'ends that would be in themselves duties,' and that he is 
making this argument about 'another's perfection' only in the service of this broader 
claim, we can imagine that, although he puts this argument forward as though it applies 
in the case of any given other, it may in fact apply only to the case of some indefinite 
other, since this would be all Kant would need in order to support his broader claim.  That 
is, it may be, here, that Kant has in mind the case of another about whose ends we have 
no specific knowledge, and no right to make assumptions; another, therefore to whom we 
have no right to attribute 'perfection' as among those ends which they have adopted as 
their own.  And, if this is the case, then we can begin to see how the argument might be 
intended to go.  Because of the nature of perfection, it seems, and of moral perfection in 
particular, as concerned not only with the ends which one adopts and acts upon, but with 
the reasons or 'incentives' for which one adopts these ends, in the case in which another is 
not themselves in any way committed to cultivating their own perfection, that is, to 
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themselves furthering this end as one of their own, any action I might take which could 
otherwise serve to promote this perfection will be unable to do so.  If we look at the ways 
in which one might be capable of acting to promote the perfection of another, as we have 
discussed and examined them above, we can see that all of these actions depend for their 
effectiveness not directly upon some natural effect of the action, but upon their 
contribution, in some way, to an effort or process which can only be undertaken by the 
choice of the other themselves; all of those factors which might further another's 
perfection, it seems, depend crucially, for this effect, upon some 'inner action in the 
human mind,' which only they themselves can choose to take.  This would seem to 
suggest that not only those actions which constitute the other's perfection itself, but even 
those actions which constitute its cultivation, may be ones which only the other 
themselves can take, and which we, as their friends, can only enable or facilitate.   
 And all of this looks very much, in the relevant ways, like our example of your 
playing the piano, above, in which, although I may well be able to take actions to 
promote such piano-playing on your part, without myself being capable of doing that in 
which the piano-playing consists, because this piano-playing can only be realized by your 
own action, I can do so only by facilitating in various ways this action on your part, or 
working to provide you with enabling conditions for so acting.  And, in which, it seems, 
as a consequence of this, that should you turn out not to have such piano-playing as an 
end, or at least an aim,  of yours, none of those actions I might take to promote your 410
 If only, perhaps, as a means.410
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piano-playing in the case where you did have this end or aim will be actions which 
promote your piano-playing at all.  It seems plausible to say, that is, that no matter how 
many pianos I might provide you with, or how many lessons in reading sheet-music, in 
the case in which you in no way mean ever to play the piano I have in no way promoted 
your doing so by doing these things.   And, likewise, it would seem, in the case of those 411
actions I might take to promote your perfection.  No matter how much earnest discussion 
of the meaning of your actions for your character I might attempt to engage you in, for 
example, it would seem that, in the case in which you in no way mean to reflect honestly 
on the moral significance of your own motives and dispositions, I will in no way have 
promoted your self-knowledge, in the relevant sense, by so doing.  At this point, however, 
we can see an important disanalogy emerge between the piano-playing case and the case 
of another's perfection.  In the ordinary sort of case, like your playing the piano, in which 
your reasons or 'incentive' for acting, or adopting an end or an aim as your own, are 
irrelevant, there is an immediately obvious way in which I can still take some action to 
promote your doing so, even in the case where you lack the relevant end or aim, that is, 
by providing you with an incentive, or in some other way convincing you, to act or to aim 
in this way.   In the case of promoting your perfection, however, this further course of 412
 As many a disappointed grandparent has discovered.411
 And indeed, in the piano-playing case, we might be inclined to say that I do still promote your piano-412
playing, to some extent, by providing you with access to a piano, etc., even in the case where you do not in 
any way mean, antecedently, ever to play, insofar as by doing so I exert social pressure on you to adopt this 
aim, which you did not previously have, in order to please me or to better conform to the expectations of 
your social position, etc.
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action would not seem to be available, or, at least, would not seem to be available in quite 
the same way. 
 In the case of those actions you can take to 'cultivate' your own perfection, it 
seems, whether natural or moral,  and which I as your friend, we have argued above, 413
may be able to facilitate in various ways, undertaking these actions, or similar ones, for 
reasons unconnected to their contribution to your own perfection will not serve to 
'cultivate' your perfection in this way, and may even serve to undermine your progress in 
this respect, to the extent that this constitutes doing your duty from another incentive than 
duty itself.  It would not seem, then, that I can promote your perfection by providing you 
with other incentives to undertake such actions, or convincing you to do so in some other 
way, independent of the end of your own perfection, since your doing so would not then 
serve to promote this end.  But, what of the case of this end itself, the end of your own 
perfection?  Could I not still act to promote your perfection, if in no other way, at least by 
acting to promote your adopting this end as your own, in the case in which you had not 
yet done so?  I could not, of course, do this by providing you with an alternative incentive 
for doing so, since any reason for which you might adopt this end, other than that it is 
your duty to do so, would be self-undermining.  It seems that I could very well, however, 
promote your adopting this end in one obvious way: by providing you with a rational 
argument showing that it is your duty to make your perfection your end, and thereby 
persuading you to do so.  And indeed, it seems that Kant is attempting to do just this with 
 Though it seems clear from Kant's characterization of 'perfection' here that it is 'moral' perfection he 413
primarily has in mind.
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many of his arguments here in the Doctrine of Virtue.   How, then, if there is a way of 414
promoting your adoption of your own perfection as your end in the case where you have 
not yet done so, and your doing so is clearly a prerequisite for any further progress you 
might make towards this end, could Kant maintain, consistently, that it is impossible, in 
such a case, for me to take action to promote your perfection?  415
 Here, it seems, the question becomes somewhat sticky, and our answer perhaps 
becomes more speculative than we might have hoped, but, there does, at least, seem to be 
an answer available.  And this has to do with the sort of persuasion that one must be 
employing, it seems, in order to convince someone to adopt an end by showing them that 
it is their duty to do so in this way.  Such a choice, it seems, must be free, on Kant's view, 
not only in the negative sense of being undetermined by sensible impulses,  but in the 416
positive sense of being determined "independently of any empirical conditions"  417
through "a causality of pure reason."   One must be caused to make this choice, that is, 418
not only independently of any sensible inclinations, it seems, but independently of all 
sensible conditions entirely, exclusively through the operation of one's own reason, or 
 Moreover, a significant portion of the Methods of Ethics would seem to be devoted to outlining an 414
effective way of providing such persuasion to one's students, an effort that would surely be pointless if it 
were impossible to do so.
 One might, I suppose, simply claim here that Kant does not take the provision of a prerequisite for the 415
pursuit of some end to constitute a promotion of that end, but, without further reason to suppose this, it 
would seem somewhat facile, especially since he does seem to take various kinds of actions enabling or 
facilitating the pursuit of an end in other ways to count as instances of 'promoting' that end.
 On these 'negative' and 'positive' concepts of freedom, see Metaphysics of Morals, p. 13, 6:213-4. 416
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will  in its legislative role as "practical reason itself."   When one engages in 419 420
exclusively moral persuasion, then, that is, in persuasion which is effective upon the 
person so persuaded only by way of convincing them that it is in fact their duty to do that 
to which they are thereby persuaded, without appeal to any incentive other than this, 
one's role is not that of contributing causally to that which they are thereby persuaded to 
do.  Rather, it seems, one is providing their practical reason, by way of one's argument, 
with an opportunity to grasp the independently apparent moral necessity of this action, 
and, thereby, should this succeed, providing their choice,  or will in its executive role, 421
with the opportunity to act as this moral necessity demands.  If this is the case, though, 
then it would seem that one's role in such a case, as in those above, is again one only of 
enabling or facilitating the action of the person so persuaded, rather than being a causal 
one.   
 And, if this is the case, then we would seem to face something of a puzzle with 
respect to our seemingly plausible contention above, that when one acts in this way to 
enable or facilitate the action of another, one's action can be said to 'promote' that action 
on their part, and its corresponding end or aim, only to the extent that they do themselves 
in some way mean to attempt or undertake that action, or pursue that end or aim.  The 
immediately relevant action on the other's part, here, would seem to be the 'inner action' 
of making their own perfection their end, of taking up or committing to this perfection as 
 Wille419
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an end of theirs.  Only by promoting this action on their part, it would seem, can I 
promote the other's perfection in such a case.  But, by hypothesis, this is not an action 
which they in any way antecedently mean, at least consciously or explicitly, to undertake.  
They are convinced to undertake the action, in this case, only to the extent that they come 
to realize, as they had not before, that it is either an instance of or implied by a type of 
action, or an end, to which they were already, to at least some extent, committed: a case 
of doing their duty.  It would seem, however, that if Kant is to take it, as we have argued 
above that he clearly does, that many of us frequently fail to have those ends which it is 
our duty to have, despite, in at least many, if not all cases, having it among our ends to do 
our duty,  then the mere fact of our having an end which, properly understood, would 422
imply our having another end or aim as well, cannot be enough to make it the case that 
we can also be said, in the relevant sense, to have that second end or aim.  When I set out 
to provide another with a rational argument for making their own perfection their end, 
then, it seems that I may very well mean, in doing so, to promote their perfection by so 
doing.  But, insofar as they do not yet, themselves, have the promotion of their own 
perfection in any way among their own ends or aims, to the extent that I am, by so doing, 
enabling an action of theirs which they antecedently meant in some way to attempt or 
undertake, that action is one of doing their duty, not of promoting their perfection.  
 Although Kant has argued that we are all, inevitably, by our nature as human beings, moved or 422
motivated by the thought of duty, or the law, it does not seem that we should infer, from this, that we all 
have it among our ends that we should do our duty.  Rather, since he has argued that something can only be 
an end of ours if we have freely chosen to make it one, it seems that, in order for it to be our end that we 
should do our duty we must in some way freely choose that this should be the case, and so, that this will 
involve, at the very least, some sort of endorsement, on our part, of our pre-existing moral tendencies.
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 What action, then, should we say that it is I have taken, in enabling or facilitating 
this action on their part?  Depending upon our own intuitions here,  we may wish, 423
already, to say that my action here is not yet to be seen as one of promoting the other's 
perfection, although it may well be my 'wish' or hope to do so, thereby.  Rather, we may 
wish to say, whatever the outcome, that because the action which the other takes in the 
case of my success is one to which they are moved by conceiving of it as a service to or 
instance of their end or aim of doing their duty, and not as an action which furthers their 
perfection (although it does do this), my action of enabling or facilitating this action on 
their part is an action of promoting their doing their duty, but not, yet, of promoting their 
perfection.  That is, we may wish to say that, because my action here can be only 
enabling or facilitating of theirs, rather than causally operative, and is therefore best 
described in terms of the action on their part which it enables or facilitates, and the nature 
of their action is most appropriately characterized in terms of their ends and incentives in 
so acting, rather than by mine, their having their own perfection among their ends or aims 
is indeed a prerequisite for any ability on my part to promote that perfection by my 
action.  What I am able to do, then, in the case where they do not yet themselves have 
their own perfection among their chosen ends or aims, is only to take an action which 
may help to put into place a prerequisite for my taking actions to promote their perfection 
in the future, not one which can be said, directly, to be one of promoting their perfection, 
yet.  And this is not just because 'only the other himself' can set his own ends, but also 
 Though many, of course, will not share such intuitions, and to them I may need to offer a different 423
explanation, to make my case seem plausible.
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because, in this case, the choice on his part to take up the end must be made irrespective 
of any incentive other than duty itself if it is not to be self-undermining, and it is therefore 
impossible, in principle, for anyone to move him to do so in any causal way.   
 Since it is impossible, in principle, then, for me to promote the perfection of 
another unless they themselves have taken up this end, and not all people will have taken 
up this end, I can not have a duty to promote the perfection of others, in general, as I do 
to promote their happiness.  Since such a duty would require us to do the impossible, in 
principle, in the case of many others, and many of us will be in no position to know, with 
respect to any of the others with whom we may interact, whether they are among these 
others or not, many of us will never be in a position to know whether it is possible for us 
to act in this way.  If, as seems plausible, then, we cannot have a duty to act in a way 
which we cannot know to be possible for us, then many of us cannot have such a duty.  
And if many of us cannot have such a duty, then it cannot be a duty which all human 
beings, as moral beings, have.  And, if this is so, then the perfection of others cannot be 
an end which is also a duty.  In order to promote the perfection of another in the case 
where they have not yet taken up their own perfection as one of their ends, to put the 
point above in another way, I would have to be able to causally contribute to their taking 
up an end simply because it was their duty to do so, and this is something that can only be 
done by their own practical reason.  It cannot be my duty to promote another's perfection 
in such a case, then, even if I may have their perfection as an end of mine, in the weak 
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sense of a 'mere wish,' because 'it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my 
duty to do) something that only the other himself can do.'   
XV. 'Moral' Friendship 
 Where, then, if this is enough, for now, to satisfy our worry about the possibility 
of a duty to another's perfection, does this leave us?  Where has all of this led, with 
respect to our picture of Kant's account of friendship, overall?  If it is plausible, as we 
have argued, that the 'perfect' friends do have a duty to promote one another's moral 
perfection, as a part of their friendship, to the extent that each of the friends has their own 
moral perfection among their own ends, and that this is a 'duty of love,' insofar as the 
friends are obligated in this way in virtue of their 'pragmatic' commitment to one 
another's happiness or well-being, and so, to one another's ends, but one which is made 
possible for them by the insight into one another's ends and deliberative processes 
provided through the total trust and confidence they share as 'moral' friends, then it 
follows that Kant's 'perfect' friendship will be one which shares the features of both his 
'pragmatic' and his 'moral' friendships.  And, if this is the case, then it cannot be that his 
'moral' friendship is called 'moral' because it is the closest we can ever come, in practice, 
to the 'perfect' friendship after which he has argued that we have a duty to strive.  Rather, 
it will be the case that any, even perfectly realized, 'merely moral' friendship could still, 
in practice, and not just in principle, come closer to the ideal of Kant's 'perfect' friendship 
through the introduction of 'pragmatic' concern by the friends for one another's well-
being or happiness.  Why, then, we might ask again, as we did initially, does Kant choose 
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to call this sort of friendship a 'moral' one?  The simplest and most straightforward 
answer to this that emerges from what we have said may be that which began to take 
shape in our discussion of the shared features of 'pragmatic' and 'perfect' friendship 
above, that is, that both of these friendships, already just in virtue of their shared element 
of concern by the friends for one another's well-being or happiness, even without the 
further reasons for which this may also be the case in 'perfect' friendship, are of a type 
which is 'an ideal of one's wishes, which knows no bounds in its rational concept but 
which must always be very limited in experience.'  That is, quite plausibly, as we have 
argued, although there may be many friendships which in practice do come closer to the 
ideal of Kant's 'perfect' friendship than a 'merely moral' friendship does, none of these 
friendships will be of a type which is itself in practice perfectible.  Insofar as this type of 
friendship is the closest one can come to that 'perfect' friendship after which we have a 
duty to strive, then, which admits of 'a precisely determinant maxim' to assure us of what 
it is that we must do, it makes a kind of sense to call this sort of friendship 'moral.'  
Though it is not the type of friendship which comes closest in practice to perfection, it is 
the type of friendship which comes closest to this ideal while itself also remaining 
perfectible, the type of friendship which comes closest in practice to 'perfect' friendship, 
that is, while remaining of a type which can itself still be 'perfectly' achieved. 
 But, there is, I think, a more interesting answer to this which emerges from the 
rest of our discussion above, and one which begins to answer the larger question of why 
Kant would think to conclude the entirely of his Elements of Ethics with these odd and 
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seemingly tangential little sections on friendship.  Recall that these sections are titled "On 
the Most Intimate Union of Love with Respect in Friendship,"  and this seems, at first, 424
obviously to refer to the balance of 'love' and 'respect' within 'perfect' friendship, as Kant 
has initially discussed it.  But, given all that we have said, we can see an additional 
dimension of this emerge in the way that he has structured the section.  Recall, for a 
moment, the passage we have mentioned in passing above, in which Kant discusses the 
division of the duties of virtue to oneself into those which one owes to oneself 'both as an 
animal (natural) and a moral being' and those which one owes to oneself 'as a moral 
being only (without taking his animality into consideration).'  Though this is the primary 
'subjective' division by which he orders his discussion of the duties of virtue to oneself, 
that between those duties which we owe to ourselves considered only insofar as we are 
'moral' beings and those duties which we owe to ourselves considered also in our 'animal' 
nature, he does not appear to deploy it again in his division of the duties of virtue to 
others.  Where in discussion of our duties to ourselves he gives us chapters on "A Human 
Being's Duty to Himself as an Animal Being"  and "A Human Being's Duty to Himself 425
Merely as a Moral Being,"  in his discussion of our duties to others he gives us, instead, 426
a unified chapter "On Duties to Others Merely as Human Beings"  on the whole.   The 427 428
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 215, 6:469.424
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 As opposed, that is, to our duties towards them not just as fellow human beings, but also "With Regard 428
to Their Condition" (Metaphysics of Morals, p. 214, 6:468).
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main sections sub-dividing this chapter, moreover, do not seem to track this previous 
division of respects in which a human being might be considered as the one to whom 
duties are owed.  Rather, we are given the familiar division, here, into a section "On the 
Duty of Love to Other Human Beings"  and a section "On Duties of Virtue towards 429
Other Human Beings Arising from the Respect Due Them."   If we recall a bit more 430
closely how this division between the duties of love and the duties of respect to others has 
been drawn, however, we can see that there is a parallel between this way of dividing our 
duties to others and the way in which Kant has divided our duties to ourselves.   
 Although the 'feelings' of 'love' and 'respect' do, Kant argues, "accompany the 
carrying out of these duties,"  the duties of 'love' and 'respect' are not, at least directly, 431
on his view, duties to 'love' and 'respect,' in the sense of these 'feelings.'  Rather, he 
maintains, they must be duties to adopt certain maxims with respect to other human 
beings, which maxims he refers to, respectively,  as 'benevolence (practical love)' and 432
'respect in the practical sense.'  "In this context... love is not to be understood as 
feeling..."  he tells us, 433
 It must rather be thought as the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results in   
 beneficence. The  same holds true of the respect to be shown to others. It is not to be understood  
 as the mere feeling that comes from comparing our own worth with another's (such as a child feels 
 merely from habit toward his parents, a pupil toward his teacher...). It is rather to be understood as  
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 198, 6:448.429
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 the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person, and so as  
 respect in the practical sense (observantia aliis praestanda).  434
And our duties to these maxims of 'practical love' and 'respect in the practical sense' 
towards others are ones which he argues that we have, at least in part, by appealing to the 
similar maxims which he takes it that we either do, unavoidably, have or should, by duty, 
have with respect to ourselves.  In the case of our duty of 'practical love,  he argues that  435
 [t]he reason that it is a duty to be beneficent is this: since our self-love cannot be separated from  
 our need to be loved (helped in case of need) by others as well, we therefore make ourselves an  
 end for others; and the only way this maxim can be binding is through its qualification as a  
 universal law, hence through our will to make others our ends as well.  The happiness of others is  
 therefore an end that is also a duty.  436
That is, it seems, Kant takes it that, regardless of whether we have any 'feeling' of love 
for ourselves or not, we do, unavoidably, by our nature as the sort of beings we are, take 
an interest in our own well-being and chosen ends.  It is markedly impossible, in fact, for 
us not to take an interest in our own ends, whatever these may be, since this is simply part 
of what it means to have an end.  And to the extent that we are also, by our nature, 
unavoidably vulnerable and, to at least some extent, social, creatures, we will, he seems 
to think, unavoidably find ourselves in circumstances where our ends or well-being 
cannot be secured without the help of others.  To the extent that, in willing the ends, then, 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 199, 6:449.434
 Though here he is, strictly speaking, discussing beneficence, which he elsewhere seems to take to be 435
downstream of benevolence, in the application of the maxim to action.  What he has to say about the 
relationship between these two in The Metaphysics of Morals is complicated, sometimes appearing 
contradictory, and deserves further attention.  For present purposes, however, it seems reasonable to take 
the argument he gives here to be meant to support, at least broadly, our duty of benevolence as 'practical 
love' as well.
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 155-6, 6:393.   436
 Compare this with the argument given on p. 200, 6:450-1, part of which is excerpted below, in 
which it is simply asserted that "I want everyone else to be benevolent toward me," and the question of why 
I want this, or why such a 'want' should ground a duty, is suppressed.
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as we unavoidably do, we must also will the necessary means, he seems to think, we must 
also, just as unavoidably, will that others should help us under such circumstances.   437
And we are permitted to will this, he seems to take it, only if we will it universally, that 
is, if we will not only that others should help us in the case of such need, but that all 
human beings should help any others in the case of such need, and so, that we, too, 
should help any other human being in the case of such need on their part.  As he puts it 
later on, in giving another version of this argument in his section "On the Duty of Love in 
Particular:"    438
 lawgiving reason, which includes the whole species (and so myself as well) in its idea of   
 humanity as such, includes me as giving universal law along with all others in the duty of mutual  
 benevolence, in accordance with the principle of equality, and permits you to be benevolent to  
 yourself on the condition of your being benevolent to every other as well; for it is only in this way  
 that your maxim (of beneficence) qualifies for a giving of universal law....    439
Whatever we might think of this argument itself, then, it is one to which Kant centrally 
appeals in his attempts to establish the happiness of others as an end that is also a duty, 
that is, our 'duty of love.'  And in doing so, it seems, he makes two things clear which are 
particularly relevant to our current concern: firstly, that our duty of love to others is in 
some sense a consequence of the unavoidability of our self-love, where the 'love,' in both 
cases, is his 'practical love,' that is, a 'love' which we might reasonably gloss, for present 
purposes, as something more like 'interest,'  and so, that our duty to take an interest in 440
 Though, it seems that this 'will' can be only a 'wish' in most cases.437
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deploys it, and this deserves further exploration.
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the well-being or ends of others, by this argument, is a consequence of the unavoidability 
of our taking an interest in our own well-being or ends.  And, secondly, that this 
connection, between the unavoidability of our having a maxim of such interest in our 
own well-being or ends, and our duty to take up a maxim of interest in the well-being or 
ends of others, is one which he seems to take to hold only because we are considering 
ourselves, here, 'both as an animal (natural) and a moral being,' that is, that the link 
between the fact of our first maxim and our duty to the second relies upon an 
understanding of our own (and others') animal nature and vulnerability to need.  Because 
our maxim of self-love, however, is an unavoidable one, there is no direct analogy here 
between our duty to others and our duty to ourselves.  As Kant makes explicit in giving 
the second version of this argument we mentioned above, "[t]his does not mean that I am 
thereby under obligation to love myself (for this happens unavoidably, apart from any 
command, so there is no obligation to it)."   441
 In the case of 'respect in the practical sense,' on the other hand, the parallel 
between our duty to ourselves and our duty to others is more direct.  In this case, it 
seems, we have a duty to take up the maxim of respect for others for just the same reason 
that we have such a duty with respect to ourselves.  In both cases, that is, the duty of 
'respect in the practical sense' for others and the duty of 'self-esteem' for ourselves, Kant 
argues that the relevant maxim is required of us as a recognition of the 'dignity' possessed 
by all human beings as moral beings, endowed, as such, with freedom and, thus, 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 200, 6:451.441
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'personality,' and a "worth that has no price."   In the case of our duty of respect for 442
others he argues, explicitly, not just that this is a reciprocal duty, owed equally by all 
human beings to one another, but, also, that it corresponds directly in our relations with 
others to our duty of self-esteem in relation to ourselves:   
 Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn  
 bound to respect every other.  Humanity itself is a dignity, for a human being cannot be used  
 merely as a means by any human being, (either by others or even by himself) but must always be  
 used at the same time as an end. ... But just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this  
 would conflict with his duty of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary 
 self-esteem of others, as human beings, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a  
 practical way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being.  443
And though Kant does, as we have seen, at times use 'humanity' somewhat ambiguously, 
to refer not just to our nature as moral beings, in contrast to our 'animality,' but also, it 
seems, to our entire nature, as animal beings who are also moral ones, that he means it 
here to refer to our nature as moral beings in particular is clear not just from the 
immediate context, but from what he has to say about our above mentioned duty of 'self-
esteem' elsewhere.  In the section dedicated to "Servility,"  as a vice opposed to this 444
required 'self-esteem' on our part, he directly contrasts the 'dignity' possessed by every 
human being considered as a moral being with our merely relative and pragmatic value as 
a, more or less talented or capable, member of our animal species, and grounds the 
respect due to all human beings soundly in the former.  "In the system of nature," he 
argues, here, "a human being (homo phaenomenon, animal rationale) is a being of slight 
importance and shares with the rest of the animals, as offspring of the earth, an ordinary 
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value...."   Considered as a moral being, however, as a 'person,' subject to rational laws, 445
that is, as Kant goes on to say here, in terms of his 'humanity,' a human being possesses 
'dignity' beyond all 'ordinary value' of the sort which can be possessed by animals or 
'things': 
 [A] human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is  
 exalted above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon), he is not to be valued merely as a  
 means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses  
 a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational  
 beings in the world.  446
And it is in virtue of this dignity, as a moral being, that a human being is not only 
licensed, Kant argues, but required, to demand this respect from others, and even from 
himself, regardless of how little he may sometimes feel that he deserves it: 
 Humanity in his person is the object of the respect which he can demand from every other human  
 being, but which he must also not forfeit.  Hence he can and should value himself by a low as well 
 as by a high standard, depending on whether he views himself as a sensible being (in terms of his  
 animal nature) or as an intelligible being (in terms of his moral predisposition). ... his   
 insignificance as a human animal may not infringe upon his consciousness of his dignity as a  
 rational human being, and he should not disavow the moral self-esteem of such a being,.... this  
 self-esteem is a duty of man to himself.  447
It is a duty to himself, moreover, which Kant has arrayed very clearly, here, under those 
duties which he owes to himself 'merely as a moral being,' or, as he has glossed it a few 
pages earlier, "to himself regarded merely as a moral being (the humanity in his own 
person)."  448
 It seems reasonable to think, then, on the basis of all of this, that Kant's 'duties of 
love' can be safely interpreted as duties which we owe to others, rather than ourselves, 
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considered both as animal and moral beings, while his 'duties of respect' are those which 
we owe to them considered as moral beings only.  Frustratingly, however, Kant is not 
clear, in his sections addressing our duties to ourselves, how this 'subjective' division of 
our duties to ourselves is meant to apply across the 'objective' division of these duties 
which he draws in terms of "what is formal and what is material in duties to oneself."   449
He explicitly applies this division between what we owe to ourselves considered only as 
moral beings and what we owe to ourselves considered both as moral and animal beings 
only to the 'formal' side of this 'objective' division while outlining these divisions in the 
introduction to his discussion of our duties to ourselves,  and does not explicitly 450
mention this 'subjective' division again in the sections discussing those duties which fall 
on the 'material' side.  Given the way that he titles these sections, however, "On a Human 
Being's Duty to Himself to Develop and Increase His Natural Perfection, That Is, for a 
Pragmatic Purpose"  and "On a Human Being's Duty to Himself to Increase His Moral 451
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 174, 6:419.449
 The way that he does this, moreover, in the case of the duties to oneself considered only as a moral 450
being, might seem to suggest that we have such duties only with respect to what is 'formal' in our duties to 
ourselves: "But a human being's duty to himself as a moral being only (without taking his animality into 
consideration) consists in what is formal in the consistency of the maxims of his will with the dignity of 
humanity in his person. It consists, therefore, in a prohibition against depriving himself of the prerogative 
of a moral being, that of acting in accordance with principles, that is, inner freedom, and so making himself 
a plaything of the mere inclinations and hence a thing" (Metaphysics of Morals, p. 175, 6:420). This 
appearance is undercut, somewhat, however, by the fact that he also applies the category of those duties 
which we owe to ourselves considered both as moral and animal beings only to this 'formal' side of his 
'objective' division here, where, if it were the case that all duties to ourselves considered only as moral 
beings were to do with what was 'formal,' rather than 'material,' in our duties to ourselves, we would expect 
that all of our duties to ourselves falling on the 'material' side of this division would be ones which were 
owed to ourselves both as animal and moral beings.  This gives the overall impression that, instead of 
making a claim here, with respect to how this 'subjective' division applies across the 'objective' one, he has 
simply left consideration of how this division applies to our duties to ourselves considered in terms of what 
is 'material' in them out of the discussion.
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 194, 6:444.451
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Perfection, That Is, for a Moral Purpose Only,"  along with everything else that we have  452
seen him say about our duty to our own perfection, it seems most natural, in the absence 
of good reasons to think otherwise, to read our duty to our 'natural perfection' as among 
those duties which we owe to ourselves considered 'both as an animal (natural) and a 
moral being,' and our duty to our 'moral perfection' as among those which we owe to 
ourselves 'as a moral being only.'  And if we are confident enough to put some weight 
upon his use of 'humanity,' here, as referring to our nature as a 'moral' being in contrast to 
an 'animal' one, we might find some further support for this reading, in the case of our 
'moral perfection,' in his description of this duty as a duty 'to oneself regarding the end of 
humanity in our own person,' and, perhaps, "as having to do with one's entire moral 
end."  453
 And if all of this seems plausible to us, as a reading of how Kant sees these 
different duties aligning in terms of what we owe to (and want for) ourselves and others 
considered in these different respects, either as both moral and animal beings, or as moral 
beings only, then this provides us with another plausible answer as to why he might have 
chosen to call his 'moral friendship' 'moral.'  It may be, that is, that if, as we have argued 
above may well be the case, Kant is interested in these two types of friendship, 
'pragmatic' and 'moral,' largely or primarily in terms of their respective contributions 
towards the 'perfect' friendship which he has argued that we have a duty to pursue, he has 
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called this type of friendship a 'moral' one precisely because it is this sort of friendship, 
with the insight it can provide us into one another's deliberative processes and chosen 
ends, which makes it possible, within such a 'perfect' friendship, for us to positively 
benefit our friends considered as 'moral' beings, and to benefit from them, in turn, in this 
same way, by aiding them, as they aid us, in pursuing moral perfection.  And, perhaps, 
also because, insofar as it is this type of friendship which can make it possible for us to 
aid our friends in pursuing their end of moral perfection in this way, it is this type of 
friendship which can make it possible for us to help them in pursuing their own moral 
ends, understood not just as some ends among those which they happen to have chosen, 
but specifically as moral ones.    454
 And, if this is the case, then the initially puzzling introduction of 'pragmatic' 
friendship as the obvious contrast, or, perhaps, complement, to 'merely moral' friendship 
begins to make a somewhat clearer, or at least a different sort of, sense as well, as does 
the otherwise seemingly haphazard structure of the discussion of friendship overall.  We 
have just seen Kant use this same language, of the 'pragmatic' in contrast to the 'moral,' in 
the titles of his sections on our duties to our own 'natural' and 'moral' perfection, 
respectively.  That is, more specifically, we have seen him draw an implicit contrast, 
 I realize I am making some assumptions here which I haven't in fact earned, but the thought is, very 454
roughly, something like this: while we may, in the case of a stranger, help them to achieve some end which 
they happen to have for moral reasons, in doing so we treat this end as we would any other of their 
discretionary chosen ends.  That a given end of theirs is or isn't, in reality, a 'moral' one for them isn't 
relevant to our promotion of that end, or the ways in which we are able to promote it.  In the case of our 
friend, however, in the interest of whose moral perfection we are permitted to act, to the extent that we 
know them to have this moral perfection among their own ends, whether or not some particular end of 
theirs is a 'moral' one is no longer an indifferent matter in our promotion of it.
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there, between 'a pragmatic purpose' and 'a moral purpose only,' where the first, it would 
seem, is a matter of our natural or discretionary chosen ends, while the second is a matter 
of those ends which we have a duty to choose.  Similarly, a 'pragmatic' friendship, taken 
alone, as a friendship which 'burdens itself with the ends of others,' but without the 
additional ability to aid the friend in pursuing the end of his own moral perfection 
provided by the presence of a 'moral' friendship as well,  will be one in which the 455
friends take up one another's natural or discretionary chosen ends  as their own, and 456
benefit each other, or each other's happiness, in respect of these ends, and, to that extent, 
considered both as animal (natural) and moral beings.   
Conclusion: Friendship and Virtue 
 And if all of this is right, or at least convincingly plausible, then it seems as 
though we have arrived at an answer as to why Kant might have chosen these sections 
'On the Most Intimate Union of Love with Respect in Friendship' as the conclusion of the 
entirety of his Elements of Ethics.  The purpose of the Elements of Ethics, after all, is to 
lay out the 'elements' of The Doctrine of Virtue,  where Kant is using 'ethics' and 'virtue' 457
largely interchangeably here.  As he tells it, in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue,  
 In ancient times "ethics" signified the doctrine of morals (philosophia moralis) in general which  
 was also called the doctrine of duties.  Later on it seemed better to reserve the name "ethics" for  
 one part of moral philosophy, namely for the doctrine of those duties that do not come under  
 Or, that is, a sufficiently well-realized one, since not every friendship of the 'moral' type will come close 455
enough to the perfect case of this type to provide us with this benefit.
 Or, at least, chosen ends treated as discretionary, without regard to whether the friend has chosen these 456
ends because it is their duty to do so or not; see note 454 above.
 That is, it seems, the content of this doctrine, rather than the pragmatics of learning and implementing it, 457
as in the Methods of Ethics.
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 external laws (it was thought appropriate to call this, in German, the doctrine of virtue).    
 Accordingly, the system of the doctrine of duties in general is now divided into the system of the  
 doctrine of right (ius), which deals with the duties that can be given by external laws, and the  
 system of the doctrine of virtue (ethica), which treats of duties that cannot be so given; and this  
 division may stand.  458
The picture is, of course, as always, somewhat more complicated than this.  Because it is 
not possible to give an external law for the internal determination of the will, Kant 
argues, but only for external actions, that we should do that which is our duty from duty is 
a command that can belong only to ethics.  Thus "ethical lawgiving, while it also makes 
internal actions duties, does not exclude external actions but applies to everything that is 
a duty in general"  and "[i]t can be seen from this that all duties, just because they are 459
duties, belong to ethics."   Similarly, "[s]ince the moral capacity to constrain oneself 460
can be called virtue, action springing from such a disposition (respect for the law) can be 
called virtuous (ethical) action, even though the law lays down a duty of right,"  and 461
The Doctrine of Virtue does, to some extent, particularly in the introduction, discuss 
virtue in this broader sense.  But, Kant argues, "respect for law as such does not yet 
establish an end as a duty, and only such an end is a duty of virtue."   Although, that is, 462
it seems, all duties, including duties of right, are duties to which we are, to the extent that 
they are duties, ethically bound, and so when we fulfill them because it is our duty to do 
so we are acting virtuously, only those duties which concern an end which it is a duty to 
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have will be duties of virtue.  And this, he seems to take it, is another way of 
understanding why it is that no external lawgiving will be possible for duties of virtue: 
"[d]uties of virtue cannot be subject to external lawgiving simply because they have to do 
with an end which (or the having of which) is also a duty,"  and "no external lawgiving 463
can bring about someone's setting an end for himself...."   So, he argues "what it is 464
virtuous to do is not necessarily a duty of virtue.  What it is virtuous to do may concern 
only what is formal in maxims of actions, whereas a duty of virtue has to do with their 
matter, that is to say, with an end that is thought as also a duty."   So, he argues, "there 465
is only one obligation of virtue, whereas there are many duties of virtue; for there are 
indeed many objects that it is also our duty to have as ends, but there is only one virtuous 
disposition,"  and "[h]ence all the divisions of ethics will have to do only with duties of 466
virtue."   The Elements of Ethics, then, it seems that we should take it, is meant to be 467
devoted specifically to the duties of virtue in this narrower sense: those duties involving 
'an end which (or the having of which) is also a duty.' 
 And, we have already seen Kant say, prominently, that there are two such ends: 
'one's own perfection and the happiness of others.'  But, his claim above, echoed also 
elsewhere, that 'there are indeed many objects that it is also our duty to have as ends,' 
combined with his apparent suggestion that it is their characteristic ends which 
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individuate virtues,  of which there are, presumably, more than two,  would seem to 468 469
suggest that the ends which it is our duty to have might be enumerated differently at 
different levels of description.  And in at least two places in The Doctrine of Virtue he 
offers us a tantalizing suggestion that, at a certain level of description, at least, there may 
be only one:  
 The supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it  
 can be a universal law for everyone to have. – In accordance with this principle a human being is  
 an end for himself as well as for others, and it is not enough that he is not authorized to use either  
 himself or others merely as means (since he could then still be indifferent to them); it is in itself  
 his duty to make man as such his end.  470
Or, as he puts it in discussing the "Division of the Doctrine of Virtue,"  we must  471
 ...in terms of what is material, present the doctrine of virtue not merely as a doctrine of duties  
 generally but also as a doctrine of ends, so that a human being is under obligation to regard  
 himself, as well as every other human being, as his end.    472
These passages seem to suggest, then, that the 'matter' of duty, the 'ends' with which the 
duties of virtue, and so 'all the divisions of ethics' will have to do, is ultimately only one 
thing, variously understood, that is, human beings, whether ourselves or others.   And, 473
if we read the Elements of Ethics in this way, then many things begin to slot into place.  
If we recall Kant's discussion of our maxim of 'self-love' and duty to the happiness of 
 This suggestion is perhaps more clear elsewhere than it is in the passage above, as when he claims that 468
"[t]o think of several virtues (as one unavoidably does) is nothing other than to think of the various moral 
objects to which the will is led by the one principle of virtue, and so too with regard to the contrary 
vices" (Metaphysics of Morals, p.165, 6:406).
 As we have seen him say above, 'a multitude.'469
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 Although he does also argue that "[t]he highest unconditional end of pure practical reason (which is still 473
a duty) consists in this: that virtue be its own end and, despite the benefits it confers on human beings, also 
its own reward" (Metaphysics of Morals, p. 158, 6:396).  And, as is the case in general with regard to the 
various ways he describes the ends which it is our duty to have, at no point does it become fully clear how 
he sees all of these various descriptions fitting together.
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others, above, we can see that he seems to argue there as though making someone's 
happiness one's end and making that individual themselves one's end are actions that can 
be mutually inferred from one another.  In wishing that others should help us in the case 
of need, he argues, we thereby wish to 'make ourselves an end for others,' and when it 
follows from this that we are obligated 'to make others our ends as well,' he takes this to 
imply that 'the happiness of others is therefore an end that is also a duty.'  Likewise, as is 
more expected, his language surrounding our duty of 'respect' for others, and 'self-esteem' 
for ourselves, repeatedly invokes our duty to treat 'humanity itself,' in the person of every 
'human being,' ourselves or others, 'always... as an end.'   It is not immediately clear, 
however, how the sense in which we could make human beings, either ourselves or 
others, our 'ends' could be compatible with the sense of an 'end' in which this is 'an object 
of free choice,' much less, as he puts it elsewhere, "an object of the choice (of a rational 
being) through the representation of which choice is determined to an action to .. this 
object about."    474
 If we look somewhat more carefully at what he has to say about such ends, 
however, we can see that he does not actually seem to intend to restrict this sense of 'end' 
nearly so narrowly.  As he argues in discussing "the Principle on Which the Division of 
Duties to Oneself Is Based"  these duties will comprise both negative and positive ones, 475
where the "[n]egative duties forbid a human being to act contrary to the end of his nature, 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 146, 6:381.474
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 174, 6:418.475
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and so have to do merely with his moral self-preservation..."  while the "positive duties, 476
which command him to make a certain object of choice his end, concern his perfecting of 
himself."   Both of these types of duties, however, must be to do with ends which it is a 477
duty to take up or have, and so, with ends which are chosen, or, in his language, the 
objects of choice, since he emphasizes that "[b]oth of them belong to virtue, either as 
duties of omission (sustine et abstine) or as duties of commission (viribus concessis 
utere), but both belong to it as duties of virtue,"  that is, as he has repeatedly made 478
clear, as duties which 'have to do with an end which (or the having of which) is also a 
duty.'  The distinction here, then, it seems we can take it, is not between duties which do 
and do not have to do with an end which it is our duty to have but, rather, between duties 
which involve the initial act of adopting the required end, subsequent actions to 'bring 
this object about,' or, it seems, perhaps, to actively sustain or maintain it, and duties 
which, instead, involve only the preservation of the object which is such an end of ours, 
to whatever extent it may already have been brought about (whether through our own 
agency or not), through abstention from those actions that would be destructive to it or 
contrary to its promotion on our part, or the avoidance of acts on our part which might 
militate against its being brought about in cases where this has not yet happened at all.  It 
will not be the case, then, that such an 'object of the choice' must be one which we can act 
to 'bring... about,' strictly speaking.  It seems, rather, that the crucial feature being 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 174, 6:419.476
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 174, 6:419.477
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 174, 6:419.478
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emphasized is that our 'representation' of such an end must be one which is, at least 
potentially, action guiding for us, not that the relevant action must be of any particular 
sort.  And, if we are to take his talk of the maxims of 'love' and 'respect' as ones which 
reflect our adoption of other human beings as our ends at face value, it seems he has 
offered us many examples of how he takes this end to be one which can be action 
guiding, if not, perhaps, clarification as to the details of how he understands this process.   
 We can see a suggestion, however, in his discussion of our duties to our own 
perfection, both natural and moral, that he is understanding our making ourselves our end 
in a way that is at least loosely teleological: what it is for us to make ourselves our end, it 
seems, is for us to make it our end that we should realize, to the extent that we are 
capable, the ideal or perfection of our own nature as human beings.  And if this is so, it 
seems, then it would explain his tendency to shift, rather haphazardly, between speaking 
of the relevant required end of duty as being that of 'human beings' and as being, instead, 
that of 'humanity.'  As he argues in discussing our duty to our own 'natural perfection,' 
 A human being has a duty to himself to cultivate his natural powers (powers of spirit, mind, and  
 body), as means to all sorts of possible ends. – He owes it to himself (as a rational being) not to  
 leave idle and, as it were, rusting away the natural predispositions and capacities that his reason  
 can someday use. ... as a being capable of ends (of making objects his ends) he must owe the use  
 of his powers not merely to natural instinct but rather to the freedom by which he determines their  
 scope. Hence the basis on which he should develop his capacities (for all sorts of ends) is not  
 regard for the advantages that their cultivation can provide;.... Instead, it is a command of morally  
 practical reason and a duty of a human being to himself to cultivate his capacities (some among  
 them more than others, insofar as people have different ends), and to be in a pragmatic respect a  
 human being equal to the end of his existence.  479
Or, as he has put the point much more succinctly, though somewhat more confusingly, in 
the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue,  
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 194, 6:444-5.479
!213
 [n]atural perfection is the cultivation of any capacities whatever for furthering ends set forth by  
 reason. ....The capacity to set oneself an end – any end whatsoever – is what characterizes  
 humanity (as distinguished from animality).  Hence there is also bound up with the end of  
 humanity in our own person the rational will, and so the duty, to make ourselves worthy of  
 humanity by culture in general, by procuring or promoting the capacity to realize all sorts of  
 possible ends, so far as this is to be found in a human being himself.  480
Moreover, he has spoken elsewhere of 'happiness,' which we can only hope, for present 
purposes, to be allowed to read as a matter of attaining one's chosen ends, rather than of 
'satisfaction with one's state,' given that we have failed to sufficiently address Kant's 
ambiguity on this point in the present paper, as "what all human beings recognize as their 
natural end."   And this would seem to find a parallel, potentially, in his claim, in 481
discussing our 'moral perfection' that this duty, considered 'objectively,' is a matter of 
"attaining completely one's moral end with regard to oneself."   One might be inclined, 482
then, in light of this, to suggest reading our duty to make 'human beings,' (or, sometimes, 
'humanity') in both ourselves and others our end in the following way: insofar as we 
conceive of human beings as both animal and moral beings, that is, as free or moral 
beings, but, ones whose ends can include both those which it is our duty to have and 
those which we are permitted to choose at our own discretion, on the basis of our natural 
inclinations or animal needs, that is, as agents, but not in our moral capacity specifically, 
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 154, 6:391-2.   480
Though, distressingly, he does seem to suggest in one passage, at least, that 'the capacity to set 
oneself an end' is somehow to be counted among our merely natural or animal capacities, rather than as one 
which we have as a being which is both moral and animal, despite having otherwise consistently treated 
this capacity as one which we possess in virtue of our freedom: "Although a human being has, in his 
understanding, something more than they [the rest of the animals], and can set himself ends, even this gives 
him only an extrinsic value for his usefulness...;... that is to say, it gives one man a higher value than 
another, that is, a price as a commodity in exchange with these animals as things...." (Metaphysics of 
Morals, p. 186, 6:434).
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 154, 6:391.481
 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 196, 6:446.482
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to make either ourselves or others our end is to make it an end of ours to promote the 
'pragmatic' efficacy our own or others' agency.  In our own case, this will mean 
preserving and cultivating our various natural capacities for pursuing and achieving our 
chosen ends, whatever these may be, and, in the case of others, it will mean assisting 
them in pursuing and achieving their own ends, that is, making their ends our own.  
Insofar as we consider human beings exclusively as moral beings, however, that is, as 
beings whose choice is, ideally, entirely free not just in the 'negative' sense of being 
undetermined by sensible impulses, but the 'positive' sense of being fully determined 
exclusively by their own Wille, and, so, by the law,  making human beings our end will 483
mean, to whatever extent this is possible for us, preserving or promoting their ability to 
determine their own choice in this way.  In the case of others in general, then, since we 
are not in a position to positively influence their capacity to self-legislate in this way 
without the very serious risk that our attempts to do so will be self-undermining, and 
impermissible, acting on this end will mean only restricting our own actions so as not to 
interfere with their ability to self-legislate in this way.  It will thus issue in exclusively 
negative duties: Kant's duties of 'respect.'  In our own case, however, promoting this end 
will mean cultivating virtue in ourselves, and our own 'moral perfection.'  And, if what 
we have argued above is correct, in the very special case of a 'moral' friend who is also a 
 Kant discusses these 'negative' and 'positive' concepts of 'freedom,' though somewhat opaquely, in the 483
Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals: "Human choice, however, is a choice that can indeed be affected 
but not determined by impulses and is therefore of itself (apart from an acquired proficiency of reason) not 
pure but can still be determined to actions by pure will. Freedom of choice is this independence from being 
determined by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom. The positive concept of freedom 
is that of the ability of pure reason to be of itself practical" (Metaphysics of Morals, p. 13, 6:213-14).
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'pragmatic' one, to whose ends we have devoted ourselves and to whose own moral 
aspirations and internal deliberations we are uniquely privy, that is, of a 'perfect' friend, to 
whatever extent such a thing is possible in practice, it will also mean helping them to 
cultivate their virtue and 'moral perfection,' to the extent that we can confidently do so in 
their case without thereby compromising their autonomy, that is, it will issue, in their 
very special case, in positive duties of respect. 
 Even without accepting this highly speculative reading, however, it seems that we 
have enough present in the text itself as we have laid it out above to support the view that 
Kant has structured his Elements of Ethics in much the following way: our duties to 
ourselves considered as both animal and moral beings broadly parallel our duties of love 
to others, and our duties to ourselves considered only as moral beings broadly parallel our 
duties of respect to others, such that the first pair represent those duties which are to do 
with making ourselves and others considered as both moral and animal beings our ends, 
and the second pair represent those duties which are to do with making ourselves and 
others considered only as moral beings our ends.   The 'divisions of ethics' in the 484
Elements of Ethics, have to do, then, as Kant has promised, only with 'duties of virtue' in 
the narrow sense, that is, with those duties which 'have to do with an end which... is also 
a duty,' and have been drawn, accordingly, in terms of these ends.  Kant's 'perfect' 
friendship, then, as 'the Most Intimate Union of Love with Respect,' in an 'equal mutual' 
reciprocal relationship, will be a relationship in which each of these ends which it is a 
 In whatever way we wish to interpret what it might mean to make someone our 'end.'484
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duty to have, and according to which the Elements of Ethics as a whole has been divided, 
will be simultaneously united and served.  Moreover, such a friendship will be the only 
context, of which we are aware, at least, in which Kant takes it to be possible for each of 
us to serve each of these ends which it is our duty to have in the full range of ways in 
which they can be served, by allowing us to serve the end of one another's moral well-
being, and so, one another's moral being, not only through omission, but through active, 
positive, aid.  It is not incidental, then, that he has described this sort of friendship as 'the 
union of two persons,' since it is, importantly, in our aspirations as 'persons,' specifically, 
that is, as free, moral beings, that this sort of relationship uniquely allows us to benefit 
each other.  That his odd little discussion of this sort of relationship should be the 
conclusion to his entire Elements of Ethics, then, is not so perplexing after all, since we 
find, in this relationship, the unification of all of these 'elements:' the various 'duties of 
virtue' united in the 'duty of friendship.'  
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